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ABSTRACT 
Jeanine Navarrete: “Cubans Vote Cuban”: Local Politics and Latino Identity in Miami, 
Florida, 1965 – 1985.  
(Under the direction of Zaragosa Vargas) 
 
Miami as a global city in the South provides an important window into 
understanding the intersection of immigration, civil rights, and Latino political identity 
during the demographic and political rise of the Sunbelt in the 1960s and 1970s. Local 
politics in Miami functioned as a microcosm where Latinos vied for power and 
recognition and as the first institutional point of contact for Cubans becoming new 
citizens. Focusing primarily on Cuban and other Latino involvement with local 
government in this critical period, I argue that both as voters and politicians, Cubans in 
Miami articulated a unique construction of American citizenship that accommodated their 
biculturalism.  Emboldened by the Cuban Adjustment Act, which allowed them to 
maintain dual citizenship, Miami Cubans not only demanded language accommodations 
in county services, but expected local political candidates to be well versed in foreign 
affairs and sensitive to the geopolitics of the Caribbean.  Far from the inevitability of 
demographic change, this dissertation argues that in Miami, Latino political power on 
Latino terms evolved through the work of Cuban and Puerto Rican civic leaders, 
progressive diversity policies at the municipal and county level, and widespread voter 
mobilization enabled by the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1975.  Cubans became 
adept at strategic alliance building with white and African American politicians and at 
iv 
successfully lobbying the progressive and internationally oriented county government for 
services catering to immigrants and Spanish-speakers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Where Havana Vanities Come to Dust 
“It galls a Miami resident, particularly the older ones, to see familiar places being 
replaced by Cuban places…God help us when they get a political hold, which I’m sure 
they’re trying to do,” wrote Mrs. Mildred Reynolds to Florida Governor Reubin O.D. 
Askew in 1971.  In her letter, Mrs. Reynolds unwittingly identified a crucial shift in 
political power and ethnic relations underway in South Florida. The everyday lives of 
white Miamians were forever altered as the traditional social order was upended by 
steady arrival of Cubans into Miami. To Mildred Reynolds and others like her, Miami 
appeared no longer recognizable. She was right -- Miami did not look, sound, or smell the 
same as it had ten years before. Condominiums underwritten by Cuban American bankers 
replaced the Mediterranean revival villas along Brickell Avenue. Spanish could be heard 
in executive dining rooms, on golf courses and in classrooms. The aroma of roasted pork 
wafted from Cuban restaurants that lined 8
th
 Street from downtown Miami to Coral 
Gables. Political transformation, on the other hand, happened invisibly--behind the closed 
doors of City Hall on Dinner Key, in the living rooms of a small network of Latino 
professionals and at the meetings of Cuban social clubs.
1
   
                                                 
1
 Mildred Reynolds to Governor Reubin O’D. Askew, Miami, Fl., June 28, 1971, Box 1 – Folder 7, 
Bernardo Benes Papers, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Library and Melanie Shell-Weiss, 
Coming to Miami: A Social History (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), 206; Shell-Weiss 
characterizes Miami as the site of multiple overlapping migratory labor patterns and she examines how 
competing groups of migrants from within the United States and from the Caribbean and Latin America, 
shaped the city’s development. Shell-Weiss’s study often broadly generalizes at the expense of delving into 
the complex political and social relationships between Anglos, Jewish Americans, Cubans, African-
2 
Mildred Reynold’s observation would prove to be uncannily prescient. Forty-five 
years later, Miami is home to the third largest Latino population in the United States. A 
multiethnic and multiracial Board of County Commissioners comprised of eight Latinos, 
two African Americans, a Haitian American, and a Jewish American governs Miami-
Dade County. Ballots, signage, and commission meetings are translated into Spanish and 
Haitian Creole. Far from the inevitability of demographic change, this dissertation argues 
that Latino political power on Latino terms evolved through the work of Cuban and 
Puerto Rican civic leaders, progressive diversity policies at the municipal and county 
level, and widespread voter mobilization enabled by the Voting Rights Act Amendment 
of 1975.  Cubans became adept at strategic alliance building with white and African 
American politicians, such as Democratic Congressmen Dante Fascell and Commissioner 
Reverend Theodore Gibson, and at successfully lobbying the progressive and 
internationally oriented county government for services catering to immigrants and 
Spanish-speakers.  
But how did Latinos in Miami gain political hold of local government? And why 
did Miamians like Mildred Reynolds find this political transformation so frustrating? 
Despite Miami’s contemporary ascendance as the economic and migratory nexus of Latin 
America, the Caribbean and the United States, few historians have studied this 
immigrant-dominated city, and even fewer have examined how Latinos captured electoral 
and political power in South Florida. Historian Nancy Raquel Mirabal has called for a 
reconsideration of Cuban immigration to the United States and an end to the “Miami 
monolith” that privileges post-revolutionary Cuban immigration and the myth of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Americans, Bahamians and others who struggled to build communities and find their niche in the critical 
years of the city’s development.  
3 
Cuban success story over any other account of Cuban presence in the United States. 
However, Mirabal fails to acknowledge that aside from Maria Cristina Garcia’s 
groundbreaking Havana, USA and more recently, N.D.B. Connolly’s A World More 
Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of the Jim Crow South and Chanelle Rose’s The 
Struggle for Black Freedom in Miami, there exist almost no comprehensive historical 
accounts of Miami’s history, and certainly none which take into account its unique 
political structure.
2
  
The historiographies of the Sunbelt and the New South, especially Matthew 
Lassiter’s The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South and Kevin Kruse’s 
White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism have been instrumental to 
my understanding of how Cubans articulated their rights to county services as 
homeowners and taxpayers. The same political discourse about taxpayers and 
homeowner’s rights was integral to the growth of the reactionary English Only 
referendum movement in Miami. Although the issues of desegregation and immigration 
seem superficially divergent, they both became powerful catalysts for grassroots 
organizing intended to resist changes to racial hierarchies and federal intervention in local 
communities. As native Miamians perceived their jobs and neighborhoods as being 
threatened by the federal resettlement of Cubans to South Florida, so did Charlotte 
homeowners in Lassiter’s study feel threatened by state mandates to bus their children to 
urban schools in adherence with federal desegregation. White activists in Charlotte and 
                                                 
2
 Nancy Raquel Mirabal, “Ser De Aqui: Beyond the Cuban Exile Model” (Latino Studies 1.3, November 
2003); Maria Cristina Garcia, Havana, USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-
1994 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); N.D.B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real 
Estate and the Remaking of the Jim Crow South (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Matthew 
Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007); Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: 
Princeton University, 2007).  
 
4 
Atlanta who resisted busing articulated their cause in terms of homeowner’s rights. 
English Only activists in Miami wielded an analogous discourse about the sanctity of 
American culture represented by the English language, and the rights of native-born 
citizens to employment ahead of refugees or immigrants. Ironically, Cuban immigrants in 
Miami often used the same language to describe themselves as taxpayers when lobbying 
the county government for language accommodation and other services.
3
  
My dissertation “Cubans vote Cuban: Latino Identity and Local Politics in Miami, 
Florida, 1965-1985” seeks to reorient the historiography of Cubans in Miami and of 
Miami itself away from the notion that the city Cuban exiles encountered in 1959 was 
somehow a vacuum. To the contrary, the city that Cubans encountered was in the throes 
of major governmental reform, racial strife, political upheaval and booming population 
growth. Miami’s evolving racial, cultural, and political landscape was the foundation for 
Latino political mobilization based on strategic alliance building between Cuban civic 
leaders like Bernardo Benes and white politicians like Democratic Congressman Claude 
Pepper, while the structure and autonomy of the new Metro Dade government provided 
opportunities for minorities to be appointed to office. The rapid demographic change of 
Miami’s population and a renewed interest in white ethnic identity provided a historical 
antecedent for the popularity of the reactionary English Only political movement that 
emerged in 1980.
4
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 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Kevin Kruse’s White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of 
Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
 
4
 However, political scientists and sociologists have done a great deal of work on Miami, especially in 
regards to Cuban political identity, see: Guillermo Grenier and Alex Stepick III eds., Miami now! 
Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1992); Alejandro 
Portes and Alex Stepick III, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994); Louise Lamphere, Alex Stepick and Guillermo Grenier eds., Newcomers in the 
Workplace: Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. Economy (Philaleldphia: Temple University 
5 
American Riviera or Gateway to the Americas? 
Jewish Americans, African Americans, and Puerto Ricans during Miami’s 
population boom after World War II created the precedent for the local treatment of 
Cuban immigrants in the early 1960s. The aforementioned groups, individually or in 
coalitions, began to make inroads in challenging Miami’s Anglo dominated city 
government and the Cold War red baiting of the Florida Legislative Investigative 
Committee at the height of the segregation era in the late 1950s. The unique city-county 
structure of Miami’s metropolitan government adopted in 1957 allowed a robust city 
politics relatively independent from state oversight to emerge. 
Miami had been a hub of migration and tourism between the Caribbean and the 
United States since at least the early twentieth century, but the city was in a state of social 
and economic flux after World War II. During the war years, the U.S. Army used Miami 
Beach as a training center for American troops being deployed to Europe. Miami’s 
insular Southern social structure was slowly pried open by the establishment of wartime 
military installations that ushered in the tourist boom as returning soldiers, war workers, 
and tourists who eventually sought permanent residence in Miami. In the immediate 
postwar period, two minority groups began to migrate in large numbers to the city: 
Jewish Americans and Puerto Ricans. Their experiences in many ways set the stage for 
the city’s handling of the influx of Cuban refugees that began in 1960, when almost 1,700 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 1994); Maria de los Angeles Torres, In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United 
States (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Silvia Pedraza, Political Disaffection in Cuba’s 
Revolution and Exodus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Alejandro Portes, “The Cuban 
American Political Machine: Reflections on its Origins and Perpetuation,” in B. Hoffman and L. Whitehead 
eds., Debating Cuban Exceptionalism (London: Palgrave, 2007), 123-137.     
 
6 
Cuban refugees arrived weekly before the brief halt of commercial flights during the 
Cuban Missile in 1962.
5
  
Like most urban centers in the South, a stalwart Anglo Protestant establishment 
dominated Miami’s civic life. This white political establishment faced the first challenge 
to its authority and its enforcement of white supremacy from the growing Jewish enclave 
on Miami Beach. Like Cubans a decade later, Jews from the northeast and Chicago first 
came to Miami as tourists, reveling in Miami Beach’s cottage industry of hotels and 
restaurants that catered to them. Many sought an escape from the intergenerational 
constraints of northern urban neighborhoods. Lured by balmy weather and economic 
opportunity in Miami’s booming service and tourist economies, Jewish Americans 
migrated to the city in vast numbers. Following a general migration pattern from the old 
industrial North to the emergent Sunbelt, over seventy percent of Jews who left the 
northeast settled in Miami and Miami Beach.
6
   
As the city grew in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Jews settled as permanent 
residents primarily on the island of Miami Beach where they opened business and 
established schools and synagogues. Though the Jewish migrants were predominantly 
middle class and came to Miami with significant financial and occupational resources, 
the emerging community nonetheless faced strong resistance with respect to their 
participation in local politics. Miami was hegemonically Protestant; not even the city’s 
                                                 
5
 Melanie Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami: A Social History, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2009), 143-145. 
 
6
 Considered a foundational text of the contemporary Jewish experience in the United States, Deborah Dash 
Moore’s To the Golden Cities: Pursuing the American Jewish Dream in Miami and L.A. (New York: The 
Free Press, 1994), draws numerous parallels between the Jewish and early Cuban experiences in Miami, 
and argues that Jews created the “template” for ethnic politics in Miami that would later facilitate Cuban 
entrance into local government; Moore, To the Golden Cities, 26. See also: Stephen J. Whitfield “Blood 
and Sand: The Jewish Community of South Florida,” American Jewish History 82, 1994: 73-97. 
 
7 
Catholic population was large enough to claim its own diocese until 1958. Although Jews 
were perceived as white, they faced widespread discrimination that at times was realized 
as violent anti-Semitic intimidation from the Ku Klux Klan and its adjunct the White 
Citizen’s Councils. Bombings and arson to synagogues and religious schools became 
commonplace so as to maintain white political power.
7
   
Miami in its early decades was a seasonal tourist destination with a large 
workforce concentrated in the service sector. After World War II, Miami developed a 
diverse economy, ranging from agriculture to garment manufacturing. Metropolitan 
Miami’s population grew from 495,000 in 1950 to 935,000 by 1965. Non-Latino whites 
comprised the majority of these newcomers; only about five percent of Dade County was 
Latino in 1960. However, between 1945 and 1953 the Puerto Rican community in Miami 
grew rapidly. Much like the reception of initial Cuban immigration, the Miami 
establishment initially welcomed the small number of wealthy Puerto Rican families who 
invested in the area by buying large tracts of farmland and urban rental properties. Then, 
the demography of the Puerto Rican migration shifted with the implementation of 
Operación Manos a la Obra, or Operation Bootstrap, and Puerto Rican men and women 
migrated to the city and provided a steady labor source for the area’s agriculture and the 
city’s burgeoning garment manufacturing industries. As the Puerto Rican community 
became more working class in composition, the discourse reversed. Puerto Ricans 
recruited by the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) and the Textile 
                                                 
7
 U.S. Census Bureau: 2000, Demographic Profile Miami-Dade County, Florida 1960-2000. Interethnic 
tensions, race baiting, anti-Semitism, and corruption in Miami’s city government in the 1950s were well 
documented in the national press, see: Homer A. Jack, “Ice over Miami,” Nation, 19 August 1950, 164-
165; Stetson Kennedy, “Miami: Anteroom to Fascism,” Nation, 22 December 1951, 546-47; Leslie B. 
Bain, “Red Hunt in Miami: Who Formed the Posse?” Nation, 7 August 1954, 110-112; and Nathan 
Perlmutter, “Bombing in Miami: Anti-Semitism and the Segregationists,” Commentary, June 1958, 498-
503. 
 
8 
Workers Union of America (TWUA) for membership were accused of rabble rousing and 
of being involved in subversive communist activity. Puerto Ricans moreover confounded 
Miami’s racial status quo by moving into predominantly black areas of the city, alarming 
white observers who feared the “potentially explosive” effect of this new group in the 
maintenance of segregation by blurring traditional black/white racial distinctions.
8
  
Prior to the Puerto Rican migration, Miami’s racial composition was starkly black 
and white. Although the city had a relatively small African American population 
compared to most Southern cities of comparable size, Miami’s black population grew 
steadily in the post-war years. African Americans from other parts of the South and Afro-
Caribbean migrants from the Bahamas and the West Indies were attracted by jobs in area 
agricultural production, construction, and in the hotel and entertainment industry. 
However, to keep Miami attractive to tourists and investment meant that the city 
government and Chamber of Commerce together did everything in their power to 
maintain segregation and keep the city center reserved for high end service industries 
catering to tourists.
9
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 Melanie Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami: A Social History, 143-145. For additional perspectives on South 
Florida’s labor history, see also: Robert Cassanello and Melanie Shell-Weiss eds., Florida’s Working-class 
Past: Current Perspectives on Labor, Race, and Gender from Spanish Florida to the New Immigration 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009) and Cindy Hahamovitch, No Man’s Land: Jamaican 
Guestworkers and the Global History of Deportable Labor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 
135-172. 
 
9
 For the most comprehensive account of Miami’s African American communities see N.D.B. Connolly, A 
World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2014) and Chanelle N. Rose, The Struggle for Black Freedom in Miami: Civil Rights and 
America’s Tourist Paradise, 1896-1968 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015). On the 
subject of the detrimental relationship of immigration to African Americans and other low-wage earners, 
including immigrant workers already established in the United States, the following works are instrumental 
to understanding how Miami’s native black community dealt with Latino immigration: Stephen Steinberg, 
“Immigration, African Americans, and Race Discourse,” New Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer 2005), 1-
19; Toni Morrison “On the Back of Blacks,” Time, December 2, 1973; Manning Marable, “The Fire This 
Time: The Miami Rebellion 1980,” The Black Scholar, 11 (July/August 1980), 2-18; Jacquelyn Johnson 
Jackson, “Seeking Common Ground for Blacks Immigrants,” in David E. Simcox ed., U.S. Immigration in 
9 
Ambitious urban planning projects operating under the auspices of slum clearance 
kept Miami white. This forced African Americans to the fringes of Miami, outside the 
city limits with few zoning protections, paved roads, or homes with indoor plumbing. The 
largest of these, northwest of the downtown, became known first as “Colored Town” and 
then the “Central Negro District.” As Connolly and other historians have argued, slum 
clearance broke up black neighborhoods and moved black residents further from each 
other. When Puerto Rican farm and garment workers posed the first challenge to the 
city's traditional black/white dichotomy line in the late 1940s, the city government 
responded by segregating Puerto Ricans into the neighborhoods abandoned by African 
Americans forced into the apartheid-like “all-Negro” zones.10  
In many respects, Miami in the 1950s was a Deep South city starkly divided by 
race. In the broader political context of McCarthyism and massive resistance to early civil 
rights legislation, the state government of Florida in 1956 created the Florida Legislative 
Investigative Committee (FLIC). FLIC, or the Johns Committee as it would be commonly 
known after its founder state Senator Charley Eugene Johns, was created to investigate 
potentially subversive groups such as the Florida chapter of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban League for alleged 
criminal activity and political subversion. Over the nine years of its existence, however, 
the investigative reach of FLIC extended beyond its original target. The committee 
investigated “homosexual teachers, indecent literature and pornography, liberal 
                                                                                                                                                 
the 1980’s (Westview Press, 1988), 92-103.; and Lawrence H. Fuchs, “The Reactions of Black Americans 
to Immigration,” in Virginia Yans-McLaughlin ed., Immigration Reconsidered (New York: Oxford, 1990). 
 
10
 Paul S. George, “Colored Town: Miami’s Black Community, 1896-1930,” Florida Historical Quarterly, 
Vol. 58 (1978), 432-447; Connolly, A World More Concrete, 201-204; Raymond A. Mohl, “Trouble in 
Paradise: Race and Housing in Miami during the New Deal,” Prologue: Journal of the National Archives 
19 (spring 1987): 7-22. 
 
10 
professors, and student peace and civil rights groups.” Any challenge to the postwar 
consensus on matters of race, gender, sexuality, and patriarchy were suspect.
 11
  
Despite Dade County’s relative independence from state interference in local 
politics because of the enactment of the 1956 Home Rule Amendment to the state 
constitution, the Johns Committee undertook several investigations in the county with the 
cooperation of local government into the suspected communist activities of a variety of 
organizations, such as the American Jewish Congress, locals of the ILGWU, in addition 
to the Dade County chapters of the NAACP and the Urban League. Unsurprisingly, all of 
these groups had ethnically and racially diverse membership.
12
  
State sponsored investigations were not the only source of anti-communist and 
anti-civil rights activism in South Florida. Referred to jokingly by The Nation as the 
“anteroom to fascism,” Dade County had one of the most active chapters of the John 
Birch Society outside of California. Birchers, as their members were known, believed 
that communism was rampant in the United States and that communist agents had 
manipulated the civil rights movement, infiltrated the National Council of Churches, and 
controlled the United Nations. Local chapters followed the central office’s directives and 
circulated ultra conservative periodicals, held educational seminars, engaged in letter 
writing campaigns and petition drives--all intended to raise awareness of the imminent 
threat of communism in the United States. The Miami chapter of the John Birch Society 
boasted nearly half of the state’s membership and was active well into the mid 1960s.13  
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 Stacey Braukman, Communists and Perverts under the Palms: The Johns Committee in Florida, 1956-
1965 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2012), 3.  
 
12
 Braukman, Communists and Perverts under the Palms, 3-6. 
 
13
 Founded in Belmont, Massachusetts in 1959 by former candy manufacturer Robert A. Welch Jr., the 
John Birch Society was a grassroots anticommunist activist organization. For an examination of the John 
11 
Miami’s unique position as the de facto resort capital of the United States masked 
the more virulently anti-black, anti-Semitic, and anti-Latino policies of the local 
government and racist attitudes of the city’s white residents. City officials had to find 
new ways to uphold Jim Crow while espousing the Southern progressivism that made the 
city appealing to Northerners. As Chanelle Rose has argued, a “more fluid taxonomy of 
race” altered the standard black white color line as Miami’s tourist economy grew to 
encompass not only American visitors, but Spanish speaking tourists from the Caribbean 
and Latin America as well. The preoccupation with maintaining Miami’s “Pan-
American” image meant that local elites were often more receptive to multicultural or 
Latino focused policies, than they were to actual racial integration.
14
 
As noted, Miami had long been a nexus of migration and travel from points north 
and south since it’s founding in 1896, and the city had developed a social and economic 
relationship with the Caribbean--Cuba in particular, beginning in the early twentieth 
century. Cubans had been migrating abroad, particularly to the United States and Europe, 
in large numbers since at least the outbreak of the Ten Years War (1868-1878). By some 
estimates there were nearly 100,000 Cubans living abroad by 1869. The most populous 
and politically active of these communities in the United States were in Key West and 
Tampa, Florida, and to a lesser extent New York City, Philadelphia, and New Orleans. 
The majority of these early Spanish-speaking immigrants from middle and working class 
                                                                                                                                                 
Birch Society’s influence over local politics in Califoria see also: Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The 
Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) and Robert A. Goldberg, 
Grassroots Resistance: Social Movements in Twentieth Century America (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing, 1991), 124-131. 
 
14
 Chanelle Rose, “Tourism and the Hispanicization of Race in Jim Crow Miami, 1945-1965,” Journal of 
Social History 45 No. 3 (Spring 2012): 745-747. 
 
12 
backgrounds came to work in the cigar factories of Florida established by Cuban 
proprietors like Vicente Martínez Ybor avoiding American import tariffs.
15
  
These immigrants thus established the first patterns of migration that linked Cuba 
to the United States. Florida, which offered ease of geographical proximity as well as a 
climate comparable to Cuba, became the nexus of Cuban migration. This trend continued 
unabated.  The cigar-making communities were strongholds for radical political activism, 
and after the failure of the Ten Years War they provided much of the political and 
financial support for Jose Martí’s Cuban Revolutionary Party in the 1890s. These early 
communities set a precedent for Cuban immigrant enclaves with a continued financial 
and political stake in their country of origin, la patria. Even after Cuba achieved 
independence from Spain in 1898, many of the immigrants who had once been eagerly 
waiting to return to the homeland chose to remain in the United States, reluctant to return 
to a country economically devastated by nearly thirty years of continuous armed struggle. 
Migration to Florida did not end with independence, as Cuba’s political system cycled 
through one president after another, members and leaders of ousted regimes would find 
themselves seeking refuge across the Florida Straits.
16  
Miami’s complex relationship with Cuba began around 1920 with the inaugural 
voyage of the first direct cruise service between Havana and Miami by the Havana 
American Steamship Corporation. Miami had long capitalized on its proximity to the 
Caribbean; promoting itself to North American tourists as a subtropical and exotic 
destination with a Latin feel they could visit within American borders. Indeed, as Louis 
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A. Pérez notes: “Miami was transformed by the Cuban presence. From its very 
beginnings the city appropriated Cuba as pretension and panache.” Even much of 
Miami’s architecture was inspired by the Spanish colonial styles of Cuba and the West 
Indies, with Spanish street names to match. Cuban tourists frequently visited Miami, and 
Cuba was likewise a very popular travel destination for Americans.
17
 
Postwar Miami emerged as the nation’s largest air travel hub for international 
passengers and along with the advent of air conditioning and other quality of life 
accouterments that go toward beating the tropical heat and insects, the city developed a 
year round tourism industry. Increased numbers of vacationers from the Caribbean 
arrived during the late 1950s. Most of these well-to-do visitors hailed from Cuba, who 
experienced Miami as an extension of home. Travel between Miami and Cuba grew 
exponentially in the late 1940s and 1950s. The expansion in flight service of Pan 
American, which chose Miami, as it’s American hub, and the relatively inexpensive hotel 
accommodations available in the vacant summer months, drove the city’s growth as an 
international resort mecca.
18
  
A “semi-permanent colony” of Cuban tourists became a fixture of the social and 
economic of Miami. In the off season, when the northern snowbirds returned to the 
Midwest or to New York, Miami’s economy was supplemented by 150,000 Spanish-
speaking visitors, making yearly or monthly trips to Miami to enjoy its beaches, hotels, 
restaurants and to shop for consumer goods that were exorbitantly taxed in Cuba. The 
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tourists shopped in stores such as Burdine’s, Miami’s most elegant department store 
known for its custom-made swimwear. Located on Flagler Street and founded by a retired 
Confederate officer as a Seminole trading post in 1898, Burdine’s embodied Miami's 
transformation in just 50 years from a swampy frontier to a genteel resort area. As one 
might expect, Miami city officials and businesses became even more invested in 
promoting Miami as an ethnically diverse and progressive city to boost this bonanza of 
international trade.
19
  
As the Cuban economic and political climate took an even deeper downturn in the 
waning years of the regime of Fulgencio Batista (1952-1959) and a revolutionary 
insurrection fomented, many of the wealthy Cuban tourists who had been semi-
permanent residents or recreational visitors became permanent residents of the city. They 
purchased homes and invested their savings in the comparative safety of American banks. 
Indeed, between 1955 and 1956 alone the number of immigrants from Cuba to South 
Florida increased over 150 percent. The social and political repression of Batista’s 
dictatorship, an atrophying Cuban economy, a rising cost of living, and rampant 
unemployment were all factors that contributed to this increase in Cuban migration to 
Florida.
20 
 
As January 1, 1959 dawned, the political tide in Cuba changed once again, with 
strikingly different consequences for the cycle of political exile and emigration that 
defined Cuban life. Nearly 500 Batistianos seeking political asylum settled in Miami 
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ushering in what would later be known as the first wave of self-imposed Cuban exiles, a 
period that lasted from 1959 to 1962. With the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, 
and the subsequent steady consolidation of power by the new revolutionary government, 
the deposed followers of the Batista government fled Cuba to the United States. Other 
governmental and economic elites and their families soon followed.  
Three waves of Cubans followed, dwarfing in size the first wave by bringing 
nearly 1,000,000 Cubans to the United States over a period of less than thirty years. The 
second wave lasted from 1965 to 1973 and commenced with the chaotic Camarioca 
Boatlift and Vuelos de la Libertad or “Freedom Flights.” Facilitated by the U.S. and 
Cuban governments, the Freedom Flights brought the largest number of immigrants of 
any of the waves, a group drawn from Cuba’s petite bourgeoisie and working classes. In 
1980, the third wave of migration, known as the Mariel Boatlift, brought approximately 
125,000 immigrants to the United States in flotillas facilitated by Cuban exiles in Miami. 
The majority of Marielitos had truly experienced communism on the island and were 
considered economic migrants.
21
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Government (Reform) in the Sunshine 
Governmental reform in Dade County and the creation of the Metro Dade system 
in 1957 directly effected the political participation by minorities in local government, 
especially because municipal and county government was where the largest share of 
Latino local representation was found. The flowering of Latino political strength in 
Miami took place within the intersection of ethnic based civic organizations and broader 
political developments. In order to appreciate the multitude of constraints faced by the 
Latino and African American politicians and voters in Miami it is critical to discuss the 
unique nature of the Metro Dade government and its relationship to widespread 
governmental reform in Florida. 
Described by Gary Mormino as Florida’s “Big Bang,” Florida was undergoing a 
shift in its social, political and economic structure in the 1950s. The development of air 
conditioning, the expansion of the interstate highway system, and advances in civil 
engineering accelerated the national demographic shift to the Sunbelt, making the state an 
attractive destination for millions of tourists and new residents. The influx of new 
residents from the Northeast and Midwest pushed the state further away culturally from 
its Deep South neighbors, and threatened Florida’s adherence to Jim Crow into the 1960s. 
As a result, a political battle in the state legislature ensued over apportionment and 
representation that pitted the traditional rural seat of power in North Florida with the 
growing urban centers in South Florida, and in doing so, brought into conflict the Old 
South with the new Sunbelt.
22
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Before the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment on November 6, 1956, the 
state legislature in Tallahassee enforced numerous constraints on municipal and county 
governance in Dade County. A state budget commission appointed by the Governor 
prepared the annual Dade County budget and held veto power over the creation of any 
county agency or office. State legislators from small, rural northern counties known as 
the “Porkchop Gang,” with little interest or sympathy for the needs of residents in 
growing urban areas like Miami and Tampa, controlled the Florida Senate and House. 
Senate and house seats were apportioned on the basis of county boundaries, not on 
population; for example, a state senator from a tiny northern county such as Alachua 
could represent as few as 25,000 people, while the senator from Dade represented more 
than 700,000. The same problem held true with state representatives. Not surprisingly, 
reapportionment gained few allies beyond interests in Miami and Tampa. The two urban 
areas combined accounted for nearly half percent of the state’s population but only eight 
percent of its legislative representation.
23
 
As apportionment lost what little steam it had in the state legislature, Dade 
County’s expenditures continued to balloon as a result of its burgeoning population. 
Between 1950 and 1957, Dade’s governmental expenditures increased by nearly 43 
percent per capita. County officials had no influence over the county budget and therefore 
no recourse to meet the expanding need for government services, other than increasing 
property, cigarette, and utility taxes. The City of Miami found itself in likewise dire 
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financial straits. During the 1920s land speculation boom, Miami annexed large swaths of 
unincorporated land and over extended itself through high per capita bonded 
indebtedness. When the South Florida real estate market collapsed in 1926, Miami’s tax 
base all but evaporated. The city’s bond rating remained low for the next thirty years, and 
the city government deferred capital improvement projects for decades in order to shore 
up its financial base. The city lacked strong leadership and residents were eager to pass 
along municipal expenditures to another governing body.
24
  
In light of this growing financial crisis, the state legislature and Miami’s political 
leadership saw home rule as a compromise in the absence of reapportionment. If Dade 
County could not have adequate political representation in Tallahassee, it could at least 
have more control over its own affairs. As a result of the passage of the Home Rule 
Amendment, Dade County underwent a phase of administrative and financial reform that 
changed its relationship with the state legislation as well as the structure of county 
government. The Home Rule Amendment provided the constitutional basis for the 
reorganization of government in Dade County, and it gave the residents of Dade County a 
free hand in redesigning their system of governance. Tallahassee empowered the county 
government to abolish, consolidate, or create municipalities as they saw fit. The County 
Commission, as well, could create new taxing districts and other governmental units 
without state oversight. However, the County still faced financial constraints; under 
Home Rule, Dade County could only levy taxes as “might be authorized by general law.” 
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Likewise, Dade could not utilize state revenue designated for municipalities for the 
growing unincorporated areas of the county.
25
  
It was then set to the Dade County Charter Board to create a new county charter 
for approval by the county electorate. The Charter Board, comprised of city officials and 
led by W.C. Herrell of the Dade League of Municipalities, immediately resolved not to 
abolish any of the existing municipalities or threaten their autonomy. Instead, the Charter 
Board moved to implement a two-tiered or metropolitan federal system of governance by 
which responsibility would be shared between the county and the municipalities for the 
delivery of services.
26
  
Led by a board of commissioners, Dade County retained area-wide powers over 
Miami International Airport and functioned as the exclusive local government for the 
unincorporated areas of Dade County. The Charter Board proposed a weak mayor form 
of county government with a board of thirteen commissioners. County Commissioners, 
one from each of the five districts, would be elected at large in a non-partisan countywide 
election. Voters of each district would then elect an additional County Commissioner to 
represent their district. Municipalities with over 60,000 residents (Miami, Miami Beach, 
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and Hialeah) would elect their own commissioner to the board. Like the County 
Commissioners, the Dade County Mayor would be elected at large in a non-partisan race 
and then would appoint a County Manager to oversee the day-to-day administrative 
functions of county services. In 1964, in light of the growing population, Miami residents 
approved a new county districting plan that created eight residential districts, each with 
one commission seat to be elected at large.
27
 
The move towards metropolitan governance would have mixed consequences for 
Miami’s growing Latino and African-American communities in the 1960s and 1970s, 
although ultimately Metro would be integral to increasing minority representation at the 
local and state level. There was no record keeping of Latino voting at the county or 
municipal level until 1973, but African American voters in Miami overwhelming voted 
against the passage of the Home Rule Amendment in 1956 and the Metro Dade Charter 
in 1957. Black community leaders feared that a strong county government would dilute 
their political power in the City of Miami. With most of Miami’s African American 
residents concentrated in the City of Miami, consolidation and abolishment of the 
municipalities would have done exactly that. However, consolidation never took hold and 
the municipalities retained their autonomy. Furthermore, the professionalization of 
county government that occurred during Metro’s implementation reduced what some 
African Americans described as a “redneck” political culture within the county agencies. 
However, it was by virtue of numbers and the extreme social and demographic changes 
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experienced in Miami that minority representation on the county commission was 
accomplished to a limited degree without the advantage of single member district 
elections.
28
  
The municipal and county commissions’ power to appoint commissioners when 
vacancies arose would provide a path to political office for minorities in Miami. The 
municipal commissions, which under the Metro Charter maintained a great deal of 
autonomy in electing commissioners and council members, were the first to appoint 
minority commissioners in great numbers. In 1965, Mayor Robert King High appointed 
M. Athalie Range to a vacancy on the Miami City Commission and in 1967 Range won 
election as an incumbent in a citywide vote. Mayor King enthusiastically supported the 
increasingly ethnic and “Latinized” character of Miami. Probably no other official better 
understood the importance of maintaining the City of Miami’s progressive image to 
secure its reputation as an international tourist destination. In 1968 and 1972, Reverend 
Theodore Gibson and Reverend Edward Graham secured seats on the City of Miami and 
Metro Dade County Commissions respectively, also through the practice of appointment. 
Both Gibson and Graham were then elected as incumbents. It was not a coincidence that 
as of 1976, Commissioner Graham was the only black county official in the entire state. 
Latinos very soon would be seen everywhere in local politics, because the same 
appointment and election practice would place Latinos such as Maurice Ferré and Jorge 
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Valdes into office and the autonomous municipal commissions would become proving 
grounds for new minority leadership.
29
  
My study is organized chronologically around three pivotal moments in the rise of 
a Latino majority local government in Miami that correlate to three key pieces of federal 
and local legislation: the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, allowing any Cuban who lived 
in the U.S. to become a permanent resident, the 1973 Dade County Bilingual and 
Bicultural Resolution, that declared the county officially bilingual and bicultural, and the 
1980 Dade County Anti Bilingual Ordinance, passed in reaction to the Mariel boatlift in 
the spring of 1980. Chapter One spans the years from 1965 to 1973, roughly from the 
passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act to the election of Maurice Ferré, Miami’s first 
Latino mayor. This chapter examines the influence of local politicians and the Cuban 
independent press in shaping the discourse around U.S. citizenship, and also considers 
why Cubans rejected assimilation for biculturalism. Chapter Two focuses on the period 
from 1965-1978, and uses the 1973 Dade County Bilingual and Bicultural Resolution and 
the activism of Cuban civic leader Bernardo Benes as a lens to examine the work of 
Cuban political and professional networks in fostering Latino friendly county policies 
and grooming a new generation of Latino political leadership. Chapter Three chronicles 
the period from 1980 to 1985. It explores the brief and tumultuous emergence of 
reactionary anti-Latino and anti-bilingual activist Emmy Shafer and her battles with the 
Cuban advocacy group Spanish American League Against Discrimination (SALAD) and 
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the Dade County Board of County Commissioners over Miami’s future as a minority 
majority urban center. The study concludes with the election of Miami’s first Cuban born 
mayor and the repeal of the Anti-Bilingual Ordinance. 
I argue that Cubans and other Latinos in Miami through their involvement with 
local government in this critical period, both as voters and politicians, articulated a 
unique construction of American citizenship that accommodated their biculturalism.  
Emboldened by the Cuban Adjustment Act, which allowed them to maintain dual 
citizenship, Miami’s Cuban Americans not only demanded language accommodations in 
county services, but expected local political candidates to be well versed in foreign affairs 
and sensitive to the geopolitics of the Caribbean. Local politics in Miami functioned as a 
microcosm where Latinos vied for power and recognition and as the first institutional 
point of contact for Cubans becoming new citizens. Miami as a global city in the South 
provides an important window into understanding the intersection of immigration, civil 
rights, and Latino political identity during the demographic and political rise of the 
Sunbelt in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 24 
CHAPTER I: THE ROAD TO CITY HALL 
“To stay away from the polls is bad. Look what happened to us in Cuba.” – Olga Reyes, Miami resident. 
Introduction  
In a darkened studio at the WTVJ 4 television studios City of Miami Mayor 
Maurice A. Ferré and former City of Miami Commissioner Manolo Reboso sat across 
from one another at a conference table. Between them WTVJ’s veteran anchor Ralph 
Renick moderated the “Road to City Hall.” It was November 1981 and the televised 
mayoral debate had devolved into a bitter run-off between the two Latino businessmen 
and former city hall colleagues. Ferré and Reboso were both elected into office in 1973 
and they became, respectively, the first Puerto Rican mayor and Cuban American elected 
to public office in Florida history. Now, eight years later they sat across from each other 
as political rivals. Ferré, himself accused of pandering to Cubans in 1973, blasted Reboso 
for pandering to Cubans, remarking that “I wouldn’t advertise in Spanish differently than 
my campaign slogans in English. I wouldn’t go around inciting people to vote Cuban. I 
think in this country we shouldn’t be voting Catholic, Jewish, Black, Cuban, white or 
anything else… the mayor’s office should be open to everyone.”30  
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In 1981 Miami, “a mayor that represents all the people” meant a Latino mayor. In 
less than a decade, Latinos had gone from being only 5 percent of registered voters to 
holding key positions in Miami’s municipal government and on the Metro Dade Board of 
County Commissioners. The road from the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966 to city hall in 
1981 was long and fraught with contentious questions about citizenship, assimilation, and 
governance as Cuban exiles and their children made efforts to secure their place in 
American life.
31
 
This chapter argues that local politicians and the Cuban press played an integral 
role in shaping the development of a Cuban American electorate in Miami between the 
years 1966 and 1980. The Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) was slow to be accepted by the 
Cubans who hoped for a return to a liberated Cuba, and attainment of U.S. citizenship 
remained controversial until the suspension of the Freedom Flights in 1973. Moreover, 
Cubans rejected full assimilation in favor of biculturalism – which allowed them to 
maintain their allegiance to Cuba while claiming new political ties to the United States. 
First, I consider the role of Florida legislators such as Democratic Congressman Dante 
Fascell in the passage of the CAA in 1966 as a means of increasing federal funding and 
employment opportunities for Cubans. Subsequently, as Cubans moved towards the 
American political mainstream, Cuban political journalism shaped discourse about 
naturalization and citizenship. The Cuban community’s tilt towards liberalism in local 
politics, tempered by an ironclad anti-communist stance towards American foreign 
policy, was born of the CAA and the influence of Democratic party politics in Miami. 
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Finally, the rise of Maurice Ferré, Miami’s first Latino mayor, cemented a new bilingual 
and bicultural political order in Miami. 
Creating Temporary American Citizens  
In 1959, as the first wave of post-Revolutionary Cuban refugees arrived in Miami, 
federal immigration reform was at an impasse. The 1950s were a period of intense 
national debate over immigration and the possible abolishment of the quota system, a 
debate largely shaped by the European refugee crisis and the Cold War. American’s 
foreign policy considerations thus fostered the liberalization of the nation’s immigration 
policy as it shifted toward the containment of communism. The destabilization and 
collapse of a series of pro-American regimes in the Caribbean and Latin America in the 
1950s and 1960s led to significant changes in federal policy towards refugees and 
immigrants. As the United States began to accept refugees from communist regimes, 
Cubans were the first in these “third world” waves of migration that forced the U.S. 
government to revamp the nation’s traditionally European-oriented immigration 
policies.
32
 
The surge of Cuban refugees arriving in Miami forced county politicians and local 
legislators to act as intermediaries, assuaging the frustrations of non-Latino residents 
without alienating a new political base and, after 1963, a source of federal revenue. 
Public discourse about the nature and extent of Cuban assimilation and involvement in 
                                                 
32
 The evolution of U.S. immigration and refugee policy has received considerable scholarly attention in the 
last thirty years. For a selected historiography of Cold War era immigration reform and refugee policy in 
the United States, with an emphasis on Caribbean and Latin American migration, see: Carl J. Bon Tempo, 
Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees During the Cold War (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2008), David Reimers, Still the Golden Door: the Third World Comes to America (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1992), Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: the Politics of Immigration 
Control in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), and Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, 
Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half Open Door, 1945 to Preseent (New York: Free Press, 
1986). 
 
27 
American civic life prior to the passage of the CAA encompassed many of the issues that 
would shape ethnic politics in Miami in the subsequent twenty years. 
 As early as 1961, the question of status normalization and residency for the 
growing Cuban refugee community became a subject of consternation for Cubans and 
Anglo Miamians alike. Capitol Hill insiders were not the only ones concerned about the 
immigration status of Cubans. Cuban journalists in Miami published editorials pondering 
the moral dilemma of pursuing naturalization in light of the island still “enslaved” by 
communism and the Castro regime. Amid an economic recession, Anglo and African 
American Miamians criticized the federal government’s initial lack of aid for Cubans as a 
burden on fiscally strapped Dade County, and then alleged that the subsequent creation of 
the Cuban Refugee Program (CRP) was unwarranted favoritism.  
Democratic Congressman Dante B. Fascell was a fervent opponent of Fidel 
Castro, and one of the earliest and most important local supporters of the Cuban Refugee 
Program (CRP) and status normalization for Cubans. Admired by Floridians for his 
ability to direct federal monies to projects he favored, his support ensured the CRP’s 
longevity into the 1980s, and he often interceded on behalf of the Cuban community at 
town hall meetings and in correspondence with constituents. The son of Italian 
immigrants, Fascell was elected to Florida’s 4th Congressional District in 1955. At the 
time, his district encompassed nearly all of Greater Miami and a portion of the Florida 
Keys. The congressman distinguished himself almost immediately among Southern 
Democrats in Congress by refusing to sign the 1956 Southern Manifesto criticizing the 
racial integration of public facilities. One of the first congressional candidates in Miami 
to openly court the black vote, Fascell dismissed the Southern Manifesto as a “piece of 
28 
chest thumping.” Despite criticism from his white constituents, Fascell maintained his 
commitment to representing a district that was perhaps one of the most diverse in the 
South – a patchwork of Northern carpetbaggers and snowbirds, white native born 
Floridians (Crackers), black Bahamians, Puerto Rican garment and agricultural workers, 
and a smattering of Cubans who had absconded during the decades of political repression 
during Machado and Batista regimes.
33
  
As the number of Cubans settling in the 4
th
 Congressional District grew 
exponentially between 1960 and 1963, so did the angry letters from constituents 
concerned about immigration, and unemployment in Miami. With every new wave of 
Cuban refugees, the “native” citizens of Miami chanted the same litany of complaints: the 
Cubans don’t speak our language; they don’t share our religion, our values, or our race; 
and they threaten our jobs.  The arrival of Cubans triggered an outpouring of nativism 
that led many Miamians to pressure their elected officials to halt the flow of immigrants. 
Writing in 1963, Carl Walden of Miami Shores, demanded to know: “Why doesn’t the 
immigration quota limit the amount of Cubans allowed to enter?” Another resident from 
Cutler Ridge, a rural area in South Dade, wrote that he feared that there were “10 Cubans 
wating [sic] for my job.” These complaints reflected a commonly held belief, especially 
acute in a period of economic recession, that the influx of Cubans was hurting Miami’s 
workers.
 34
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Unwilling to stoke the fires of nativism, Fascell attempted to offset these demands 
by responding with promises to “continue to urge our government to…accelerate the 
program for the resettlement of Cuban refugees outside of Florida.” Fascell knew that 
resettlement was an empty promise. Even as immigration from Cuba all but ground to a 
halt in 1962 after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cuban families that had been successfully 
resettled out of state often found their way back to Miami once they had saved enough 
money to do so. Once these families were no longer dependent on aid from the CRP there 
was little the federal government could do to prevent them from moving back to Miami, 
the center of Cuban life in the United States.
 35
   
 Despite the oft-repeated promise of resettlement, criticisms of the Cuban 
community continued to devolve into foul-mouthed nativist rhetoric. William Jones 
wrote, “Miami…has now become a Havana slum, raucous and crowded. Why don’t 
Central and South America open their doors to these people whose culture is so similar to 
theirs?” When a rumor swirled through the city in July 1963 that a further 100,000 
Cubans were preparing to arrive, Fascell received another rush of complaints. “That’s all 
we need now. Shuttling another quarter to half million of this Cuban crap to Dade 
County.” 36  
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 Congressman Fascell lobbied hard to extend Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) funding for processing Cuban refugees in Miami and to relieve the 
financial burden placed on county agencies and local charitable organizations to provide 
for their reception, processing and resettlement. Constituents were almost unilaterally 
against any sort of aid beyond resettlement arrangements, especially monetary aid. Many 
Miamians interpreted federal relief for Cubans as a free handout that encouraged laziness 
and reckless spending. “These people are working and not reporting it. They are getting 
allotments and free food and handouts everywhere…I personally saw Cubans in a jewelry 
store buying gifts which I could not buy.” Some even felt that aid from private sources 
and charities was excessive. John Gerheim, self professed “Taxpayer and Voter,” another 
4
th
 District resident, wanted to know why “preferential treatment” was given to a group of 
young Cuban men enlisted in the Army, who were allowed to return home for Christmas, 
when his son had to “pay his own transportation home for Xmas [sic].” Similar disdain 
was extended to the exchange of 1,110 political prisoners captured by Castro’s forces 
during the ill fated Bay of Pigs for 62 million dollars or what Gerheim considered to be 
the “U.S. government paying blackmail to Castro.”37 
 Fascell was in an impossible position, caught between the demands of his 
constituents and his responsibility as a congressional representative to lobby for aid. Thus 
he was forced repeatedly to explain to the residents of his congressional district why 
Cubans were being afforded certain privileges that no one else could access. Offering 
permanent residency to Cubans seemed to be a solution that could simultaneously open 
                                                 
37
 Louise E. King to Senator Kenneth Hart, Miami Springs, Fl., 12 Jan 1963, Dante B. Fascell 
Congressional Papers, Special Collections, University of Miami Library, Box 1952; John W. Gerheim to 
Hon. Dante B. Fascell, 31 December 1962, Miami, Fl., Dante B. Fascell Congressional Papers, Special 
Collections, University of Miami Library, Box 1952.   
 
31 
up more avenues to federal aid, and make Cubans eligible for a wider variety of 
employment in order to wean them from refugee assistance. 
 By late 1965, county and municipal leaders acknowledged the permanence of the 
Cuban exodus to Miami. With the initiation of the Freedom Flights that year, 
Congressman Fascell, Congressman Claude Pepper and Mayor Robert King High joined 
with other state, county, and federal officials to create the Task Force on Cuban 
Refugees. The task force brought together politicians, county administrators, the Catholic 
Diocese of Miami, and the National Council of Churches to solve problems related to the 
Cuban migration and assess federal interagency efforts to deal with the refugees. The 
Task Force certainly reflected an unusually concerted federal-local effort to aid the 
community. However, what was most significant about the Task Force meeting in 
October 1965 was, first, its call for federal legislation allowing Cuban refugees to attain 
permanent residency status (in spite of local antagonism towards Cubans) and, second, 
the inclusion of the Cuban Coordinating Committee (CCC). The latter was one of the 
earliest groups to articulate Cuban demands for permanent residency and local political 
recognition.
38
  
 At a three-day long meeting held at the DuPont Hotel in downtown Miami, forty 
individuals representing the Catholic Church, African American civil rights organizations 
and county, state, and federal agencies met to discuss the future of Cuban refugees in 
Miami. With the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization (Hart-Cellar) Act of 1965 
on October 3 less than a month behind them, it seemed likely that a change in the parolee 
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status of most Cuban refugees was imminent. Although interagency meetings like this 
had taken place with some regularity since 1961, this was the first that prominently 
featured Cubans. The Cuban Coordinating Committee left behind few paper records, but 
we know they gave the concluding statement at the Task Force on Cuban Refugees 
meeting on November 1, 1965.  
Prior to the assembly of the Task Force, the CCC circulated an eight-point 
memorandum that established some of its major grievances with the status of Cuban 
refugees in Florida. Primarily focusing on their economic importance in Miami, the major 
points of the memo would become the bedrock of a new discourse around the role of 
Cubans in Miami’s economic and political life. Rather than dwelling on the dependence 
of many Cubans on federal refugee benefits, the CCC portrayed Cubans in Miami as 
breadwinners, taxpayers, and homeowners who deserved recognition and rights as 
permanent residents, even as they awaited the possibility of return to Cuba.
39
  
The CCC described themselves as “a group composed of representatives of Cuban 
exiles” striving to ensure good relations between federal and local agencies and working 
for positive community relations between Cubans and other Miami residents. Addressing 
the prevailing public opinion of many Anglos in Miami towards Cubans, the CCC 
undermined the “unfounded talk of the tax burden” created by Cuban use of Dade County 
services. The CCC argued that Cubans had in fact been a huge economic blessing for 
Miami bringing “millions in federal money…investments made by wealthy Cuban 
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exiles,” and “the Cuban as client and customer” to Miami businesses. Cubans had 
purchased homes and in doing so had become direct taxpayers to the county.
 40
   
The CCC argued that with federal subsidies Cubans were able to contribute to 
Dade's economy. They established businesses --- stores, cafeterias, and nightclubs that 
created the commercial strip of Calle Ocho that became the heart of “Little Havana” and 
a popular tourist attraction for visitors to Miami. Cubans had “provided the City and 
Miami Beach with a bilingual Latin American environment which had enhanced the 
tourist attraction of both cities.” Thanks to the establishment of Cuban businesses and 
stores, Miami had become “the true gateway to Latin America.” The CCC turned the 
argument of those who hoped to preserve Miami’s Old Florida past on its head, and 
insisted that the citizens of Miami should really be thanking Cubans for making the city 
an exotic tropical tourist destination. This argument would carry through the next fifteen 
years of political debate about the assimilation of Cubans into Miami’s local government. 
When bilingualism became a municipal policy issue in the early 1970s, proponents of 
bilingual education and county services would make the same economic argument.
 41
    
 Ironically, it was the protestations of South Florida constituents and lawmakers 
about the need for federal funding for Cuban refugees that led to status normalization, 
producing within a decade the creation of a large enfranchised Latino population in 
Miami. After the successful passage of Johnson’s immigration reform legislation in 1965, 
congressional Florida legislators brought the question of status normalization for Cubans 
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to the fore. Discussions of status normalization had circulated since the early 1960s, but 
President Johnson tabled the issue in favor of seeking a consensus in support of broad 
immigration reform. Status normalization was simply the creation of a program that 
would allow refugee/parolees seek permanent residency and eventually, citizenship.  
 HEW Secretary John W. Gardner argued for status normalization as a means for 
dealing with the increasing antagonism from state and local officials in South Florida 
who felt that the federal government had left them with too much of the cost of Cuban 
settlement and refugee welfare programs. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and 
the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 indicated that the Johnson 
administration was trying to extend federal funding and social welfare programs that 
could, in theory, benefit Cubans and provide additional funding state and municipal 
agencies in Florida. This was a concerted effort by the Johnson Administration to reduce 
racial and political tension in Florida. However, many of these programs required 
beneficiaries to be permanent residents in order to participate. Lack of permanent resident 
status also barred Cubans from most public sector employment, and from applying for 
state licenses for professions ranging from cosmetology to dentistry.
42
  
With the encouragement of state officials in Florida and CRP administrators, 
Congress passed the Cuban Status Adjustment Act in 1966 with little resistance. 
However, two obstacles impeded its implementation. First, President Johnson and 
Undersecretary of State George Ball initially feared that the American public would 
interpret the passage of the CAA as tacit acceptance of the Castro regime. The Johnson 
Administration knew that HEW would have to sell and promote status normalization, as 
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it did with the Cuban Refugee Program, to the public as part of the larger anti-communist 
foreign policy, and as a means of undermining Castro’s government by aiding Cubans 
who exemplified the best of American values. Advocates of the CAA such as Senator 
Ted Kennedy reiterated the unique qualities of Cubans such as adherence to traditional 
family values, hard work, and fervent resistance to communism that were the cornerstone 
of the original CRP’s publicity campaign.43  
The option of citizenship presented a second obstacle to Congress accepting the 
CAA: what would happen to Cubans who became permanent residents or citizens if 
returning to a post-Castro Cuba became a reality? From the beginning of the post-
Revolutionary Cuban migration, the U.S. government assured Cubans and the American 
public that refugees would be able to return to Cuba immediately after the fall of the 
Castro regime. This promise not only kept hope of a return alive for Cubans but also 
stoked Cuban exile efforts to undermine the Castro regime from Miami. From the federal 
government’s perspective, it eased the resistance to the refugee population by 
characterizing the migration as strictly temporary.
44
  
Ultimately, Congressional representatives and federal administrators did not have 
an issue with granting American citizenship to refugees and allowing them to maintain 
Cuban citizenship while at the same time allowing for the possibility of their return to 
Cuba. Explaining the rationale of the legislation, Undersecretary Ball stated in a 
congressional hearing: “I think we should give them the option of being able to live in 
this land as good citizens…even though some of them will ultimately return.” The final 
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legislation stated that Cuban refugees who entered the United States after January 1, 
1959, as parolees or visa overstays, could apply to be permanent residents. The CAA 
allowed Cubans to count up to 30 months of their time in the States towards the five-year 
residency requirement for citizenship. This greatly expedited the citizenship process and 
cut time towards citizenship by half for some refugees. American citizenship had never 
been formulated in such a manner -- no other immigrant group had been given the 
freedom to define their loyalty simultaneously to the United States and to their country of 
origin.
45
  
“Elections? What for?”   
 The passage of the CAA created a crisis of conscience among Cubans over the 
political and cultural implications of obtaining permanent residency and, ultimately, 
American citizenship. This created a divide between Cubans who sought a return to Cuba 
from those who wanted to stay in the United States while retaining their Cuban 
citizenship and those wanting to acquire a new national identity as U.S. citizens. This 
identity crisis was most apparent among the more ardently anti-Castro elements of the 
Cuban community in Miami. Patria (Native Land), one of the earliest and most popular 
periodiquitos (little newspapers) and the voice of the Batistianos (pro-Batista faction) in 
exile politics, initially decried the passage of the CAA as a betrayal of Cuba by the 
federal government and a betrayal of the cause of liberation by any exile that sought 
citizenship. Patria’s editorial board roundly criticized any Cuban who even considered 
                                                 
45
 Historian Carl Bon Tempo argues that this was a “stunning formulation of American citizenship” and 
that “no other previous refugee or immigrant group had been granted…such leeway in defining their 
loyalties.” He argues that this was largely due to the proximity of Cuba to the United States, the long 
relationship between the two countries, and the belief by both many in the Cuban community and in the 
Johnson administration, that the collapse of the Castro regime was imminent. See: Bon Tempo, Americans 
at the Gate, 131. 
 
37 
pursuing citizenship by asking rhetorically: “Why would we abandon Cuban citizenship 
when we aspire to liberate the homeland?”46  
However, Cuban readers who hoped status normalization would be a means to 
economic stability did not accept Patria’s resolutely anti-residency stance. In November 
1966, only a few short months after their scathing critique of the CAA, Patria published 
a lengthy editorial on the merits of securing residency. In response to numerous letters 
from readers angered by the residency debate, staff writer Alberto Rodriguez argued 
pragmatically “becoming a U.S. resident does not mean you are no longer Cuban, or that 
you are betraying the cause…and it does have its advantages.” However, Rodriguez 
refused to go any further on the matter of seeking citizenship -- in his opinion it would be 
a betrayal of one’s Cuban heritage and a betrayal of the greater cause of a free Cuba. 
“You abandon being Cuban when you seek other citizenship and take the oath of 
naturalization.” 47   
Patria’s stance now set the limit at seeking full citizenship, but it was forced to 
acknowledge that residency provided many of the employment and tax benefits of 
citizenship without an outright abandonment or betrayal of Cuban nationality. Rodriguez 
also made the case that as a permanent resident, Cubans could still collect some refugee 
benefits and use the medical services of the Cuban Refugee Center, which they might not 
be able to do as citizens. Similarly, as the Cuban community became more permanently 
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settled, residency meant Cuban homeowners could seek Federal Housing Administration 
loans and insurance and receive breaks on county property taxes.
48
 
Rodriguez’s article reveals the conflict that many Cubans faced in the mid-1960s, 
and the challenges for aspiring Latino politicians as they mounted their first campaigns in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. How would they reconcile the realities of day-to-day life 
in the U.S. with a commitment to the political and ideological struggle of liberating Cuba 
from the Castro regime? In 1966, at the height of the Freedom Flights and the escalation 
of the war in Vietnam, Cuba remained at the center of Cold War foreign policy. As 
Patria’s dismissive view towards seeking citizenship shows, for many Cubans there was 
a powerful hope of return. Yet, the liminal status of refugee-parolee granted by the 
President Johnson left many exiles in legal limbo, unable to obtain public employment, 
buy a home, or apply for credit. Patria’s hedging was a tacit acknowledgment of this 
conflict between pragmatism and ideological commitment. Supporting residency offered 
a compromise.
49
 
Fear of cultural assimilation or Americanization, especially of Cuban children, 
formed an integral component of the Cuban discourse around attaining U.S. citizenship. 
In the eyes of those committed fully to the liberation of the homeland, residency offered 
temporary economic and professional benefits, but assimilating culturally offered none at 
all. In a 1966 column, the editorial board of Patria explained that the mere idea of 
assimilation was “terrifying” for a number of reasons. Foremost, they argued that 
assimilation was the greatest enemy of the Cuban nationalist project, because it 
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undermined the “transience” of the Cuban community in Miami. Cubans were in Miami 
solely because of the “fact of Communism,” and assimilation would suggest that, not 
only were they in the United States by choice, but because of the inherent superiority of 
American society and culture over Cuban culture. Miami was a “world of abundance” but 
Cubans had to ground themselves in the hope of return, and remember that the 
“comforts” and temptations of the United States could never replace a liberated Cuba. 
This rejection of assimilation hints at the contradictions between the historically troubled 
relationship between the United States and Cuba, and the dependence of Cuban exiles on 
the American government for aid.
50
  
For many Cubans the shift towards involvement in American politics was slow 
and tempered by cynicism. Zig Zag Libre, the Miami reboot of the famed Cuban satirical 
magazine under the direction of José Manuel Rosada, frequently criticized of the 
hypocrisy of both local and national politicians. Illustrator and satirical cartoonist Silvio 
Fontainillas published humorous caricatures of world leaders ranging from Mao to 
Nixon, as well as vignettes depicting the mundane frustrations of exile life in Miami. The 
magazine remained non-partisan and became popular for its ability to make light of any 
political faction or conflict in the Cuban community. By 1966, Zig Zag Libre boasted a 
paid circulation of 30,000 subscribers.
51
 
Three months before the 1968 Presidential Election, Zig Zag Libre’s cover 
depicted a dismal scene. On the right, Miami’s Art Deco skyline and palm trees were 
festooned with campaign banners promoting Nixon, Humphrey, Rockefeller, and 
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Wallace, the front-runners for the presidency. An elephant shaped balloon with the letters 
G-O-P floated above the city. Across a narrow body of water, a Cuban man dressed in the 
guajiro (peasant) garb of straw hat, guayabera (linen shirt) and tattered pants raised his 
arms in distress. Barefoot and shackled to a ball and chain painted with the Soviet 
hammer and sickle, the guajiro was a sharp contrast to the glamour and frippery of 
Miami in election season. Silvio made the gulf between Miami and Havana seem 
insurmountable, and just as the caption reads, he forced readers to ask themselves: 
“Elections? What for?”52 
Image 1. Zig Zag Libre Cover Image – August 10, 1968. 53  
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Silvio’s weekly comic strip Cosas de Nuestro Exilio expressed the frustration of 
maintaining a cultural and political connection to Cuba while living in the United States. 
In Silvio’s satirical version of Miami, Cuban children spoke back to their parents in 
English, or worse Spanglish, the hybrid language combining words and idioms from 
Spanish and English that represented a new Cuban American identity. Cubans on the 
island, who had been proud to call themselves “anti-imperialist revolutionaries” in 1960, 
now wrote their relations in Miami begging that they apply for citizenship so they could 
secure a place on the Freedom Flights.
 54 
Image 2. Cosas de Nuestro Exilio Cartoon
55
 
 
Despite their hesitancy to assimilate, Cubans were quick to criticize the federal 
government for dragging its heels in its efforts to process Cuban residency applications. 
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The Johnson Administration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
promised to open offices in Miami solely to service Cuban applicants when Congress 
passed the CAA in 1966. The INS scheduled the offices to open in January 1967, but by 
the end of the month construction plans had stalled resulting in eligible Cubans unable to 
have their applications processed. In the wake of the CAA’s announcement, a wave of 
residency-eligible Cubans purchased homes in the hopes that the INS would process their 
applications quickly enough to secure a homestead tax exemption by April. Instead, they 
found a shuttered application office. Patria’s editorial board blamed the delay on the 
government’s “lack of funds” and noted that Cubans were deeply “anxious” about the 
financial repercussions of not being able to seek residency in a timely manner.
56
 
The CAA empowered Cubans to became economically independent and 
economically invested in Miami, whether through home buying or the creation of small 
businesses, and as a result they became more interested in local politics. In the year 
following the passage of the CAA and the increase in Cuban home-ownership in Miami, 
discourse in the periodiquitos about Cuban political participation in the United States 
began to shift away from a hardline on cultural assimilation. The political establishment 
in Miami, led by bilingual Mayor Robert King High, attuned themselves more closely to 
Cuban special interests.  
On January 6, 1967, Mayor High proclaimed the “Day of the Freedom Fighters” 
in the City of Miami in honor of Cubans past and present striving for the liberation of 
their homeland. The celebrations included a special event held at Dinner Key Auditorium 
in conjunction with the Information Council of the Americas (INCA), an anti-communist 
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organization dedicated to containing and fighting communism and supporting free trade 
in the Western Hemisphere, especially Latin America. Founded by public relations 
wizard Edward Butler and historian of conservatism Lee Edwards, INCA organized 
informational lectures, released publications, made documentary films and lobbied 
against the spread of communism, while seeking support from liberal as well as 
conservative anti-communists. On “Day of the Freedom Fighters,” the City of Miami 
hosted a showing and reception for INCA’s latest production Hitler in Havana. The lurid 
propaganda film ominously equated Castro with Hitler and blamed the Cuban leader for 
Kennedy’s death. Hitler in Havana contained previously unseen footage of the early days 
of the Castro regime, smuggled into the United States by anti-Castro refugees, including 
scenes of the Bay of Pigs invasion and its aftermath 
57
  
Events such as “Day of the Freedom Fighters” were indicative of how over the 
next decade local politicians used a two-pronged strategy to pique Cuban interest in 
voting: (1) extoll the untapped electoral power of Cubans and (2) promise a continued 
effort to defeat communism on the island. Newly elected democratic State Senator 
Richard Bernard “Dick” Stone visited Patria in 1967 to thank the Cuban periodical and 
the Cuban people of South Florida for their support in his successful campaign. Stone, the 
former Miami City Attorney under Mayor King High gave a short but stirring speech 
about the importance of the Latino vote: “The Cubans registered to vote in Florida 
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constitute a large and decisive electoral force…and that force will be even greater when 
they realize that they could be the determining factor [in future elections].”58  
Stone thanked the newspaper for their endorsement, and promised to represent the 
interests of the Cuban people “with the dignity they deserve” in Tallahassee. Stone closed 
his speech with the promise to “honor [his] word to inform the Senate of the danger only 
90 miles away of communism in Cuba.” Stone’s image as a Cold Warrior Democrat 
would serve him well, and the people of Florida elected him to the U.S. Senate in 1975.  
Stone’s promise would echo for years to come, as it became the rhetorical device of 
choice for any non-Latino politician campaigning in Cuban districts be it for city 
councilman or President of the United States and regardless of party affiliation.
59
 
The Road to City Hall  
 In 1967, a young Puerto Rican elected to the Florida State Legislature would build 
on the political momentum started by Robert King High and serve as the template for the 
generation of Latino politicians who followed him and usher in an era of Latinized 
political culture. Maurice Ferré embodied the perfect bicultural, bilingual candidate – 
educated in the United States, but with deep political and economic interests in Puerto 
Rico.  Ferré assimilated to American life but oriented still oriented himself towards the 
geopolitics of the Caribbean; a version of American citizenship that would appeal deeply 
to the growing Cuban middle class.   
In 1966, Maurice Ferré was a “vibrant and charmingly Latin” newcomer in the 
South Florida business and political elite. The scion of an influential Puerto Rican-Cuban 
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family based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Ferré was only 28 when he was elected company 
president by the stakeholders of Maule Industries, a Puerto Rico-based concrete and 
building materials conglomerate.
60
 The Maule construction materials empire spread 
outwards from Puerto Rico to encompass concrete production, glass works, and iron 
works facilities in Florida, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. The Ferré 
Family became major real estate holders in South Florida, purchasing over 7000 acres of 
undeveloped land on the fringes of Dade County and several blocks of hotels and office 
buildings in Downtown Miami.
61
 
A half-hearted engineering student at best, Ferré became involved in the 
movement for Puerto Rican statehood during his time at the University of Miami. Ferré 
described his uncle, Luis A. Ferré, as Puerto Rico’s “Abraham Lincoln, a perennial 
candidate [who] always lost.” Nonetheless, Maurice cut his political teeth on Luis A. 
Ferré’s failed gubernatorial campaigns in 1956, 1960, and 1964. The cause of Puerto 
Rican statehood and his uncle’s long and tumultuous career were the inspiration of 
Maurice’s decision to pursue a run for office in Florida. Construction, real estate, and 
tourism were the drivers of Miami’s economy, and Ferré held significant interests in all 
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three, but aside from his appointment on the Downtown Development Authority, real 
political influence in Miami remained elusive to him.
62
  
After a failed bid for the state senate in 1966, Ferré mounted a successful 
bilingual campaign for Representative (District 91) to the Florida State Legislature the 
following year. Running unopposed on a generic platform, Ferré emphasized his 
experience at Maule, his interest in the welfare of children and the elderly, and his 
advocacy for the creation of a state consumer protection agency. For Ferré, his legislative 
experience was a stepping-stone; he admitted that he “went to Tallahassee to learn how 
politics works,” not because he intended to pursue a career in the state legislature. 63 
A stint in the legislature was a rite of passage for Miami politicians. Ferré’s 
incoming class included future governor and U.S. Senator Bob Graham. Ferré, however, 
lasted less than a term in Tallahassee, and he did little to distinguish himself from his 
peers while he was there. His only achievement was to support the passage of a bill that 
would force companies contracted to build state roads to purchase all of their cement and 
construction materials from Florida vendors. Political self-interest motivated Ferre’s 
backing of the legislation. The new legislation would be detrimental to Maule, which 
sourced its cement for Florida projects from Puerto Rico, and would be forced to spend 
an additional $500,000 purchasing cement from local suppliers to complete a number of 
state building project. Ferré’s business interests and political ambitions often clashed in 
his pursuit of public office; whether this first accomplishment was the hallmark of a 
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selfless politician, or a performance of his virtues as a public servant for the benefit of 
voters remains a mystery. Claiming the difficulties of overseeing Maule’s operations 
from the state capitol, Ferré returned to Miami in March 1967 and set his sights on 
gaining a seat on the City of Miami commission.
 64
 
Ferré’s brief term in the Florida House cemented his reputation as a rising star in 
local politics. As fate would have it, on August 30, 1967, Mayor of Miami Robert King 
High died of a heart attack at age 43. Vice-Mayor Stephen P. Clark succeeded the late 
Mayor King High, leaving a city commissioner’s seat vacant. Clark, himself the owner of 
a large construction company, temporarily appointed Ferré to the City Commission until 
the city held elections in November. Appointments to vacant City Commission seats at 
this time were the primary means by which minorities were incorporated into Miami’s 
political institutions. The City of Miami’s first African-American commissioners, 
Reverend Theodore Gibson and Athalie Range, were both appointed to empty seats and 
subsequently elected. Although he was a former state legislator and member of the 
Downtown Development Authority, Ferré’s appointment was no different. 65   
In September 1967, Ferré declared his intent to run for the commissioner’s seat in 
the regular city election. His 1966 state legislature campaign ads in Diario Las Americas 
and the Cuban periodiquitos raised his profile considerably in the Cuban community. 
Ferré would now have to push hard for the support of the few registered Cuban voters in 
his extensive campaign for the commissioner’s seat. In trying to ingratiate himself with 
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Cubans his courtship of the periodiquitos proved to be an uphill battle. He set his sights 
first on the popular Latino owned and operated Diario Las Americas, a daily Spanish 
language newspaper read by Cubans in Miami and all over Florida.
66
 A few days before 
the election, on November 2, 1967, Diario Las Americas published a special editorial 
written by Ferré entitled “My Grandfather Was Also Exiled.” Ferré recounted the life 
story of his grandfather, Antonio Ferré-Bacallao’s plight as a young Cuban Mambí rebel 
soldier, who fought valiantly against the Spanish between 1895 and 1898 in the Cuban 
War of Independence, and escaped to Puerto Rico to avoid imprisonment. Ferré-Bacallao 
fell in love with a Puerto Rican girl, but still returned to Cuba after the War of 
Independence. Realizing the devastation on the island left him with few opportunities for 
a livelihood, he returned to Puerto Rico to marry and raise a family. Ferré used his 
grandfather as a metaphor for the strength and adaptation of the Cuban diaspora in 
Miami, and as a reminder that there was hope in the great devastation of exile from one’s 
homeland.
 
He praised the political contributions and economic influence of Cubans in 
Miami, reminding the reader that the efforts of “Cubans…have given birth to more than 
500 businesses and changed this city into a bilingual urban center.”67   
In a community still internally divided about the prospect of citizenship and the 
dangers of assimilation, the extreme factions of the Cuban community predictably viewed 
Ferré’s campaign with utter skepticism, and quickly branded him a shameless panderer. 
For this vocal minority, bilingualism and an effective city commission were far less 
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pressing issues than the immediate liberation of Cuba. Many had left family and friends 
behind to succumb to poverty and injustice. This fact was a main driver behind their 
political activities in the United States. Writing two weeks later in El Nacionalista, 
journalist and anti-Castro activist Felipe Rivero asked, “What has Mr. Maurice Ferré 
done for Cubans? What have Mr. Maurice Ferré’s millions of dollars done to solve the 
problem of an enslaved Cuba, in the last nine years of terror?”68  
Rivero had a right to ask this question. The ideological chieftain of the Cuban 
Nationalist movement, Rivero spent 19 months in Cuban prisons for his involvement in 
the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Although Ferré’s work as a commissioner would have 
absolutely no bearing on U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba, there was nonetheless an 
expectation that as a Latino candidate, he be engaged in Cuban activism. Rivero even 
went so far as to question why, if the Cuban cause so moved Ferré, had he not 
volunteered to join Brigada 2506 in the Bay of Pigs and “[fought] alongside the two 
Puerto Ricans who were there on April 17, 1961.”69  
Certainly, El Nacionalista was not the only Cuban media outlet available to Ferré. 
The political aspirant had many Cuban organizations supportive of his campaign. In these 
early years of his political career, Ferré gained the most support from the culturally 
oriented Cuban social clubs, especially the regionally themed municipios (hometown 
clubs), and their newspapers. As Maria Cristina García has argued, municipios were 
incredibly important institutions for the preservation of Cuban traditions and cultural 
practices in exile. Formed by individuals and families from particular towns and cities in 
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Cuba, the municipios became an integral part of any local politician’s courtship of ethnic 
interest groups to build their own political base. A whirlwind tour of Miami’s ethnic 
interests could include attending services at St. Sophia’s Greek Orthodox Church on 
Coral Way, shaking hands in the Bahamian neighborhood along Grand Avenue, or giving 
a speech during the weekly schnitzel dinner at the German American Social Club.
70
  
In November 1967, a few days before the election, Ferré gave the keynote speech 
at the Municipio de Matanzas en Exilio’s annual “Día del Matancero Ausente” (Day of 
the Absent Matanzan). Matanzas held special significance in the Cuban exile community. 
The province was a stronghold of post-revolutionary opposition to the Castro regime. The 
yearly highlight of the municipio’s programming, the festivities began with a mass in 
honor of Saint Carlos of Borromeo, the patron saint of Matanzas, followed by dinner and 
a lengthy roster of speeches held in the Saint John Bosco Catholic Church reception hall. 
Ferré delivered a moving speech that reiterated his campaign editorial about his Cuban 
grandfather, who had been born and raised in Matanzas, and to whom he “was forever 
indebted for his spiritual connection to the Cuban colony.” The club members applauded 
the speech warmly and it was later glowingly reviewed by club president Demetrio Pérez, 
Jr., who praised Ferré’s emotive delivery in the club newspaper a few weeks later. 71  
Regardless of his standing in the Cuban community, it was not the Cuban vote 
that secured Ferré’s election in 1967. Dade County did not maintain records of Spanish-
speaking voters and the percentage at that time remained negligible. Ferré, on the other 
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hand, did extremely well in Miami’s African-American precincts and among Anglo 
voters. Bloc voting by African Americans essentially secured the election for Ferré. He 
became the first Latino elected to the Miami City Commission, although the election of 
Athalie Range, the first black woman elected to any municipal commission in the state, 
overshadowed Ferré’s achievement. Ferré nonetheless maintained a high profile in 
Miami’s growing Latino community. As a result, Latin American trade relations would 
be his major political crusade as commissioner.
 72
  
The Only Hispanic Politician of any Consequence in Miami 
Although City Commissioner was a non-partisan office, Ferré was deeply 
involved in the Dade Democratic Party. In 1968, Lawrence O’Brien, who directed Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey’s presidential campaign, appointed Ferré to head the Florida 
Committee to Elect Hubert Humphrey for President. Ferré used the position to revamp 
the Democratic Party’s image among Latinos. Perhaps reluctant to assimilate culturally, 
Cubans were demanding more recognition from their elected representatives -- on Cuban 
terms. They were frustrated with the Johnson Administration’s policies towards Cuba 
which offered neither an overt nor covert military solution as did Kennedy’s controversial 
policies. Instead, Johnson confined the administration to enforcing economic sanctions. 
As one of Silvio’s cartoons, a disgruntled middle-aged man, scowled and remarked, “Not 
one candidate says anything about Fidel!” 73   
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Once again, Ferré relied on Diario Las Americas to publish a pithy editorial 
reflecting on the Democratic Party’s history from Jackson to Humphrey, arguing that 
Latinos should unite to support the political party that had always been on the right side 
of history. He emphasized Democratic administrations interventions in Latin America 
and argued they supported democratic regimes in Latin America, most recently though 
the Organization of American States, while Republican administrations had “decorated 
dictators in Latin America…had cynically accepted the tyranny of communism in 
Cuba…and not only recognized, but helped finance a communist regime in Bolivia.”74  
However, the National Committee to Elect Hubert Humphrey and the Florida 
Democratic Party were completely uninterested in Ferré’s stumping in the Latino and 
Cuban press in Miami. Cuban voters only held majorities in the Hialeah and Little 
Havana precincts, but not in any of Dade County’s 27 other municipalities. O’Brien 
instructed Ferré to “target Nixon” and devote 100 percent of funds and volunteers to 
undermine Nixon’s appeal in South Florida. O’Brien’s instructions baffled Ferré, who 
recalled, “It was my opinion that nobody in Florida, nobody in Miami, liked Richard 
Nixon.” Humphrey was polling a comfortable lead in Dade County. Perhaps George 
Wallace, running for the American Independent Party and gaining momentum in 
Alabama and Louisiana, seemed a more realistic threat.
 75
  
Nonetheless, Ferré saw the campaign as an opportunity to create a “Hispanic 
political machine.” He earned considerable influence within the Dade Democratic Party 
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as the major financer of the get-out-the-vote canvassing and volunteer operations and by 
donating meeting space and rooms in his father’s hotels in Downtown Miami, the 
McAllister and the Columbus, to serve as the headquarters of South Florida for 
Humphrey. Going “against instructions,” he also used the campaign offices as a base for 
recruiting and briefing a small group of Cuban “shock troops” he planned to dispatch into 
Cuban and Puerto Rican working-class neighborhoods.
76
  
Ferré’s shock troops were a small group of educated young Cuban professionals: 
Manolo Reboso, an engineer and aspiring commissioner, Alfredo Durán, a Bay of Pigs 
veteran and lawyer, and Demetrio Pérez, Jr., a private school teacher and publisher of El 
Matancero Libre, prominent among them. The Cuban volunteers were on a dual mission: 
to encourage eligible Cubans to apply for citizenship and register to vote and to 
undermine George Wallace’s appeal in Cuban and Puerto Rican working class 
neighborhoods like Hialeah. The canvassing operation became an “uphill battle,” to say 
the least. Going door-to-door, Ferré recalled they encountered “Cubans that were all 
going back to Cuba…none of them had any idea of staying.” The operation “never really 
had any feet,” in his opinion, and it was difficult to get any Cuban interest in the 
Humphrey campaign at all.
77
  
Ferré’s prediction that Wallace would win Florida proved wrong. Richard 
Nixon’s campaign in Florida was successful and he won the state. Democratic Nominee 
Humphrey carried Dade and Monroe Counties by a wide margin. George Wallace, the 
leading national opponent of President Johnson’s Civil Rights Act won the majority of 
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Florida’s rural counties. The combined Wallace/Nixon conservative vote comprised 70 
percent of Florida’s electorate. In 1968, racial and social conservatism trumped 
Democratic liberalism in Florida.
78
 
Ferré still emerged victorious from the campaign. His organizing efforts earned 
the attention of Reubin O.D. Askew, speaker of the Florida State Legislature. In 1969, 
Askew asked Ferré to serve as his running mate and lieutenant governor for the 1970 
Florida Gubernatorial campaign. Ferré turned Askew down, again pleading the difficulty 
of running Maule from Tallahassee and uprooting his family. Still, Ferré considered 
himself part of a progressive political moment in the South and a golden age in Florida 
politics that would put Democrats Askew and Bob Graham in the governor’s office. 79  
Ferré’s political prospects were on the rise as the 1970 race for county mayor 
loomed and his place as the “only Hispanic politician of any consequence in Miami” 
gained national and international attention. A few months before he declared his intent to 
run for Dade County Mayor, Venezuela’s largest newspaper El Mundo, described Ferré 
as “the Hispanic candidate most likely to win…and become the first Latino mayor of 
Miami.” Ferré believed that the City of Miami Commission had prepared him to govern a 
larger body, and that he was ready to serve the people of the entire county, instead of just 
a single municipality.
80
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But for all the excitement, Ferré’s campaign for Dade County mayor was 
ultimately unsuccessful. It was a tight race, but Ferré lost in the run-off to Miami Mayor 
Steve Clark, and Ferré returned to Maule Industries to “lick his wounds.”81 Ferré 
abandoned his seat on the City of Miami commission and devoted himself fulltime to 
Maule, which was expanding rapidly in Florida’s construction boom. By 1973, fate again 
conspired to pull him back into politics. In April, Miami Mayor David Kennedy was 
indicted on bribery conspiracy charges during a federal investigation of political 
corruption in Dade County. Following the Florida state statute on municipal officials 
under indictment, Governor Askew suspended Kennedy, and forced the City of Miami 
Commission to find an interim mayor.
 82  
Ferré recalled the frank phone call he received in April from the disgraced 
Kennedy, “Would you like to be mayor? I’m going to be indicted. I’m going to step down 
for three months so I can clear my name.” Kennedy summoned Ferré for a meeting with 
Manolo Reboso, appointed by Kennedy to a fill a vacancy, the only other Latino on the 
commission. Reboso pledged his support in the appointment hearing. The three men 
knew the interim appointment would be preceded by a long day of political infighting. 
Kennedy’s suspension and the specter of Watergate weighed heavily on the Commission. 
Commissioner Rose Gordon attempted to block the appointment on the grounds that 
Maule’s ongoing civil litigation with the IRS over alleged non-payment of $25 million in 
back taxes would put more scrutiny on the Commission. Gordon requested that the 
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appointment be put off until a report on Ferré’s legal difficulties could be prepared. There 
was also concern among the commissioners that Maule’s cement and heavy equipment 
contracts with the City of Miami and Dade County posed a potential conflict of interest 
for Ferré. In response, he promised to block any new municipal contracts with Maule 
while he was interim mayor. His appointment as acting mayor of Miami passed 3-1. “I 
have never done anything to shame me or my family,” Ferré said after being sworn in.83  
 Ferré settled into the mayoral role instantaneously. Labeled by the press as 
“Miami’s millionaire mayor,” he refused the position’s annual salary of $7,500. He began 
the daily commission meeting promptly at 9 a.m. and clashed with the less than prompt 
City Manager Melvin Reese within minutes of taking his seat in the City Council 
chambers on his first day in office,  “Mr. Reese! It is 9 a.m. I said we would start at 9 
a.m. and so we will!” Yet a cloud of suspicion hung over the new mayor. Ferré took the 
City Commission’s apprehension surrounding his appointment in stride, telling the Miami 
News, “Nobody wants to believe me when I say I just want to be involved in Miami 
politics. I think I can be of service to the community…But people are so suspicious and 
untrusting these days because of things like wiretapping and Watergate.”84 
 Ferré’s prior political experience as a state legislator insulated him from much 
criticism during his short three-month tenure as interim mayor. He aggressively promoted 
the Downtown Development Authority, fostered new confidence in Miami’s politicians 
and took a stand against “the decay of decency in government.” In August, David 
Kennedy’s bribery charges were dropped on the basis of insufficient evidence and 
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Governor Askew reinstated him as Mayor of Miami. Ferré was once again out of political 
office, but he had gained the visibility and attention he needed to mount a successful 
campaign, this time for City of Miami mayor. Unsurprisingly, Kennedy decided to retire 
and not run for re-election, and in September Ferré announced his candidacy for the 
city’s highest office.85  
The 1973 City of Miami election was the first in history to see the successful 
candidacy of two Latinos, Maurice Ferré and Manolo Reboso. Ferré at last had the 
opportunity and the votes to mount a highly effective bilingual campaign that brought 
unprecedented numbers of Latinos to the polls. His campaign strategy was a combination 
of a traditionally liberal stance on social welfare issues and an unrelenting emphasis on 
his connections to Cuba and the Caribbean, a strategy time and again would prove 
successful in local, state, and national campaigns with the Cuban American electorate. He 
utilized the organizing experience he had gained in the Humphrey campaign six years 
before but now with a much smaller geographic area with two of Dade County’s Latino 
majority districts to canvass.  
Demography was also on Ferré’s side. In 1973, 370,000 Cubans resided in South 
Florida. Of these, about 70,000 or 20 percent, had become U.S. citizens. In October, the 
Latin League of Voters, a bipartisan voter education organization, reported that Miami 
Latinos, especially Cubans and Puerto Ricans, were registering to vote, volunteering as 
voter registrars, and serving as campaign managers in unprecedented numbers. The 
League of Latin Voters had two offices in the City of Miami: one in Little Havana, the 
largest Cuban neighborhood in Miami, and one in Wynwood, the city’s largest Puerto 
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Rican neighborhood. Each office processed a record 60 to 70 new registrations a week in 
the months leading up to the 1973 election. Leo Moriffi, the League Registrar observed 
that Latinos “were registering at the rate of four Republicans to one Democrat in 
May…but now it’s the other way around.” Although the mayoral election was non-
partisan, the boost in Democratic Party registrations was likewise a boost for Ferré, who 
was publicly associated with the Florida Democratic Party.
86
 
Ferré aggressively campaigned in the Cuban press and sought endorsements from 
Cuban newspapers and organizations. He emphasized his grandfather’s Cuban heritage, 
as he had in his 1967 State Legislature campaign, and made known his sensitivity to the 
foreign policy concerns of Cubans. However, he faced competition: Evelio S. Estrella, 
the perennial Cuban candidate who ran for a variety of local Miami offices and stalwart 
of the Cuban right wing establishment, and Gloria Calhoun, wife of Dade County 
commissioner Mike Calhoun, running on a zoning liberalization platform. Ferré received 
an early and key endorsement from Patria editor Armando Ruz. Ruz described the 
hopeful mayor as a man of “deep spiritual values” who was “faithful to the Cuban 
community” and employed a great number of Cubans in his businesses, when others 
would not.
 
 Ferré’s campaign purchased more advertising space in Patria than any other 
candidate. In addition to political advertisements, Ferré, determined to take his message 
to the Latino community, ran commemorative messages on behalf of Maule Industries 
celebrating the Grito de Yara and the birthday of Jose Martí.
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Image 3. Full Page Advertisement for Maule Industries in Patria.
88
 
 
The field in the mayoral race was crowded, but Ferré emerged as the clear front-
runner and the “handpicked” successor to David Kennedy. He was not, however, the only 
Latino on the ballot. Evelio Estrella, a Cuban insurance salesman, had run unsuccessfully 
for City of Miami Commissioner in 1967 and 1971. Estrella ran his campaign 
advertisements solely in Spanish and only canvassed in Latino majority precincts. It is 
unclear whether this was a campaign strategy to mobilize the Latino voter that is 
choosing an “ethnic” versus a “mainstream” strategy, or simply the result of Estrella’s 
own inability to speak English. Estrella did not receive any endorsements from the major 
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English or Spanish-language newspapers, nor from key unions or special interest groups. 
He received only one endorsement from one of the lower circulation Spanish newspapers 
in Miami, America Libre.
89
  
Image 4. Miami News front page features Ferré Campaign Billboard with Misspelling.
90
 
 
Instead, La Semana and Diario Las Americas ignored Estrella’s candidacy 
altogether in favor of publishing editorials that emphasized Ferré’s Cuban ancestry and 
his involvement in Cuban professional and social organizations. Ferré was applauded in 
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Patria for “the enthusiasm his candidacy had awakened in this important sector of the 
community,” and for his work in bringing together leaders from the Cuban and African 
American communities.
 
 Ferré and Manolo Reboso also secured a key endorsement from 
a coalition of 300 African American civic and union leaders, led by Dade County School 
Board Member William Turner and Commissioner Theodore Gibson, including the entire 
Miami chapter of the Urban League and the Miami Local of the Longshoreman’s Union. 
This indicated that Ferré had artfully created a formula for political success in racially 
and ethnically divided Miami. 
91
 
Ferré’s main challenger in the six-way 1973 mayoral race was Gloria Calhoun, 
who implemented a similar bilingual and tri-ethnic campaign strategy. Calhoun’s 
campaign manager was Cuban lawyer Miguel “Mike” Suarez, who had previously 
worked for Dade County mayoral candidate Jack Orr. Resorting to red baiting to cast 
suspicion on the Ferré family name, Suarez arranged for Calhoun to appear on WQBA La 
Fabulosa, where she accused Ferré’s uncle, the former Governor of Puerto Rico, of being 
a communist. Suarez also arranged for interviews with the periodiquitos to push 
Calhoun’s campaign promise to increase diversity in municipal hiring and appointments 
to reflect Miami’s Latino population. In an interview with Alerta conducted by Suarez 
himself, Calhoun claimed to have “a hundred Cubans working” on her campaign and she 
promised to include “prominent figures from the Latino community in the permanent 
government…and to name Cubans to the “most important city agencies.” Calhoun again 
emphasized her anti-communist political stance, her “respect” for the Cubans in Miami 
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and she promised to be a “voice in favor of the cause of a free Cuba.” Ferré’s campaign 
also had to endure overtly racial attacks. Describing his campaign strategy for Calhoun 
bluntly, Suarez told a reporter “Let’s face it. It is going to be Miss Blue Eyes and Blonde 
Hair against the Spic.”92 
Ferré dismissed Calhoun’s courtship of the Latino community as pure tokenism. 
He accused Calhoun of colluding with her County Commissioner husband to use the 
office of the mayor to reduce the City of Miami’s fiscal and administrative independence 
from Metro Dade County, and in doing so reduce the services available to the 
municipality’s poor black and Latino residents. Ferré frequently compared Calhoun to 
Edith Bunker, the naïve and deferential blonde housewife to Archie’s racist patriarch on 
All in the Family. Calhoun responded in kind with a healthy dose of Watergate paranoia: 
she suggested that Mayor David Kennedy was the puppet master of Ferré’s campaign, 
having personally anointed Ferré as his successor. As one attack advertisement read, “I, 
Gloria Calhoun, challenge M. Ferré to make public how David Kennedy was 
instrumental in securing Ferré’s appointment as interim mayor…what is your real 
political goal?”93  
  Ferré and Manolo Reboso, the two major Latino candidates in the race, bore the 
brunt of Calhoun’s accusations of corruption and collusion with Kennedy. Calhoun 
argued that Ferré was essentially an incumbent because he had been interim mayor, and 
that Reboso, appointed by Kennedy to fill an empty commission seat in 1970, was also 
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part of Kennedy’s political machine. Despite the accusations of political cronyism, both 
Ferré and Reboso secured endorsements from the Miami Herald, Miami News, and the 
Miami Times, the latter South Florida’s largest African American independent 
newspaper.
 94
    
The day before the election Spanish language newspapers in Miami implored 
their readers to head to the polls. Patria -- the newspaper that had once questioned 
whether Cubans should even attain residency, much less citizenship -- now beseeched 
Cubans to cast their ballot for Maurice Ferré. Editor Armando Sifredo emotionally 
explained the significance of Ferré’s candidacy by drawing attention to his ethnicity, “By 
voting for Maurice Ferré, we are enabling a Latino to become mayor. Somebody who is 
the same as us, in language, in religion, and in custom would occupy the highest office in 
Miami.” The historic nature of Ferré’s candidacy provided an extra incentive for Sifredo 
to hype his ethnicity. The Patria editor argued that a decisive vote for Ferré, without a 
run-off, would be a powerful symbol against Anglos in Miami who wanted Cubans and 
“the Hispanic influence in Miami to be absorbed into the county.” Exercising the vote 
was a means to undermine the totalitarianism of the Castro regime, as it was the “most 
powerful weapon [citizens of] free countries had.” Diario las Americas voiced their 
endorsement with equal enthusiasm, describing Ferré as a visionary beholden to no 
political machine, who would preserve the independence of the City of Miami to serve its 
residents directly and without county interference. Editor Alfredo Torres likewise called 
attention to Ferré’s ethnicity. Torres emphasized the new political consciousness and 
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civic duty of Cubans and reminded his readers “in politics Cubans are no longer 
unconscious or apathetic...and our Cuban votes should go to Ferré.”95 
Conclusion  
It was midnight on Election Day November 6, 1973, and the mood at Ferré 
campaign headquarters at 2727 Coral Way was upbeat. Ferré secured the election without 
a run off and with a plurality over his six opponents in all 82 districts. Yet it remained a 
closely contested election. Runner-up Gloria Calhoun refused to concede and accused 
Ferré of corruption, but Ferré’s victory was clear: he received 16,580 votes to Calhoun’s 
5609. Manolo Reboso, the Bay of Pigs veteran and engineer, also secured a two-year 
term on the City of Miami commission, largely on the coattails of Ferré’s bilingual voter 
mobilization. Election day polling by the Miami Herald revealed strong ethnic voting 
patterns at work in Miami; Ferré gained his widest margins in Latino precincts followed 
by the majority black precincts.  
The efforts of the Ferré campaign and the Latin League of Voters, in addition to 
the steady increase in naturalization rates among Cubans, had led to a record turnout 
among Latino voters, nearly double the number of Latino voters turned out for the 1973 
city elections as had for the 1971 city elections. Extensive outreach efforts by the 
candidates brought them into contact with tens of thousands of Latinos from all walks of 
life, like Ofelia Lebatard, a Winn-Dixie supermarket cashier and newly naturalized 
American citizen. She described casting a vote for the first time in 25 years, “It was a 
thrill to vote again. It is a sacred right everyone should exercise.” Indeed, many of 
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Miami’s Latino voters viewed Maurice Ferré’s election as mayor as the moment in which 
Latinos finally became integrated into Miami’s political institutions.96 
 Ferré’s election in 1973 marked the birth of a Latino political machine and the 
birth of the Cuban-American voting bloc in Miami. Mayor Ferré would remain in power, 
with little opposition, for twelve more years. He was re-elected six times and his office 
withstood the Mariel Boatlift, the McDuffie Riot, and at one point, the highest murder 
rate in the country.  
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CHAPTER II: THE COUNTY THAT SPEAKS YOUR LANGUAGE 
“What was so unusual about Spanish in Miami was not that it was so often spoken, but that it was so often 
heard.” – Joan Didion, Miami. 
 
Introduction 
Stocky and redheaded, Bernardo Benes stood out in the audience at the Dade 
County Board of Commissioners’ meeting on April 16, 1973. The commissioners’ 
meeting was unusually packed. Onlookers hovered in the aisles and lined the back of the 
room to watch Dade County become the first municipality in the United States with two 
official languages. Benes stood near the speaker’s podium, watching as years of activism 
came to fruition. In honor of his work, the commission anointed him as unofficial master 
of ceremonies and he concluded the roster of speakers briefing commissioners prior to 
the vote. As he concluded his statements he remarked: “Today is a beautiful day for Dade 
County and especially the 350,000 Spanish speaking people here…you are going to make 
official what is already a fact of life, that Dade County is already a bicultural county.” 97 
When the resolution reached the first five out of eight votes necessary for passage, 
the county hall erupted noisily, and the standing room only audience of Cuban and Puerto 
Rican community leaders and residents broke out spontaneously in “extraordinary” 
applause. Commissioner Harvey Ruvin answered the roll call “sí” instead of yes. Three 
more commissioners passed the resolution for a unanimous decision and, once again, the 
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assembled observers jumped to their feet and applauded thunderously, giving the 
commissioners a standing ovation.
98
  
Miami’s biculturalism and bilingualism may have been a “fact of life” to some, 
but the city was exceptional in its embrace of diversity policies, affirmative action, and 
bilingualism in local government during the 1970s. 1973 marked the turning point in the 
relationship between the local government and the growing Cuban community. The City 
of Miami elected its first Latino mayor. The Dade County Elections Board embarked on a 
highly successful voter registration effort. The Metro Dade Board of County 
Commissioners passed a resolution proclaiming Dade County “bilingual and bicultural” 
and designed an ambitious range of programming that would integrate Spanish speakers 
into county affairs, and rebrand Miami as the new capital of the Caribbean.  
These local electoral and policy victories were the result of two major factors. 
First, the transformation of previously held conceptions of race and ethnicity in which the 
assimilationist vision of the 1960s gave way to the multiculturalism of the 1970s, marked 
by the passage of the 1975 Voting Rights Act Amendment. Secondly, the local activism 
of civic-minded members of the Cuban professional class, Bernardo Benes prominent 
among them, on behalf of the expansion of political representation for Cubans and other 
Latinos in Miami.  With the wide support of grassroots organizations that ran the gamut 
from ILGWU locals to municipios, Benes and his social circle functioned as 
intermediaries between the federal government and municipal politicians. They pushed 
the notion of Cuban bilingualism and biculturalism as a positive good that would 
ultimately bolster the city’s image as a center for tourism and international business. This 
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confluence of federal and municipal reform resulted in the transformation of Miami’s 
local government and political culture in the span of only a decade.  
This chapter will use Bernardo Benes’s public life as a vehicle to understand the 
transformation of political culture in Miami in the 1970s, and to illustrate the first broad 
shift in ethnic politics nationally from assimilation to multiculturalism. First, I consider 
his cultivation of a large network of political and business allies, and his relationships 
with prominent figures in the Democratic Party as an engine to promote the 
enfranchisement and political recognition of the Cuban community in Miami. Then, I 
examine Benes’s involvement in several key local campaigns as examples of his call for 
and support of Latino political leadership. The chapter concludes with the passage of the 
1973 Bilingual Bicultural Resolution, the centerpiece of Benes’s activism, and the nadir 
of the Dade County government’s acceptance of a rising Latino political class.   
The Voting Rights Act Comes to Dade County  
Historians of twentieth century liberalism have argued that in the 1970s the 
discourse around racial justice and civil rights shifted from an emphasis on racial 
integration and assimilation to the celebration of multiculturalism and diversity. In 
critical years following WWII, policy making and social activism had largely been 
informed by liberal universalism: “a belief in the fundamental united and sameness of all 
humanity.” Progressive Americans, such as members of the American Council on Race 
Relations, embraced racial liberalism and rejected the notion of inherent differences 
between racial and ethnic groups as prejudiced and misinformed. Given this paradigm, 
69 
the 1950s and 1960s call for racial integration was the logical progression in the 
development of a more inclusive American democracy.
 99
   
The civil rights movement did much to surmount the barriers of racial 
discrimination in American civic and public life. Under federal and state mandates, 
public facilities, educational and political institutions were finally opened to African-
Americans. The federal government developed a number of progressive legal and 
employment programs to end legal segregation.
 
Between 1966 and 1979, the budget of 
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission grew from $3 million to $111 million. 
The black middle class grew and the citizens of Cleveland elected Carl Stokes as the first 
black mayor of a major U.S. city. However, as the U.S. economy slowed in the early 
1970s, it became apparent to black activists that many of economic and social gains of 
African-Americans were contingent on the largesse and interest of the federal 
government. In the late 1970s, affirmative action became synonymous with “reverse 
discrimination” as working class whites began to resent programs, such as hiring quotas, 
serving minorities. In a series of landmark decisions, the Supreme Court struck down 
affirmative action in university admissions and public school busing. Black 
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neighborhoods and schools remained segregated and underfunded; true racial justice 
remained elusive.
100
  
Influential brown and black intellectuals began to question the integrationist 
project. Albert Murray, Amiri Baraka, and Harold Cruse critiqued the progress of civil 
rights, and posed the question: “Who is being integrated into what?” What were the 
implications of assimilating into white culture? What did the acceptance of whiteness as 
the cultural ideal mean for “newly racially conscious minorities”? These questions would 
have serious implications not only for blacks, but also for Latinos and Asian Americans 
in their quest for political recognition and access to institutions of power. As a result, 
Chicano cultural nationalists and their counterparts among American Indians and Asian 
Americans gained a greater voice in the early 1970s, by rejecting “conventional reform 
politics” and instead focusing their efforts on anti-assimilationist agendas.101  
This left policymakers to question if it was possible to preserve numerous racial 
and ethnic heritages and still share the same polity. These policies still intended to 
increase representation of minorities, but not because they needed to be subsumed, rather 
because racial and cultural difference was a positive good in mainstream institutions. 
Johnson’s Immigration Reform Act of 1965 had ushered in a new era of immigration.  
The demographic change that had transformed Miami from a sleepy resort town to the 
“Gateway to the Americas,” was visible in other American cities, too; refugees from 
Vietnam settled in large numbers in New Orleans, Louisiana and Orange County, 
California. Korean immigrants became prominent business owners in Chicago and the 
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Pico Union district of Los Angeles. Policymakers embraced some of these demographic 
shifts – and slowly, “diversity” supplanted “assimilation” as the driving force behind 
affirmative action and civil rights legislation and programs.
102
 
In this context, it is crucial to consider the role of federal reform and expansion of 
enfranchisement to Latinos and other minorities via the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 
1965, before exploring the evolution of multiculturalism within Dade County’s 
government. Intended to address electoral discrimination against blacks in the South, the 
VRA curtailed state and local election officials from conducting elections without 
oversight, and authorized the U.S. Attorney General to oversee changes in local election 
laws and to appoint election monitors. However, the first iteration of the VRA failed to 
eliminate the barriers to voting that existed for Asian Americans, Hispanics, American 
Indians and other “language minorities,” except for a concession that banned literacy 
tests for five years, but only directly addressed Puerto Ricans or “persons educated in 
American-flag schools in which the prominent classroom language was other than 
English.” 103  
The limitation of the VRA in enfranchising language minorities was more 
immediately evident in Miami than anywhere else, simply because the demographics of 
the voting public in Dade County were changing at an unprecedented pace. Between 
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1970 and 1975 the percentage Dade County constituents with citizenship increased from 
12 percent of the “Spanish American” (or Latino) population to 32 percent. Lacking 
federal provisions for bilingual election materials, Miami polling places were often 
scenes of confusion, as new citizens with limited or non-existent English skills attempted 
to vote for the first time.
104
 
 Writing to Congressman Dante Fascell in 1971, Maria Hrwyniak, a bilingual 
constituent, expressed her frustration at a scene she witnessed at a polling place in 
Homestead, a rural municipality in Southern Dade County. “Last year I have [sic] the 
experience to watch a young Cuban man using his pencil in a sample ballot that another 
Cuban couple had…I turned around and told him that this was ilegal [sic] that by 
electoral laws you shouldn’t talk at all.” Hrwyniak suggested that the Dade County 
Elections Board hire bilingual inspectors to supervise future elections, because “it is very 
important for everyone to know for what and for whom they are voting.” Representative 
Fascell responded and promised he would try to recruit some “Spanish speaking 
individuals who would be interested in serving at the polls in some official capacity.” 
Cubans had settled in nearly every precinct in Dade County; the geographic and 
manpower challenges of administering a countywide election, alone made this an 
impossible task to undertake without the cooperation of the Dade County Board of 
Elections and some form of federal intervention.
105
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In 1975, Congress moved to extend the VRA’s provisions from banning electoral 
discrimination solely based on race to discrimination based on language. Following the 
literacy test ban in 1970, bilingual voting had been implemented piecemeal in some local 
elections in the Southwest with little success. In Arizona, a number of counties provided 
interpreters for Navajo speakers, but only at a few polling places and not at every 
election. Likewise, counties in California provided Spanish language ballots in some 
Latino/Chicano majority precincts in Los Angeles. Unfortunately, the Spanish ballots had 
voting instructions only in English.
106
   
The failure of local election oversight that occurred in Arizona and California 
indicated to Congress that eliminating the literacy requirement was not enough. In a 
series of VRA reauthorization hearings, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
heard extensive testimony from citizens and activists alike who argued that the dearth of 
basic public educational opportunities in Latino, Asian American, and Native American 
communities resulted in widespread English illiteracy, and as a result, 
disenfranchisement. 
In response, Congress prescribed “other remedial devices” to allow these groups 
to participate in the electoral process. Foremost among them was bilingual voting 
implemented through the use of bilingual ballots and interpreters at all polling places.
107
 
The 1975 VRA amendments established guidelines, or “eligibility formulas,” that would 
determine when localities would be mandated to provide language assistance. If a single 
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language minority accounted for more than five percent of a jurisdiction’s voting age 
citizens and the English literacy rate was below the national average, or the jurisdiction 
conducted the 1972 election solely in English and had attracted less than 50 percent of 
potential voters, then Congress required written voter materials and oral assistance be 
made available in non-English languages.
108
   
As a result, Dade County was designated a Title I jurisdiction, requiring federal 
oversight and enforcement of bilingual election procedures. After the passage of the 
Bilingual and Bicultural Ordinance of 1973, Dade County began offering bilingual voter 
materials and ballots upon request in county elections, but municipal elections remained 
single language until 1975. The Dade County Elections Board, under the leadership of 
Joyce Dieffenderfer, took an active role in providing a number of new special services 
including voter education, personnel training and registration procedures, with successful 
results. Their aggressive registration efforts led to unprecedented numbers of new Latino 
voters in 1975 and 1976. In a two-year span the number of registered Latino voters grew 
from 58 percent to 75 percent of Latino citizens. Aside from the unprecedented increase 
in voter registration of 17 percent, this percentage is particularly significant when 
compared to the population of Dade County as a whole. In 1976, only 64.5 percent of the 
eligible voting age population of Dade County was registered to vote, compared to 75 
percent of eligible voting age Latinos.
109
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Joseph Malone, Assistant Supervisor of Elections for Dade County, explained 
how the county targeted new Latino citizens for registration almost immediately after 
naturalization. Malone oversaw a cadre of county registrars who were sent to 
naturalization ceremonies armed with registration paperwork to encourage new citizens 
to register to vote immediately after the ceremony. In a massive Bicentennial themed 
ceremony held on July 4, 1976, a record 7000 new citizens, about 79 percent of them 
Cuban, were naturalized in Dade County. Through Malone’s organizing efforts, 5000 of 
these new citizens were successfully registered to vote by a Dade County Elections Board 
registrar before they left the naturalization ceremony that day.
110
  
Despite significant growth in Dade County voting power during this period 
Latinos remained a numerical minority. By the 1976 general election, Latinos comprised 
only 11.8 percent of the total Dade County voter roll. However, new election procedures 
and aggressive voter registration had an immediate impact on municipal elections. 
Latinos may have been only 11.8 percent of the county roll, but they held voter majorities 
in a number of key districts: Hialeah, Westchester, Flagami, Wynwood, and Little 
Havana. Hialeah and Sweetwater were incorporated municipalities, and the Latino 
majority was already evident in the election of Cuban municipal commissioners like 
Jorge Valdes. Flagami, Wynwood, and Little Havana were significant neighborhoods 
because they comprised a large segment of the incorporated City of Miami, the largest of 
Dade County’s municipalities. Between 1973 and 1975, Latino voters had a higher than 
average turn-out in municipal elections as well as the presidential primary (or “Florida 
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presidential preference”). In the November 4, 1975 City of Miami municipal election all 
the high turnout precincts (30 percent or above turn out) were Latino majority precincts. 
The Presidential Preference election held on March 9, 1976 had an average Latino voter 
turn out of 59 percent, with Latino majority Little Havana, Precinct 658, showing one of 
the highest turnouts in the entire county with 68 percent.
111
 
However, Dade County was not the norm. Most Title I jurisdictions had local 
election officials who were less than willing to comply with the amendments, and 
implementation problems were rampant nationally. This was partially the result of 
indifference of many white election officials to the enfranchisement of Asian Americans 
and Latinos, and antagonism towards federal intervention in state and local elections. 
Congress broadly construed the amendments, but neither they nor the U.S. Department of 
Justice provided extensive federal monitoring or federal training of election officials. 
With little federal funding or direct oversight attached to the aforementioned 
amendments, there was no incentive for local governments to extend voter registration 
drives to minority communities or to publicize the new laws. As a result, it took several 
years for the amendments to result in an increased number of minority voters at the polls. 
Despite these challenges, the amendments were extended in 1982, and eventually 
jurisdictions with large minority populations developed responsible, cost-effective, 
measures for running bilingual elections.
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Bernardo Benes and the Development of Municipal – Federal Political Networks 
Federal policy and voter registration drives were not enough to increase Cuban 
and Latino representation in local government, or to make Dade County embrace 
bilingual and bicultural Cuban. Cuban civic activists, Bernardo Benes foremost among 
them, were both the originators and beneficiaries of the emerging diversity-friendly 
policies in Miami’s local government. Benes and his allies, like their counterparts in in 
Texas and California, demanded that the language and culture of Latinos in Miami be 
respected and upheld by county and municipal government. This reveals a consistent 
foregrounding of cultural nationalism in attaining political recognition and empowerment 
for Latinos that transcended geography, country of origin and socioeconomic class. 
Benes was Vice-President of Washington Federal Savings & Loan on Miami 
Beach, one of a handful of Cuban bank executives in Miami, and was active in the 
Sephardic Jewish community, Cuban professional organizations and the Florida 
Democratic Party. He was an astute power broker who leveraged his connections across 
ethnic and religious lines throughout the county, on behalf of numerous political or social 
causes related to the plight of Cuban community in Miami. Benes was the linchpin of a 
network of civic minded and politically ambitious Latino and Jewish American bankers, 
lawyers, economists, and real estate developers who would rise to prominence in county 
and city politics and in the Florida Democratic Party.
113
  
Benes’s story of exile was a familiar one for many Cubans in Miami. Benes was 
born in Matanzas, Cuba in 1934, to Jewish parents who emigrated to the island from 
Russia and Lithuania in the 1920s. His father owned one of Cuba’s largest garment 
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manufacturing facilities, and the family enjoyed a position of relative prosperity until the 
1959 Revolution. In 1960, Benes fled to Miami temporarily leaving his wife and infant 
daughter behind, and abandoning a successful career as a lawyer and public accountant. 
In explaining his attraction to community activism, Benes recalled the feeling of up 
rootedness, alienation, and loneliness of exile he experienced almost immediately upon 
landing at Miami International Airport: “It was a terrible day, of terrible anguish, to not 
have anybody, to not be able to communicate with anybody, to have left everything: 
family, education...”114  
In December 1965, reacting to the undocumented flow of Cubans to South Florida 
during the Camarioca Boatlift, President Lyndon Johnson announced the commencement 
of the Freedom Flights. Benes approached Marshall Weiss, director of the Cuban 
Refugee Center (CRC), about creating a program to provide support to refugees at the 
airport. Weiss suggested creating a cafeteria where CRC volunteers could greet new 
arrivals and assist the thousands of Cubans arriving weekly. Benes was tasked with 
raising the funds and finding volunteers for the project. The program was a success and 
lasted until the Freedom Flights were terminated on April 6, 1973, having brought 
300,000 Cubans to the United States. Benes’s monumental undertaking and work with 
the CRC attracted the attention of the United Way of Greater Miami, and he was 
“recruited” as their point person for Cuban related community projects.115 
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The United Way was just the beginning. Benes’s position as a reform minded 
pillar of the community led to his role as the Cuban voice in the Florida Democratic 
Party. In 1968, the core of the Hubert Humphrey presidential campaign in South Florida 
was comprised of Benes, Maurice Ferré, and Arthur Courshon. Benes and City of Miami 
commissioner Maurice Ferré were among the few Latinos who organized fundraising 
events and providing logistical and financial support to the Hubert Humphrey campaign 
in South Florida. Courshon was the founder of Washington Federal Savings & Loan, the 
bank that employed Benes as a vice president.  
A Jewish WWII veteran, banker, and pioneer of condominium development in 
Miami Beach, Courshon, like Benes, was known for his civic engagement in elite social 
and political organizations in Miami and Miami Beach. Courshon rose to prominence in 
the party as co-chair of Kennedy’s campaign in Florida in 1960, and despite Kennedy’s 
loss of the state to Nixon in the election, Courshon established himself as the most 
effective fundraiser for the Democrats in Florida. Courshon was the consummate political 
insider who never ran for political office himself, serving as Chairman of the Democratic 
Party National Finance Committee. Courshon was a lifelong friend and confidante to 
both Congressman Claude Pepper and State Senator Jack D. Gordon, who was also a 
banker at Washington Federal Savings & Loan. In 1968, Courshon recognized Benes’s 
unique position as one of the handful of influential Spanish-speaking Cubans in the 
Democratic Party, and relied on his friend heavily to garner support and speak on behalf 
of the Humphrey campaign at local fundraisers and rallies in the months leading up to the 
election.
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Benes’s work for the Humphrey campaign did not go unnoticed by insiders in the 
national Democratic Party. The Democratic National Committee was very slowly 
beginning to acknowledge the political potential of Cubans in South Florida. In 
September 1968, Benes was tapped to escort Norman Stark Paul, Under Secretary of the 
Air Force and a representative of Vice President Humphrey, at a political rally on Cuban 
issues. The rally comprised a series of lectures by representatives sent by the three major 
presidential candidates, Humphrey, Nixon, and third party candidate Wallace, followed 
by a Catholic mass. Paul sent Vice President Humphrey a detailed rundown of the rally, 
and he lauded Benes as being “of tremendous assistance” during the event and his stay in 
Miami. The success of the event itself was a different matter altogether. Paul described 
the turnout, as “disappointing” and he seemed unimpressed with the speeches of the other 
representatives. In his account, Paul remarked that Governor George C. Wallace’s 
spokesman was a “real red-neck” and a “complete bore,” and that the Nixon man said 
“virtually nothing” at all. 117 
However, Paul immediately recognized the ignorance of his own party to the 
untapped voting potential of Cubans in Miami, especially in comparison to the overtures 
of the Nixon campaign: “…Nixon forces are working hard on Spanish-speaking 
communities, Cuban and otherwise…committees are being formed etc.” Paul advised 
Humphrey to address the “Cuban situation,” and prevent Cubans from feeling as if “their 
cause is gathering dust in some State Department file.” Paul’s letter reveals the extent to 
which the National Democratic Committee failed to develop a political base among 
Cubans and others Latinos in the 1960s, despite “get out the vote” efforts in Florida, 
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Texas, and California. Republican hopes to attract the Latino vote proved credible, as 
Latino Democrats were growing dissatisfied with their treatment by a Democratic Party 
unwilling to address their concerns. Paul clearly identified the concerns of Cuban voters 
specifically: a desire to be acknowledged as new citizens whose interest in Cuba was 
fundamentally American and part of a national commitment to eradicating communist 
threats worldwide, rather than a “forgotten” special interest case overshadowed by 
Vietnam.
 118
 
Congressman Claude Pepper also came to rely on Benes as his most ardent Cuban 
constituent, and as an inside connection to the Cuban community. The two men would 
collaborate on community projects and correspond extensively until Pepper’s death in 
1989. In 1967, fresh off his successful reelection the previous November, Pepper enlisted 
Benes to write editorials and biographical pieces, intended for publication in the Cuban 
periodiquitos, which emphasized Pepper’s ongoing commitment to fighting the Cold War 
and bringing freedom to Cuba. Benes used his social position and clout in the business 
community to mount a letter writing and direct mail campaign to key Cuban social 
organizations on Pepper’s behalf. In 1967, he sent Jorge Esteva, secretary of the Cuban 
Lions Club in Exile (Leones Cubanos en Exilio), a packet of materials on Pepper, 
including a short biography in Spanish, a signed photograph, and a copy of Pepper’s 
motion before Congress to acknowledge the continued efforts of the United States to 
undermine the Castro regime.
119
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In 1968, Benes drafted a Western Union Telegram celebrating the centennial of 
the Grito de Yara on Pepper’s behalf that was sent to Dr. José Vidañas, president of the 
Rotary Club of Cuba in Exile (Club Rotario de Cuba en Exilio). Greeting Vidañas on 
what is considered the birthday of Cuba’s first war of independence from Spain, the 
telegram proclaimed: “…with the efforts of all, we will soon see the free and democratic 
Cuba Martí and Céspedes dreamed of.”120  
Benes interceded frequently on Pepper’s behalf, and his correspondence indicates 
the extent to which Benes made sure that local Cuban leaders knew Pepper was their 
champion in Washington and a “longtime supporter of free immigration.” To his 
professional network of Cuban businessmen, Benes circulated copies of congressional 
press releases that ranged from extolling Pepper’s appointment of a young Cuban North 
Miami High School graduate to the U.S. Air Force Academy, to announcing Pepper’s 
sponsorship of a Small Business Administration lease guarantee grant to a Cuban 
shopping center being built in Little Havana. Benes also aided Pepper in his 
correspondence with Cuban parolee constituents seeking congressional intercession with 
the Department of State for visas, especially for family members still in Cuba or exiled 
abroad.
 121
 
In a series of correspondence between Pepper, the U.S. Ambassador to Spain, and 
Benes, Pepper sought Benes’s advice on the case of Delfina Roig, a Cuban woman whose 
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husband was exiled in Spain while she and her children were struggling to get by on a 
small Cuban Refugee Program (CRP) pension in Miami.
 
By providing Benes with copies 
of letters from Cuban families petitioning for visas or naturalization and soliciting 
feedback on handling sensitive cases, it is clear that Pepper’s office wanted to showcase 
the Congressman’s active involvement in rescuing political refugees.122  
The working relationship between Representative Pepper and Benes in the late 
1960s complicates contemporary notions of Cuban aversion to the Democratic Party. 
Rather, partisanship had little effect on how Cubans in Miami interacted with their 
elected representatives on the state and local level. In 1962, Pepper was elected to the 
newly created 3
rd
 district, which encompassed downtown Miami and Miami Beach. 
Pepper was midway through a long and storied career in which he had served both as a 
U.S. Senator and then as a U.S. Congressman representing Miami. The 3
rd
 district had a 
growing Cuban population that was liberal on domestic policy issues, but remained 
conservative on Cold War foreign policy. Pepper began his political career as a liberal 
New Dealer and staunch ally of Roosevelt, and then survived redbaiting accusations of 
communist sympathy in the early 1950s to represent the rapidly growing 3
rd
 district.
 123
   
Attuned to his newly enfranchised Cuban constituency, Pepper remained a 
stalwart Cold Warrior and took any opportunity to lambast Fidel Castro as a Soviet 
puppet and praise the patriotism of Cuban exiles on the congressional floor. Long before 
most of his Cuban constituents could cast a vote, he published Spanish campaign ads in 
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the periodiquitos, and actively courted Cuban and Latino voters in his district through his 
engagement of Cuban community organizations and social clubs, his support of the 
Cuban Refugee Program, and his hard line on communism in Latin America. Pepper 
relished his status as a prominent foe of the Castro regime. He forwarded to Benes an 
amusing transcript of a CIA intercepted Cuban radio broadcast that criticized his blind 
allegiance to the “Cuban counterrevolutionaries” residing in Florida and his “ridiculous 
ignorance” of foreign policy for calling for “direct aggression” to be launched against 
Cuba.
124
  
Ferré for County Mayor 1970  
  Benes built a network of state and national power brokers interested in the growth 
of a politically active Cuban community in Miami.  He also drew support and built 
alliances through his involvement in campaigns for municipal office. Keenly aware of the 
necessity of empowering Cuban voters and would-be voters through local elections, in 
1970 Benes became involved in the mayoral campaign of Maurice Ferré.  
 In the weeks before the run-off to the 1970 election race between Maurice Ferré and City 
of Miami Mayor Steve Clark for the position of Metro Dade County Mayor, Benes 
published a stump speech in Spanish on behalf of Ferré. In it he extolled the importance 
of voting in local elections and encouraged Cubans to head to the polls. Benes identified 
language as the primary obstacle to Cuban political participation and access to county 
services Cubans were entitled to as U.S. taxpayers. These two issues became central to 
Benes’s creation of the Bilingual and Bicultural Resolution. Benes connected the issue of 
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language directly to the election, although bilingual services were not a major platform 
issue for either candidate.
 125
 
Image 5. Bernardo Benes featured in Continental National Bank of Miami Flyer, 1977.
126
 
 
County elections were non-partisan, but Ferré was well known in the community 
as a Democrat, and Benes worried it could rankle Cuban voters more partial to 
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Republican foreign policy stances on Cuba. Reflecting these fears, Benes encouraged 
Cubans to overlook partisanship in supporting local candidates. He encouraged Cubans to 
instead consider who could do the most good for the day-to-day functioning of Dade 
County and offer the most to Cubans living in Miami: “The problem of la Patria won’t 
be resolved by the Commissioners of Hialeah or any other city…so, which candidates are 
interested in the 100,000 Cubans who live in Dade County and don’t speak English?” 
Benes acknowledged a pervasive mindset among many Cubans in Miami that the return 
to Cuba was imminent, and correctly suspected that this accounted for much of the Cuban 
apathy toward local politics.
127
   
Instead of crushing the hope of return, Benes reminded them that regardless of 
their citizenship or interest in casting a vote, they were taxpayers entitled to county 
services and the attention of public servants as long as they resided in Miami. This tactic 
allowed Cuban voters to be invested in local politics without necessarily sacrificing their 
allegiance to the political cause of a free Cuba. Benes countered a discourse that 
remained pervasive -- especially among the more extreme factions of the independent 
Cuban press in Miami -- which characterized the attainment of naturalization and 
assimilation as tantamount to betrayal of the Cuban nationalist project. Rather than 
engage directly with this discourse, Benes correctly drew attention to many of the more 
immediate concerns of Cubans such as access to affordable healthcare, and bilingual 
emergency and county administrative services that were determined by local government.  
Benes was not alone in his crusade to get Cubans to the poll in the Ferré 
campaign. Alfredo Durán, the Bay of Pigs veteran and rising star in both Dade County 
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politics and the Florida Democratic Party, led the Latin American Committee to Elect 
Maurice Ferré. Durán’s committee and dozens of canvassers devoted themselves to 
getting out the vote in Miami’s Cuban and Puerto Rican neighborhoods, recruiting 
campaign volunteers, and increasing Ferré’s visibility as the candidate who cared about 
Latinos. The Latin American committee arranged appearances and interviews on WQBA 
“La Cubanisima,” the most popular Spanish language radio station in South Florida. They 
established offices and call centers in the key Cuban majority districts of Little Havana, 
Westchester, and Hialeah. The Latin American Committee scheduled Spanish-speaking 
volunteers to telephone canvas on key dates immediately before Election Day to remind 
residents to vote and to arrange transportation to the polls if needed.
128
  
Durán emphasized Ferré’s Latino identity to sell him as a candidate to Cubans. In 
a Spanish direct mailing sent to Cuban households, Durán described Ferré as “a man who 
speaks our language, knows our problems, and has taken the charge to serve our 
community.” The Latin American Committee was not only interested in addressing the 
specific needs of Latinos, but in emphasizing the symbolic power of electing a Spanish 
speaking Latino official. They described their mission as “an essential proposition: to 
elect a Latin American mayor.” For his part, Benes wielded his connections to the Jewish 
community in Miami to form the Committee of Jewish Cubans to Elect Maurice Ferré, 
and organized a direct mailing campaign to Jewish families in Miami and Miami Beach. 
In a Spanish mailer to recruit new members, Benes and ten other eminent Cuban Jewish 
professionals promised a “dynamic and aggressive” new mayor who would resolve Dade 
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County’s “biggest problems.” The Cuban Jewish Committee also encouraged interested 
parties not eligible to vote to take part and encourage friends and family members with 
citizenship to vote for Ferré on their behalf.
 129
    
However, Ferré’s viability as a general candidate still rested largely on his ability 
to mobilize all of Dade’s ethnic interest groups, and the support of mainstream 
journalists. The Miami Herald endorsed Ferré, but merely as the only remotely viable 
candidate in a thin field. Ferré described the endorsement editorial as “90 percent about 
Steve Clark, and then…a small slap in the back for Maurice Ferré.” Clark entered the race 
late in September, and ran on a pro-developer, pro-construction platform that capitalized 
largely on his status as a “card carrying member of the carpenters union,” and on Miami’s 
booming real estate market. The two emerged as the immediate front-runners, and their 
“bloody battle” played out in the local press, and during city of Miami commission 
meetings were they frequently butted heads in the months leading up to the election.
 130
  
Ferré admitted that he knew the moment Clark entered the race that in terms of 
“racial and class politics” he was doomed. Ferré’s campaign strategy relied heavily on 
winning the support of each of Miami’s distinct ethnic voting blocs. Ferré described the 
various constituencies as such: “It’s about personalities and people…the Polish Club, the 
German American Club, the Greek vote, the Jewish vote…then of course all these senior 
citizens…and then labor was very important.” Ferré, Benes, and Durán tried to 
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outmaneuver Clark by devoting significant time to getting out the Latino vote, though 
Dade still lacked a significant Latino voting bloc.
 131
  
On Election Day, neither Ferré nor Clark secured the majority needed to win 
outright, and the election went to a hotly contested run-off. Ferré was interviewed on 
WQBA on November 15; in a last ditch appeal to Cuban voters before the run-off vote. 
In a series of questions scripted by Durán, Benes, and the Latin American Committee, the 
issues at stake for Latino voters were not so different from those that defined any county 
mayoral campaign:  inefficient trash collection, a dearth of affordable housing, 
construction of a new county hospital, and the consolidation of county and municipal 
governments. However, the interview concluded with a series of pointed questions that 
clearly addressed the Latino experience in Miami: how will county officials offer services 
to the 100,000 people in Dade County who don’t speak English? How will the county 
promote intercultural exchange between Anglos and Hispanics? Ferré’s campaign placed 
the issue of county language services and Anglo-Latin relations at the forefront of the 
campaign, and gave a sense of urgency to the plight of a growing non-English speaking 
population who were completely cut off from county services and local political life.
 132
  
The County That Speaks Your Language 
Ferré lost the 1970 election to City of Miami mayor Steve Clark, but Benes 
continued to use the campaign’s momentum to advance bilingualism as a local political 
issue. On May 6, 1971, Benes appeared before the Community Relations Board (CRB) 
on behalf of the Greater Miami Coalition to discuss bilingualism before a racially diverse 
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board of community leaders and activists. The CRB was a progressive outgrowth of the 
county government. Established in 1962 it mediated local race relations, served as an 
intermediary between civil rights groups and local government, and advised the Board of 
County Commissioners.  Drawing on evidence from surveys conducted by the Greater 
Miami Coalition, Benes took the CRB to task for what he identified as a “hostile attitude 
based on prejudice” toward Latinos among county agency employees and a general need 
for “attitudinal change” in the community.133  
Benes devoted most of his speech to identifying the projects and bilingual 
community services that had been created to serve the Spanish speaking community 
without the CRB or county support. Benes ran down the seventeen-point list that 
described the coalition building efforts of the Spanish Speaking Committee of the Great 
Miami Coalition. The Committee was created to increase Cuban and other Latino 
representation in the public and private sector and to increase Latino representation on 
the advisory boards of County agencies.  
The programs the Committee created ranged from the creation of Cuban Parent 
Teacher Associations with Dade County Schools, to organizing groups of Spanish 
speaking social workers, to the implementation of Spanish-speaking telephone operators 
and staff at Southern Bell. In his successful letter writing campaign to the Vice President 
of Southern Bell, Benes wrote that the lack of Spanish speaking staff and operators not 
only limited access to phone service but created a “poor image” of the company to the 
nearly 300,000 Spanish speaking customers Southern Bell provided service to in Dade 
County alone. The Spanish-Speaking Committee had also collaborated extensively with 
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the Dade County Board of Public Instruction to create a series of cultural education 
workshops intended to introduce Anglos and African Americans to their Cuban 
neighbors.
 134
   
Benes made it clear that efforts to increase the recognition and accommodation of 
Spanish speakers in Dade County were too often being left to Cuban groups and activists 
alone. More importantly, these small victories were doing little to combat the larger 
problem of community intolerance for Latinos, especially Cubans. He recommended that 
the CRB undertake a number of programs to make itself more accessible to the Latino 
community. Benes criticized the CRB for not employing a full-time Spanish-speaking 
staff member in its office nor having Latino representation on the board. Benes’s 
suggestions were not as concrete as many of his other recommendations to local 
organizations, but clearly he felt that the CRB offered an opportunity to change “hearts 
and minds” in creating a local climate of acceptance towards Spanish-speaking Dade 
residents.
135
  
Benes wanted the CRB to host “rap sessions” or town halls where Anglos and 
Latinos would have the opportunity to discuss community issues and form positive 
relationships in a neutral environment. The necessity of these community forums reflects 
the pervasiveness of residential segregation in Miami, which contributed to ethnic 
tensions between native Anglos, Latinos, and African Americans. Although not referred 
to in this CRB forum explicitly, the problem of de facto residential segregation is an 
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undercurrent in Benes’s dealings with the CRB, and was a major issue the CRB 
attempted to address from its founding.  
In 1971, Benes found another ally in Italian-American Congressman Dante 
Fascell. Like Claude Pepper, Fascell was a devout Cold Warrior who sponsored 
legislation to strengthen the Cuban trade embargo and increase federal aid for Cuban 
refugees during his membership on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In light of the 
inroads the Republican Party was making in Miami’s Latino communities, Fascell and 
Benes forged a bond over their shared frustration at the Democratic Party’s lack of 
interest in cultivating a Latino voting bloc in South Florida. The Nixon Administration 
was aggressively courting the Latino vote with programs like the National Economic 
Development Agency (NEDA), established by Vice President Spiro Agnew as an 
outgrowth of the Small Business Administration, which supported Latinos creating their 
own small businesses.
136
 In personal correspondence with Benes, Fascell expressed his 
disappointment with the Florida Democratic Committee’s half-hearted efforts to register 
new Cuban voters: “Neither the County nor State Committees [are] able to amount any 
significant continuing campaign…just to have some kind of an effort going, I undertook 
to write each person who became a citizen…”137  
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Benes was even more critical of the State Democratic Committee’s floundering 
outreach strategy: “While the Republican Party has been active in seeking the support of 
the Cuban-American in Dade County, the Democratic Party doesn’t show any sign of 
being alive!”138 Benes shared a rumor that a group of Cuban Republicans recruited by 
President Nixon’s re-election committee had raised the “astronomic” sum of $800,000, 
while local Democrats were incapable of even finding Cubans to pass out literature and 
register voters at naturalization ceremonies.  Benes encouraged Fascell to seek out the 
support of Durán and political maverick Reboso, two other prominent Cuban Democrats, 
and to work harder at promoting young Cuban Democrats instead of building alliances 
with Cuban Republicans, simply in the service of tokenism. Fascell agreed that Cubans 
needed to be placed in more visible positions by Democratic Party leadership, in order to 
cultivate better ties with the community, but he acknowledged that such tactics “were no 
substitute for a well-organized, highly visible [national] Democratic Party effort.”139  
Fascell received a similar warning from Mayer Finkel, the business manager of 
the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) office in Miami: that the 
Democratic Party was not paying enough attention to the fastest growing segment of 
Miami’s electorate, in contrast to the Republican Party’s push for the Latino vote. The 
garment industry in Miami was comprised almost entirely of Cuban and Puerto Rican 
women piece-workers. Finkel passed along a leaflet given to him by one of his union 
members that Republican Party representatives were passing out at naturalization 
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ceremonies. The simple mimeographed leaflet was written in Spanish and entreated new 
citizens to “participate in the selection of your governing officials, and make your 
opinion count in the regulation of taxes, the interests of the community and the busing of 
children to schools far from their homes.”140   
The ILGWU, part of the AFL-CIO, was at the center of the dwindling labor 
establishment in Miami, but even as their numbers shrunk they staunchly allied 
themselves to the Democratic Party. Finkel suggested on behalf of the ILGWU that “the 
Democratic Party set up the same sort of committees to help these new citizens…” and to 
make sure they were properly informed of the Democratic political platform. Democrats 
were failing abysmally in tailoring their message to Miami’s growing Latino population. 
Fascell was aware of this and offered Finkel the same response he offered Benes--that his 
efforts had been stymied by a lack of interest at the state and national level of the 
Democratic Party, and that there was little else he could do but gather his own 
information for campaigning purposes and reach out individually to new citizens in his 
district.
141
  
Beginning in 1971, Benes and Congressman Fascell began to assess the stability 
and change in the basic Democratic Party commitments of Miami Cuban voters in order 
to fully gauge the political potential of this rapidly growing Latino community, including 
those who were citizens but remained unregistered and did not vote. Congressman 
Fascell contacted urban demographers and geographers studying the growing Cuban 
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community in Miami in order to better understand how to campaign effectively in 
Florida’s rapidly changing 12th district. In April 1971, Fascell obtained a copy of The 
Projected Impact of Cuban Settlement on Voting Pattern in Metropolitan Miami, 
Florida., co-authored by Robert C. Mings and Paul Salter. The Democratic 
Representative’s track record in Cuban districts contradicted the study’s prediction that 
the Cuban voter “will turn Miami from a liberal stronghold to a source of conservative 
strength.”142 
More useful to Fascell, Mings and Salter identified two types of Cuban voters: 
“the exile type” and “the immigrant type.” The former expected to return to Cuba and 
was uninterested in naturalization, while the latter was “more realistic” and had begun to 
look at Miami as their permanent home. The “immigrant types” were the constituents that 
Fascell needed to target, according to the geographers. Fascell thanked Salter and Mings 
effusively for “filling an obvious void in political intelligence.” Durability of party 
identification in determining voter choice was of great import to Fascell and Benes, and 
the article as a “cause for concern” for Miami Democrats, whom Fascell felt needed to do 
more in addressing the problems of the Cuban community and reconciling “prevailing 
attitudes with [the] party…”143 
 Led by Benes, the Spanish Speaking Committee independently conducted a 
survey of the 26 Dade County Boards and discovered that Latinos were only represented 
on eight boards. Of those eight, only two boards, the Zoning Appeals Board and the 
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Transportation Advisory Committee, had more than one Latino member. Benes circulated 
the letter to every Metro Dade County Commissioner and included a copy of the survey’s 
findings. To supplement the survey, Benes commissioned Biscayne College economics 
professor Dr. Antonio Jorge to write a policy paper on the relationship between county 
services and bilingualism.
 144
    
Specifically, Benes wanted to determine what efforts had been undertaken to 
facilitate access to county programs and services for limited English proficiency and non-
English speaking residents. Benes also wanted to ascertain if County employees were 
fluent in any languages other than Spanish and exhibited sensitivity towards the culture 
of Latino residents. Jorge and Benes intended the policy paper for members of the 
Coalition and for circulation to commissioners interested in how implementation of a 
language as well as an affirmative action program could make county services and 
employment more inclusive. This did not mean assigning County employee volunteers as 
in-house interpreters, one of the ways by which government agencies often circumvented 
hiring Latinos.
145
  
Jorge’s findings confirmed Benes’s fears. In a letter accompanying the survey 
sent to Dade County Mayor Jack B. Orr in 1972, Benes decried the “disturbing” fact that 
Latinos were significantly underrepresented in all the county’s many agencies. Jorge 
framed the issue of county agencies servicing ethnic groups as part of a larger political 
discourse about the nature of cultural pluralism in the United States: “Are we striving 
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towards total assimilation…or are we laboring for cultural identity and uniqueness…?” 
The Biscayne College professor argued there were fundamentally two types of bilingual 
services the county could offer. On the one hand, it could merely offer bilingual services, 
such as training emergency response staff to respond to calls in Spanish, or provide 
publications such as county permit applications in Spanish. Alternatively, however, a 
fully bilingual and bicultural County office would deliver the services and “tailor” them 
in terms of the cultural needs of the target communities.
 146
  
On April 16, 1973, Benes’s tireless efforts came to fruition. The Dade County 
Board of Commissioners heeded his call and Miami became the only city in the United 
States with two official languages: the result of a county resolution that formally 
acknowledged the cultural place and permanence of Spanish-speaking Latinos in Dade 
County.
147
 
The Board of County Commissioners, with a single black commissioner and no 
Latino commissioners, passed the Bilingual and Bicultural Resoultion of 1973 
unanimously. Among those assembled were Bernardo Benes, Armando Lacasa of the 
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its communications with the Spanish-speaking segment of its population in order to promote a mutually 
prosperous interchange of ideas as well as a closer affinity with these citizens.” April 16, 1973, Bernardo 
Benes Papers, Cuban Heritage Collection.  
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Manpower Training Agency, Alfredo Durán, and Luis Sabines, President of the Latin 
Chamber of Commerce (CAMACOL). These individuals along with other Latino 
community leaders were invited to testify before the Commission on the resolution’s 
importance for nearly 350,000 local Spanish speakers. Their testimony proved to be a 
resounding success in justifying their position on behalf of Miami’s Latinos.148 
Image 6. Caricature of 1972-1973 Metro-Dade Board of County Commissioners 
149
 
 
However, the County Commission that passed the resolution had no idea what 
implementation of such a broad policy would actually entail. In an interview about the 
roll out of the groundbreaking legislation with the Los Angeles Times, Dade County 
Mayor Jack Orr stated flippantly, “I really don’t know…but we’ll most certainly have all 
street and office signs printed in English and Spanish…” Orr’s candor revealed the 
disconnect between the county’s intentions and the realities of serving nearly 350,000 
Latino residents, predominantly Cuban, without alienating racially biased Anglo 
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constituents. Orr’s flippant remark did not go unnoticed. Once more, Miami Herald 
Editor in Chief Don Shoemaker used the paper’s opinion and editorial pages to attack the 
values and cultures of Miami’s Latinos. The day following the resolution’s passage, the 
Herald published a short but pithy editorial criticizing the County Commissioners for 
passing legislation that “could prove costly in taxpayer’s money and county 
cohesiveness.” Shoemaker took aim at the commission’s public recognition of Miami’s 
Latinos, suggesting that the resolution served only to “belabor the obvious by translating 
the de facto situation into a de jure situation.” Shoemaker’s commentary confirmed a 
common view among Miami Anglos: Cubans and other Latinos could be tolerated as 
neighbors, or as colleagues, but not as a threat to the political order as it existed.
 150
   
Shoemaker’s editorial did not go unnoticed for it once again demonstrated the 
insensitivity of many Miamians to the causes and interests of the Cuban community. 
Outraged, Benes immediately wrote a reply to Shoemaker, addressing his “concerns” in a 
multi-point memo on Washington Federal Savings and Loan stationery. Benes 
emphasized that the resolution would serve primarily to “change the attitude of some 
people in Dade County who are supposed to be servicing the total community…”151 
Benes’s thinly veiled jab was the first of four points that answered the editorial’s 
budgetary concerns. Assuming his role as an influential local banker, Benes went on to 
frame the resolution as a source of revenue, emphasizing it could increase the “business 
potential” of U.S. firms hoping to use Miami as a stepping-stone to commercial 
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opportunities in Latin America. Clearly, Benes’s response to Shoemaker was a strategic 
choice that emphasized the economic potential of bilingualism. It was difficult to deny 
the centrality of tourism to Miami’s economy, and if offering more services in Spanish 
meant more tourists, bilingualism potentially could become a source of additional 
revenue for the county, and the resolution would be more palatable to the predominantly 
Anglo business community. Nonetheless, with the passage of the resolution Benes and 
leaders of Cuban social organizations won a victory in the ongoing battle for power 
between Miami’s white elite and the rapidly growing Latino community. 
The Implementation of a Bilingual and Bicultural Dade County 
Beginning in May 1973, the momentum of creating a new bilingual and bicultural 
local government shifted from Cuban pressure group activism to the County 
Commissioners tasked with developing the programming to carry out its mandate. Benes 
remained a central figure in local civic issues and politics, but once the resolution passed 
he shifted his attention to maintaining a Latino voter base for the Florida Democratic 
Party and later working with the Carter administration on immigration reform, and less to 
petitioning the county commission.   
With the resolution in place, the County prioritized bilingual employment 
programs (“Employment and Service Programs”), communication and signage 
improvements (“Communications Program)”, and public relations and business/tourism 
development in Latin America (“Economic Development and Tourism Industries”).152 
County Manager Ray Goode compiled a report for the Bilingual and Bicultural Task 
Force that outlined the major areas to be targeted by the program. The task force was as a 
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precursor to the Office of Latin Affairs, and broadly concerned itself with only the three 
major areas. The Task Force was made up of five members, all county employees, and 
reported directly to the Board of County Commissioners and Mayor Orr. Jorge Guerra, 
Emilio Caballero, and Salvador Lew were newly naturalized Cuban refugees employed in 
Human Resources Administration. María Casellas, from the Department of Public 
Employment, represented Puerto Rican interests, and Fernando Pro from the South Dade 
Government Center, was the Mexican American representative.
153
  
In a city where migration consistently outpaced policy and legislation, everybody 
anticipated that a formal County resolution would facilitate the earmark of funds and the 
creation of County employee training programs and offices to effectively provide public 
services to Cuban and other Spanish-speaking residents on a day-to-day basis. Language 
training for County emergency and hospital employees, bilingual signage, bilingual forms 
and permit applications had long been demanded by Cuban community leaders and 
community activists, as well as the County’s multi-ethnic Community Relations Board.  
 Indeed, the resolution eventually did provide for these basic needs and also an 
assortment of new public relations programs that would connect ordinary Cuban residents 
to their County Commissioners and civil servants. And, it implemented a marketing and 
advertising strategy to develop a new identity for Miami as a tourist destination friendly 
to free-spending Latin American visitors. The resolution was couched in the language of 
a client – provider relationship. Thereby, the Cuban community had finally earned “the 
right to be serviced and heard” because of their new status as American citizens and their 
contributions to the local economy as taxpayers and consumers. Businesses and 
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politicians sought Cubans as clients and as voters, without acknowledging realignment in 
local power relations or the cultural hegemony of English speaking Anglos in the area.
154
  
In 1973, Latinos made up only 8 percent of county employees but 20 percent of 
county residents. Utilizing current employees saved the County the initial cost of new 
hires and, in theory, would provide role models for new Latino and minority county 
employees brought in under the Resolution’s affirmative action push. The county also 
sought to augment the existing employment training programs SABER and EMPLEO by 
seeking additional federal and state funding on their behalf as another means to train 
future Latino public service employees. On January 29, 1973, in a precursor to the 
passage of the resolution, and under pressure from activists like Benes and Dr. Antonio 
Jorge, the Dade County Personnel Department abolished the written English test for 100 
different government positions, and appointed a minority job counselor. A Cuban 
community activist, Ray Muniz, was tasked with pre-screening Spanish speaking 
applicants, and then forwarding their applications to the appropriate hiring personnel.
 155
 
Managerial and administrative positions still required the English exam, however, 
and Spanish-speaking applicants were limited to jobs as clerks or typists, as well as 
building trades and laborer positions. One of the Task Force’s first activities was to 
inventory available employment opportunities for Latinos in county offices. It discovered 
that Latinos were a very small percentage of county employees in administrative and 
managerial positions, and only marginally better represented at the lower levels as 
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transportation workers, janitorial staff, etc. And of the public office holders in the county, 
only two were Latino, City of Miami Mayor Maurice Ferré and City of Miami 
Commissioner Manolo Reboso. Both positions were appointed.  
The County relied heavily on non-profit and government efforts to provide job 
training and evaluation of employment opportunities for Latinos seeking public 
employment. SABER (Spanish American Basic Education and Rehabilitation) was 
particularly successful in this partnership. Created in 1971, SABER relied on a 
combination of grants from the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center and the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to provide referral services for Spanish 
speaking residents seeking county services or employment. SABER evaluated 
manpower-training needs in the Cuban community and provided training and workshops 
for Spanish speakers seeking county employment. Comprised mainly of former Cuban 
Refugee Program officials like lawyer Armando Lacasa, SABER was criticized for its 
success at securing a number of large federal grants totaling nearly $2 million between 
1972 and 1973. However, federal monies remained a fixture of county affirmative action 
efforts, and organizations like SABER were the county’s first point of contact for Latinos 
seeking public employment.
156
  
With Cuban led organizations making progress in providing job training, the 
County Commission next set its sight on extending the communications program to 
public safety agencies such as the Dade County Fire Department and Jackson Memorial 
Hospital. Jackson was the county’s primary public medical facility, and addressing the 
role of the language barrier in providing adequate care received considerable attention as 
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a local public health crisis. Jackson’s lack of bilingual medical and administrative 
employees made the hospital a frequent target of criticism and derision in the Cuban 
press and from the Community Relations Board.  
As early as 1961, Spanish-speaking patients frequently complained of receiving 
subpar care or being ignored altogether by medical and nursing staff. Patients were forced 
to rely on family members or passerby for help translating intake paperwork, diagnoses 
and even basic instructions from medical staff. To deal with this problem, the Task Force 
immediately established six bilingual “Complaint Officers” who would be available to 
handle telephone inquiries and walk-ins at the hospital round the clock. Additionally, the 
hospital began to offer basic Spanish language training to its medical staff, and actively 
recruit bilingual doctors and nurses as new hires. Public display signs also fell under the 
aggressive communications program, and the county devoted funding to placing new 
signage in Spanish throughout county facilities and public offices. Additionally, any 
booklets, informational pamphlets, and forms published by Dade County would be 
translated into Spanish.
157
  
Under the third prong of the Task Force’s implementation scheme, the county 
mounted an ambitious plan to use the resolution and its newfound acceptance of Miami’s 
latinidad as a platform for a major economic and tourism development campaign, and to 
cultivate business ties between Miami and Latin America In May 1973, Commissioner 
Harvey Ruvin, a veteran of county politics, suggested that Dade County open its own 
consular-style offices in Latin America, and provided a list of Latin American consuls in 
Miami who might be interested in pursuing a partnership as a means to boost tourism, 
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business interests, “clean industry,” and advance Miami’s internationalized image abroad. 
Concerns about the county’s image as “Latin friendly” was not limited to tourism. The 
Task Force also provided funds for the creation of a Hispanic Heritage Week that 
publicly honor the city’s Latino heritage and would provide new opportunities for Latino 
focused business development in Miami.
158
  
The County Commission outlined a four-part plan for Hispanic Heritage Week 
that relied heavily on building relationships with CAMACOL, the Spanish Consul in 
Miami, and the consular offices of eighteen Latin American countries. The offices would 
be given opportunities to participate in Hispanic Heritage Week and other cultural events, 
in exchange for opportunities for Dade County to advertise itself abroad. Likewise, the 
county planned an advertising campaign with the Metro Publicity and Tourism 
Department, themed around celebrating the passage of the ordinance. Airlines, cruise 
lines, and shipping companies would be invited to create bilingual themed advertisements 
to promote themselves and, by proxy, Miami in Spain, Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
159
  
The County Commission envisioned a more active Office of Latin Affairs (OLA) 
that would expand the scope of the resolution beyond affirmative action and 
communications, to develop a successfully media policy and encompass a major public 
relations and tourism development campaign. In 1977, the County undertook a major 
search to appoint a new Director of Latin Affairs. The new position would involve both 
                                                 
158
 Memorandum to Mayor and Commissioners from County Manager Ray Goode, 29 May 1973, Office of 
Latin Affairs Files, Box 05-335, Miami-Dade County Clerk of Courts. 
 
159
 Memorandum to Mayor and Commissioners from County Manager Ray Goode, Miami, 29 May 1973, 
Office of Latin Affairs Files, Box 05-335, Miami-Dade County Clerk of Courts. 
 
106 
administrative duties such as overseeing Hispanic Heritage Week, and coordinating 
federal grants for Latino employment training as well as a public relations component. As 
the visibility of the OLA grew, the county needed an effective spokesperson that could 
handle all inquiries from the public and the press.  
Dr. Aida Levitan was the young Academic Dean of Latin Affairs at Biscayne 
College when she saw the ad for Director of Latin Affairs position in the classifieds of 
the Miami Herald. Levitan immigrated to Miami Beach from Cuba as a teenager, and like 
Bernardo Benes and others of the Cuban professional class, she had managed to scale the 
professional ladder to become the youngest dean at Biscayne College. The latter was no 
small accomplishment for a Latina. Prior to her position at Biscayne, she oversaw the 
implementation of Operation Buen Besino (Good Neighbor) in the City of Miami Police 
Department between 1974 and 1975. The program was intended to train police officers in 
cultural sensitivity and tolerance towards the Latino community and to communicate 
effectively with Latino citizens on the job. The program also provided remedial education 
to minority police candidates brought in to the academy under court ordered 
integration.
160
  
Levitan was interested in returning to public service when she saw the ad. “You 
could see the Cuban community just beginning to assert itself politically,” Levitan 
recalled, “but the community was totally ignorant about what was going on in county 
government.” With the Bilingual Bicultural Resolution in place, Levitan envisioned 
herself as a public facing liaison between the Latino community and the government. She 
studied every publication the League of Women Voters produced on Metro Dade County 
                                                 
160
 Dr. Aida Levitan in discussion with the author, 8 November 2014. 
 
107 
and “moved everyone [she] knew” to get an interview for the Latin Affairs job. When she 
finally sat before the hiring committee, led by County Manager Merrett Stierheim and 
Assistant County Manager Dewey Knight, the administrators were stunned by her 
knowledge of arcane county legislation and policy. They immediately offered her the 
position.  
Image 7. Aida Levitan, Director of the Metro Dade Office of Latin Affairs.
161
 
 
Blonde, gregarious, and impeccably dressed, Levitan immediately began to make 
contact with the local television and radio stations to build interest and enthusiasm for the 
work of the OLA, while overseeing a number of federal programs run out of her office. 
She was the public face that the County had been unable to find as it shuffled internal 
candidates in and out of the position between 1974 and 1977. It may have been Benes’s 
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vision that made the Bilingual and Bicultural Resolution a reality, but it was Levitan’s 
charismatic personality and public relations acumen that made the work of the OLA 
visible and relevant to a wide audience. Predictably, not everyone in Miami was thrilled 
with the multicultural, pro-Latino county programming of the OLA. At a time of 
economic and political struggle for control of Miami, anti-Cuban sentiment was at its 
peak. Anonymous bomb threats were called-in to Levitan’s office at the Metro-Dade 
Building on Flagler Street with weekly regularity during Levitan’s first year as director. 
Levitan remained undeterred in her commitment to the work of OLA. She relied on many 
of the federal connections that Benes had forged and conferred with Senator Lawton 
Chiles and Congressman Pepper about funding opportunities for Metro Dade’s CETA 
(Comprehensive Education and Training Act) programs for Latinos, and the licensure 
program for Cuban professionals seeking work in the United States.
162
  
Hispanic Heritage Week was the only annual public event, “a tiny little 
celebration,” hosted by the Office of Latin Affairs. Before Levitan’s appointment, the 
festival had relied on county and state grants to fund the celebration’s limited offerings. 
Upon a suggestion from a well-known financial adviser and local philanthropist, Fred 
Berens, Levitan began to promote the event’s sponsorship to local corporations such as 
Eastern Airlines interested in penetrating the Hispanic consumer market and raising their 
profile with Latinos. By 1980, Levitan had raised almost $300,000 in sponsorship funds, 
and Hispanic Heritage Week became the Hispanic Heritage Festival. The new month-
long event drew thousands of locals to programs like “Discovery of the Americas Day” 
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which commemorated the Spanish exploration of Florida, and the “Market of the 
Americas,” which featured vendors from all over the Spanish-speaking world.163  
The shift to include business development under the auspices of the OLA was a 
shrewd one. Latinos in Miami were becoming naturalized, registering to vote, and 
entering the middle class in ever-greater numbers. The problems of U.S. citizenship and 
assimilation became less pressing. Thus, Cuban organizations and County agencies could 
begin developing Latino-serving business partnerships and Latino entrepreneurship 
through free enterprise focused programs. As Bernardo Benes and the County 
Commission had envisioned, Miami’s bilingual and bicultural citizenry provided a wealth 
of new opportunities for municipal economic development through international business 
partnerships and the creation of a tourist sector that catered primarily to Latin America, 
Spain and the Caribbean.  
Conclusion 
In the years after the passage of the 1973 Bilingual and Bicultural Resolution, 
Bernardo Benes turned his attention from domestic affairs to diplomatic ones. In 1976, 
Benes became part of the inner circle of the Carter Administration, thanks to his work on 
behalf of President Carter’s campaign in South Florida. In 1977, Benes was approached 
by Ricardo De La Espriella, the vice-president of Panama, whom Benes had become 
friendly with while doing contract work in Panama for the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). De La Espriella encouraged Benes to take his 
family on a vacation to Panama. Benes had close ties to the country through his work 
with the USAID and the United Way and out of a sense of personal obligation he 
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accepted De La Espriella’s invitation. On the trip, Benes was approached by a number of 
high-level Cuban intelligence officials interested in Benes’s connections to the White 
House, and in the possibility of opening a diplomatic dialogue with the United States. 
The diplomatic negotiations led by Benes and held in Cuba and Panama in the following 
months resulted in the release of 2000 political prisoners from Cuba to their families in 
exile. However, many in the Cuban community saw Benes’s role as a mediator in el 
diálogo as akin to treason, and the man who had once been the self-described “first token 
Cuban in Miami” became a social and political outcast. Derided in the exile press as a 
stooge for the Castro regime, picketers lined up outside his office at Continental National 
Bank. Benes continued to be active in Democratic Party politics and in banking, but in 
Miami his stature and the memory of his activism on behalf of the Cuban community was 
largely forgotten or erased from public memory.
164
  
However, the legacy of Benes’s work is clear. The 1973 Bilingual and Bicultural 
Resolution subverted an ages old notion that immigrant culture is inevitably subsumed by 
the English language and American culture in the process of assimilation, and moreover 
that immigrant status should be synonymous with lack of political, economic, and 
cultural power. By the mid-1970s the cultural and political hegemony that Anglos held in 
Miami began to dissipate. As bilingualism and biculturalism became more than just a 
resolution or a mandate for county services and lived reality in Miami meant navigating a 
visibility multilingual and multiethnic urban landscape, Anglos became publicly less 
tolerant of the so-called “latinization” of the city.  
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Significantly, the rapid demographic change in Miami wrought by the Cuban 
Revolution, occurred simultaneously as African Americans in Miami achieved limited 
political and economic gains through the civil rights legislation and the passage of federal 
civil rights and voting rights legislation in the 1960s. Whites in South Florida were 
confronted not only with a politically and economically ascendant Cuban population. 
Black Miamians were elected to both the City of Miami and Dade County Commissions, 
the Dade County School Board and Dade County School Superintendent’s Office, and as 
County Manager.
165
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CHAPTER III: A CITY UNDER SIEGE 
“What is United States culture? After all, Florida was discovered by Ponce de Leon and certainly 
Spanish was spoken here long before English.” – Murray Greenberg, Dade Assistant County 
Attorney, 1981. 
 
Introduction  
 The plume of black smoke from the Norton Tire Company fire could be seen from 
I-95. As night fell on Saturday May 18, 1980 the acrid smell of burning tires drifted 
through Liberty City, Miami’s largest black neighborhood. That afternoon at 2:36pm, the 
48-day trial of four police officers charged with bludgeoning black insurance salesman 
and Liberty City resident, Arthur McDuffie, to death came to an end. After two hours of 
deliberation, the all white, all male, Tampa jury found the four officers not guilty and 
acquitted them of all charges. Former Officer Alex Marrero, accused of being the 
ringleader who dealt the fatal blows to the back of McDuffie’s skull with a Kel-lite 
nightstick, openly wept in relief in the courtroom. His fellow officers, Michael Watts, 
Sgt. Ira Diggs, Sgt. Herbert Evans Jr., followed suit. In the gallery, Arthur McDuffie’s 
mother, Eula Belle McDuffie, stifled a scream and staggered out of the courtroom where 
she collapsed in the hallway. “They’re guilty! They’re guilty! They’re guilty! God will 
take care of them now.”166  
 Despite the protestations of Dade County State Attorney Janet Reno, The trial was 
moved from Miami to Tampa early in the jury selection process. The defense argued that 
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the officers would never receive a fair trial in Miami, and Circuit Judge Lenore Nesbin 
feared the trial would draw angry crowds of protestors to the courthouse or worse yet, 
that an unpopular verdict would incite a race riot. Moving the trial to another city could 
not stop the daily television and radio updates of the trial’s progress. On Friday May 17, 
1980 the verdict from Tampa was reported instantaneously; a special bulletin interrupted 
regular programming on local radio and television in Miami. In Liberty City, a small 
crowd of 80 had gathered in African Square Park to listen to Public Safety Director 
Bobby Jones, who was scheduled to discuss improving relations between police and the 
African American community. News of the verdict percolated in the crowd of frustrated 
onlookers, while Jones gave his speech without a single mention of McDuffie. A local 
resident remarked ominously to a reporter, “with all that has happened with the Cubans 
and Haitians, we did not need that [the verdict]...there are going to be some terrible 
repercussions behind this.” Jones, unperturbed by the visibly tense crowd, told the Miami 
Herald that he did not predict any violence. 
The crowd moved from African Square to Liberty City’s main thoroughfare at 
62
nd
 Street or a few blocks away on N.W. 12
th
 Avenue at the Metro Public Safety 
Department Headquarters. At both points the crowd picked up onlookers and their 
numbers swelled. Teenagers threw rocks and bottles at passing white motorists, while 
others lit fires in trashcans along the street. At the PSD Headquarters, the crowd grew 
from perhaps eighty to a couple thousand by 9pm.  The protestors broke down the door 
and rushed the building. In a span of three hours the deadliest riot in Miami’s history had 
begun, and the chaos would not relent for three days.
167
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 April and May were tumultuous months in Miami. Every morning the Miami 
Herald reported new arrivals of refugees from Cuba and Haiti to Key West, and the 
McDuffie Trial unfolded nightly on the evening news. The day before the McDuffie 
verdict devastated Miami’s black community, an overloaded boat on route from Mariel to 
Key West sunk in the Florida Straits. The Olo Yumi was overloaded with passengers 
when it sunk and fourteen Cuban refugees and the skipper drowned before the U.S. Coast 
Guard located the vessel and rescued the remaining passengers.  The Herald described 
Miami as a “city under siege,” and local events seemed to reflect a national mood of 
despair. As refugees washed on shore in Key West and Liberty City self-immolated, in 
affluent Coral Gables a nascent conservative movement was brewing.  
In 1980, Miami was the birthplace of an anti-immigrant conservative movement 
known as English-Only and later, U.S. English. Loosely connected to the conservative 
political movement that would usher in the Reagan administration, English-Only 
supporters sought to restore Miami to its “Old Florida” roots. Mariel and McDuffie were 
worst nightmares realized: racial tensions and immigration gone horrifically awry. These 
political crises were perfect opportunities for the English Only movement to advance its 
cause. English Only built on the local long simmering resentment to the Cuban Refugee 
Program and Latinos in Miami that had previously only manifested itself in constituent 
letters, editorials, and town hall meetings.  
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Image 8. The Miami Herald’s Tropic Magazine 1980 Year in Review168 
 
English Only also arose in response to the rapid demographic changes in South 
Florida between 1960 and 1980. As one Dade resident explained in a 1981 survey: “it’s 
the numbers that give them this foothold…and there isn’t anything we can do about it.”169 
English-Only activists may have rallied against the “Cuban take-over,” Miami had 
become the number one destination for all immigrants to the United States, especially 
immigrants from Latin American and the Caribbean. Ironically, while conservative 
activists claimed that Spanish speakers were turning Miami into a third world “cultural 
ghetto” devoid of traditional American values, Cuban visibility in mainstream 
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institutions, Cuban voter registration and Cuban economic prosperity in Miami was at its 
peak.
 170
  
In the post Civil Rights milieu of mainstream American politics, it was not 
socially acceptable to organize around the overt exclusion of certain racial or ethnic 
groups. The English Only movement replaced race with language as a means of defining 
inclusion and exclusion.
171
 Race was perceived as an immutable quality, but language 
was a choice. Non-Hispanic whites in South Florida fixated on language as the primary 
symbol for the erosion of American values and the loss of the old Florida. In the face of 
rapid demographic change, language politics served as an opportunity to maintain group 
identity and define the cultural borders of the community.
 
Choosing to speak English or 
refusing to engage with Spanish speakers became an act of “everyday resistance.” 
Speaking English in a Latino dominated public space staked a claim to power based on a 
native white identity, which may have been eroded locally but still held meaning in 
mainstream America.
172
  
Led by conservative activist Emmy Shafer, Citizens of Dade United’s (CDU) 
anti-bilingual crusade tapped into the strength of white ethnic politics that had been a 
central feature of Richard Nixon’s political pandering to the white working class. White 
ethnics also identified as “PIGS – Poles, Italians, Greeks and Slavs,” emerged as self 
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aware interest group in the early 1970s, and were the bulk of Nixon’s “Silent Majority.”  
These second and third generation descendants of European immigrants were 
disillusioned with the civil rights movement and alienated by the radical elements of the 
Democratic Party. Ethnic political activity and ethnic lobbying existed throughout the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, but in the 1970s and 1980s these cultural 
identities took on new political meaning in the face of a number of civil rights 
movements after World War II. Ethnic neighborhoods gave way to suburbs, 
intermarriage eroded linguistic ties, and attendance in religious institutions plummeted. In 
cities, ethnic difference was also diminished by the prevalence of racial segregation. The 
law distinguished between only black and white.  However, the homogeneity of post-war 
consumer culture led some Americans to return to their European cultural heritage as a 
source of authenticity and connection to the past. While in a large part this revival was 
performative, it had very real political and social consequences. White ethnicity 
“reflected the insecurity of Americans, especially those whose parents were working 
class European immigrants, and whose hold on the middle class status was precarious.”173   
Language politics in Miami functioned as a vehicle for claims to white privilege 
in an historical moment when asserting status based on race was politically and socially 
unacceptable, just as embracing white ethnic identity was a means to assert citizenship 
rights in the post-affirmative action era. The English Only movement in South Florida, 
comprised largely of lower middle class or working class European descended or 
European immigrants from Germany and Russia, was a direct inheritor of the political 
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interests and discursive language of the white ethnic revival.  This chapter will argue that 
much like the white ethnic revival that preceded it, the English Only or Anti-Bilingual 
movement achieved “token” attention from elected officials and policy makers, and 
limited policy recognition. Careful consideration of the interactions and relationships 
between local politicians, county administrators, and local civic organizations in the 
aftermath of the 1980 Anti-Bilingual Ordinance reveal the last gasps of white political 
hegemony in South Florida, and the rocky transition to a local government increasingly 
administered by and for Latino voters.  
County Question #2: Emmy Shafer and Citizens of Dade United 
Emmy Shafer emerged on the local scene in the miserable summer of 1980. In the 
wake of the Mariel Boatlift, and the McDuffie Riots, Shafer captivated the attention of 
the local press with her petition drive for a referendum to outlaw the use of Spanish in 
county business, and to overturn the 1973 Bilingual and Bicultural Resolution. Little is 
known about Shafer before she arrived in Miami, other than she was born Alexandra 
Emmy Wiendmuller, in Rustov, Russia in 1935. Shafer developed a personal mythology 
in which she fashioned herself the “ultimate immigrant.” Six months after she arrived in 
the United States, she spoke fluent English. Six months after that she was ready to take 
the oath of citizenship, and she was so overcome with emotion during the citizenship 
ceremony, that she fainted during the pledge allegiance. The Miami Herald described her 
as “the perfect choice to lead the flag waving masses.” 174  
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Shafer’s folksy delivery and political message steeped in nostalgia appealed 
directly to the resentments of Miami Anglos feeling besieged by racial violence and the 
unending waves of Latin immigration. Shafer’s simple battle cry was that “the American 
people would like to have their community back the way it was!” Shafer singlehandedly 
ran the petition drive and secured the 26,213 signatures necessary to get her referendum 
on the November 4, 1980 ballot under the auspices of Citizens of Dade United (CDU). 
Shafer created the organization with the help of one other woman, her vice president 
Marion Plunske.
 
Plunske initially supported the cause simply by providing Shafer with 
office space and telephone, and then later accompanied Shafer on radio interviews and to 
public speaking engagements before civic audiences.
 175
   
Shafer’s referendum campaign was unusual in its use of relatively low-cost 
campaigning tactics. There were no newspaper advertisements, television spots, or 
billboards. Shafer’s media appearances were limited to radio and newspaper interviews. 
The referendum gained traction primarily through word of mouth, as even local civic 
organizations lent little outright support. The Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce and 
League of Women Voters, who usually took strong and public sides on local issues, 
refused to take a stance on the referendum. The League of Women Voters refused to 
publicly support the referendum because they felt the specific language was obscure, but 
they made clear that this stance did not necessarily mean they supported or opposed the 
issue of official bilingualism in Dade County. Annie Ackerman, a veteran civic activist 
and organizer on behalf of county issues, also steered clear of offering her support to 
CDU, although she privately opposed the referendum. Ackerman was fearful that the 
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referendum would antagonize voters she was trying to recruit for the 1980 Carter 
campaign.
176
   
The Miami Herald, which had been intermittently critical of the Cuban 
community’s involvement in anti-communist activity and politics, published a strongly 
worded editorial prior to Election Day warning voters of the repercussions of the English 
Only referendum. The editorial board of the Herald took a position similar to the county 
commissioners who opposed the referendum. Beyond the moral questionability of 
legislating cultural practices, the referendum posed a serious threat to Miami’s tourist 
sector. Limiting funding for translation, signage, and services to accommodate foreign 
tourists would create an inhospitable environment for the scores of tourists, business 
travelers, and foreign investors, who powered Miami’s economy, and were its “most 
promising source of economic growth.” Echoing Bernardo Benes and other Cuban civic 
activists, the Herald argued that the referendum placed an undue burden on the neediest 
members of the community, predominantly the elderly, whose access to county 
emergency and medical services would be curtailed by the referendum.
177
 
Cuban organizations were not afraid of antagonizing voters and came out 
swinging against Shafer’s referendum. Efforts to organize against the referendum were 
led by SALAD’s Eduardo Padrón. Padrón acknowledged that the efforts against the 
referendum might be a “lost cause” but that his organization was going to work until the 
polls closed to educate voters on the repercussions on the ordinance. The racial subtext of 
the ordinance was not lost on Cuban activists either. John Diaz of United Cuban 
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Americans of Dade accused Shafer of “trying to sell hatred by selling the American flag.” 
Padrón pointed out that the referendum while claiming to promote unity between Dade’s 
ethnic groups would only encourage “full recognition of the racism that exists in Dade 
County…and make the Cuban community more united and more militant.” Other 
prominent Cuban community leaders like Miami Dade College Professor Manuel 
Mendoza characterized the referendum as an attempt to force a certain mode of “one way 
assimilation” on Cubans, which was in direct conflict with the desire of Cubans and other 
Latinos who wished to “preserve a lot of [our] traditions even as we Americanize.” 
Mendoza’s characterization reflects most acutely what was at stake for each group on 
either side of the referendum: for Anglos, a means for Cubans to fully assimilate and 
submit to American mainstream cultural norms, and for Cubans and other Latinos, a 
desire to assimilate, but on their own terms.
 178
   
It is not a coincidence that the referendum appeared in a year that was a watershed 
in Miami’s demographic and political transformation. In 1980, for the first time the 
percentage of Latinos (41 percent) and non-Latin whites (43 percent) were nearly 
equitable. By the end of the Mariel Boatlift, the scales would tip towards making Dade 
County a minority majority area. However, Latinos still remained a 25 percent minority 
of registered voters, and no Latino candidate had been elected in a countywide election. 
However, the municipal commissions of the City of Miami and the City of Hialeah each 
had a majority of Latino commissioners.
179
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The 1980 race for the 14
th
 Congressional District provides an excellent example 
of the slow pace of political transformation in South Florida. Maurice Ferré had captured 
the mayoral office in the City of Miami in 1973, but a Latino congressman remained 
elusive. In a repeat of the 1976 race for the 14th, Cuban real estate salesman Evelio 
Estrella faced Claude Pepper, the “grand old man of Florida politics.” In 1976, Pepper 
beat Estrella handily with a 73-27 majority. Undeterred by his prior loss, Estrella hoped 
to capitalize on the Republican momentum generated by the Reagan campaign and the 
heavy Latino turnout predicted because of the English Only referendum. Pepper, on the 
other hand, was so confident that he would win the district he had held since 1962 that he 
did not bother to even campaign in Miami the last week before Election Day. Choosing 
instead to devote his time to stumping on behalf of President Carter in Connecticut.
 180
 
Pepper’s confidence was not without reason. Estrella barely spoke a word of 
English, but he was convinced that he could capture the district and its 70,000 Cuban 
residents because he was Cuban. A self-funded perennial candidate, Estrella had run 
unsuccessfully in 1967, 1971, and 1973 for Mayor of Miami, county commissioner, and 
municipal commissioner. A deeply conservative Republican who named his youngest son 
Richard Nixon Estrella in honor of the former president, Estrella’s inability to speak 
English limited his ability to gain traction with conservative Christian groups organizing 
in South Florida, such as the Parents Political Action Committee. The Dade County 
Republican Party distanced itself from Estrella and excluded him from a Republican 
                                                 
180
 George Stein, “Confident Pepper Passes Up Campaign Trail,” Miami Herald, 1 November 1980, 3B.  
 
123 
Party mailer that featured all the other Republican candidates for local congressional 
races.
181
  
 On November 4, 1980, Dade County voters approved the new ordinance with a 60 
percent majority. Almost immediately resistance emerged from two major interest 
groups: the Metro-Dade Commission and Cuban civic groups led by SALAD. The new 
policy presented a host of problems for the Dade County Commission, who over the 
course of seven years had developed extensive programming and publications to serve 
the Spanish speaking community. The language of the ordinance was at once vague and 
expansive, leaving considerable room for interpretation.  
Image 9. Full Text of the Anti-Bilingual Referendum. 
182
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The day after the ordinance’s passage, County Manager Merrett Stierheim 
released a copy of the new ordinance to the head of every county department with 
explicit instructions to immediately suspend any expenditure of county funds on printing 
new materials in Spanish, and suspend pending Spanish language programming. 
Stierheim instructed his department heads that the only exceptions to the new ordinance 
were for emergency materials or communications, or for publications and programs 
funded exclusively through federal and state sources. He also instructed them to avoid 
any public comment on the new ordinance, while he enlisted the aid of the Dade County 
Attorney Robert Ginsburg, and Assistant County Attorney Murray Greenberg to 
investigate the legality and precedent of the new ordinance, and to parse through the 
onslaught of questions from department heads as to what could and could not be 
translated into Spanish.
183
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Image 10. Emmy Shafer Serves Champagne on Election Night.
184
 
 
Stierheim’s instructions were met with incredulity and confusion from agency 
administrators. Correspondence between Stierheim and the heads of county agencies 
reveals that the original 1973 resolution had actually been cost and labor effective in 
terms of providing services for Spanish speakers efficiently. Likewise, the efficacy of the 
county’s affirmative action efforts in the early 1970s meant that even without county 
funds to explicitly serve Latinos, there were enough bilingual employees scattered 
throughout county agencies to somewhat handle inquiries in Spanish.  
A.D. Moore, director of the county’s solid waste collection division, responded to 
Stierheim’s instructions by noting that while his agency felt the new ordinance would 
“hamper (the) ability to communicate” with Spanish speaking citizens, 22 percent of his 
administrative personnel were bilingual and could at least handle phone inquiries. Some 
agency directors were confused as to whether they could address or handle Spanish 
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language inquiries at all. Reginald Walters, Director of Planning, inquired as to whether 
his employees could use “non-English languages in responding to direct oral or telephone 
inquiries” and whether his planning reports could even make reference to specific 
community services that might be required by Cubans or Haitians.
185
   
As confusion from county agency administrators mounted, it became clear that 
the commission needed to enlist legal counsel to interpret the vague wording of the 
ordinance. County employees and administrators were uncertain how the ordinance 
would change their day-to-day operations, and which violations of the ordinance would 
incite the wrath of the hyper vigilant members of Citizens for Dade United. Sensing an 
impending battle, Stierheim and County Mayor Steve Clark, relied on Robert Ginsburg 
and Murray Greenberg, in the Dade County Attorney’s Office, to interpret the nuances of 
the ordinance and provide a primer for agency administrators struggling to advise their 
employees. Greenberg was tasked with handling all public and press inquiries about the 
ordinance. 
Shafer, CDU and the referendum were wildly unpopular with the commission, 
county administrators, and many local civic leaders; by allowing Greenberg to act as the 
sole county spokesperson on the ordinance, Stierheim headed off the possibility of a 
public relations nightmare. In an interview with the Palm Beach Post about the 
ordinance, Greenberg remained neutral on its racial dimensions, only conceding that the 
ordinance’s language was “all embracing and legally confusing.” Others were not so 
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diplomatic. Monsignor Bryan O. Walsh, director of social services for the Catholic 
diocese of Miami, described the successful referendum simply as “a racist vote.” A 
county official speaking under the condition of anonymity to the Post, described the vote 
as disastrous for Miami’s Latin American reliant tourist industry and retail trade: “these 
people might kill the goose that lays the golden eggs!”186   
 In the 1970s, influenced by federal affirmative action and diversity programs, 
Metro Dade shifted towards a policy of bilingualism and biculturalism in dealing with 
Miami’s growing Latino constituency. They registered new Cuban citizens to vote en 
masse and offered programming to help Latino immigrants adapt to life in Miami. 
County officials decided that a Spanish speaking population would only enhance Miami’s 
appeal as a tourist destination and marketed the city as such. Thus, the outraged reaction 
of county officials to the ordinance revealed a profound disconnect between Anglo 
constituents’ nostalgic views of the old Miami and the local government’s vision for 
Miami as a “Gateway to the Americas” that would shape the ordinance’s enforcement 
and facilitate its quick decline in popularity. 
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Image 11. Spanish Language Mosquito Abatement Flyer. 
187
 
 
The ordinance indicated a disturbing polarization in ethnic relations, but 
potentially presented a “great awakening” of the Cuban community to the realities of 
local social attitudes and an opportunity to galvanize a stronger group consciousness. 
Many Cuban civic groups like SALAD saw the ordinance as a double-edged sword. 
African-American leaders were publically critical of the 1980 ordinance’s passage, and a 
solid majority of black voters had opposed the ordinance, with 56 percent voting against 
its passage, compared to their Anglo counterparts who opposed at a rate of only 29 
percent. Coalition building between African Americans and Cubans on the Dade County 
School Board, evident in the election of Paul Cejas earlier in 1980, led Padrón and others 
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to hope that ordinance could be the beginning of a stronger Latin-Black coalition in local 
government.
188
   
The day following the passage of the ordinance, SALAD filed a federal lawsuit 
challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. Their initial attempt to get the 
referendum blocked from the ballot on the basis of discrimination had failed; the federal 
suit offered a second chance at countering CDU. With the public support of Paul Rich, 
Chief Assistant U.S. attorney for Civil Rights, SALAD argued that the ordinance violated 
the 14
th
 amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law. The ordinance proved 
to be a publicity boon for SALAD, the largest organization advocating for the interests of 
Latinos in Miami. SALAD was comprised of young, liberal Cuban professionals and led 
by Eduardo Padrón, an economist and a vice president of Miami Dade Community 
College’s downtown campus.  Described by one of its members as a “kind of NAACP for 
Hispanics,” SALAD distinguished itself from other Cuban civic and political 
organizations by advocating for a new exile identity that neither fixated upon the memory 
of Cuba nor “surrender[ed] their identity, their ideals, their culture.”189  
SALAD was founded in 1974 by Javier Bray, but began to gain momentum after 
their widely publicized criticism and legal work against the 1980 Anti-Bilingual 
Ordinance. Bray’s background seems to have much to do with the group’s radically 
different approach to citizenship. Bray was Cuban, but born in the U.S. and then raised in 
Matanzas. His family returned to the U.S. when Bray was in his twenties. Bray spent his 
early career working for USAID and the Asian American Free Labor Institute, but did not 
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settle in Miami until 1973, when work on a federal study of Latino high school attrition 
brought him to the city. Bray was “shocked” at what he described as the deferential and 
“apologetic” attitude many Cubans in Miami had towards Americans. Bray organized 
SALAD to bring together a coalition of rising young professionals interested in 
addressing discrimination, and moving Hispanic issues away from the “exile talk” that 
dominated most Cuban and Hispanic organizations. SALAD would serve as a space to 
groom new leaders who would be placed in positions of power: “democracy…listens to 
money, power, status, and persistence.”190 
Although SALAD did not gain significant media attention until the passage of 
English Only, the civil rights organization successfully leveraged its network to place its 
members in prominent positions in county and city government during the late 1970s.  In 
1978, Governor Reubin Askew appointed SALAD board member and lawyer Mario 
Goderich to a judicial seat on Dade County’s 11th Circuit. Goderich was the first Cuban 
to serve as a Dade County Circuit Court judge. Two years later, SALAD successfully 
petitioned Governor Bob Graham for the appointment of SALAD director and accountant 
Paul Cejas to a vacancy on the Dade County School Board. Cejas was subsequently 
elected to the Dade County School Board in November 1980, making him the first Latino 
to win a countywide election. Sergio Pereira joined SALAD in 1976, and under the 
tutelage of then director Paul Cejas, Pereira rose in the ranks of the Metro Dade 
Government. Pereira was appointed Assistant County Manager by Mayor Stephen Clark 
in 1980 and became the highest-ranking Latino employee in county government. 
Pereira’s success as Assistant County Manager gained federal attention. He was 
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appointed Special Coordinator to the White House for the Cuban Refugee Program 
during the Mariel Boatlift.
191
  
SALAD’s efficacy was not only in the strength of its members but also in its 
organizational structure and public image. SALAD’s board consciously distanced itself 
from “loud-mouth” exile groups that organized primarily around American foreign policy 
in Cuba, by emphasizing their “rational and almost ridiculously academic” strategy of 
combatting discrimination by grooming Latinos for public office. The group shied away 
from public protests and sit-ins, and instead focused their energy on developing Latino 
political and professional leadership. SALAD’s non-confrontational style and emphasis 
on gaining entry into political office was part of a larger trend in Latino political 
organizing which historian Louis DeSipio noted emerged in the 1970s in the wake of the 
success of the 1960 Viva Kennedy! Campaign to get out the vote for John F. Kennedy in 
Latino communities.
192
  
SALAD’s strategy became clear in its decision to engage the English Only 
ordinance through the court-system rather than in direct confrontation with Emmy Shafer 
and CDU, whom SALAD dismissed as “hatemongers spreading hysteria.” Its first major 
project as a group in 1974 was to compile a study of discrimination against Latino 
students in Dade County public schools. Their findings were published in an unsigned 
newsletter, Informe, distributed to community leaders and local newspapers.
193
 From the 
organization’s inception, the board of directors did not allow a single member to emerge 
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as the de-facto spokesperson or public face of the group. Decisions were made 
holistically and directors never served more than two years. SALAD hoped to attract a 
“new kind of Latin”: their ideal member was educated, professionally respected, 
interested in community activism, and conscious of Latino issues. In many respects, 
SALAD was instrumental in advancing the notion of the “bicultural” Cuban-American 
citizen -- a middle class professional engaged in local issues, “defying the melting pot 
cliché”, but still deeply self-identified with their immigrant roots.194  
English Only may have been a failure in Cuban-Anglo relations for SALAD and 
its milieu, but it provided an opportunity for the organization to expand and increase its 
visibility. In tandem with the aftermath of the Mariel Boatlift, English Only provided a 
consciousness raising experience for the white-collar board members of SALAD. As a 
result, the board decided to hire a full-time executive director, Manny Diaz, and expand 
its lobbying efforts to include refugee relief. Post-English Only Ordinance limitations of 
county funding for Latino serving organizations forced SALAD to build new alliances in 
the community. They invited Willy Bormelo, architect and director of the Little Havana 
Development Authority and the Kiwanis Club of Little Havana to join the SALAD board. 
In 1981, SALAD worked with the United Way of Greater Miami, and Miami Dade 
Community College to submit a $10.9 million federal grant for funds to offer citizenship 
and language education classes to Haitian and Cuban refugees. These new alliances show 
how the passage of the ordinance galvanized the efforts of fledgling Latino civic 
organizations to pool resources and talent, because the county was legally hindered in its 
effort to support Latino immigrants and Cuban and Haitian refugees. Ironically, the 
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public outcry swirling around the English Only referendum only strengthened SALAD by 
forcing the group to become unified and self-sufficient.
 195
 
Enforcing English 
On December 18, 1980, the County Attorney’s office reached a consensus and 
delivered a report to the County Commissioners and County Manager Stierheim on how 
to interpret the new ordinance. Ginsburg and Murray found that the ordinance’s “broad 
and general terms” gave County Commissioners and County Agencies a great deal of 
leeway in interpreting what could and could not be funded. The first major provision of 
the ordinance, that county funds could not be used for the “purpose of utilizing any 
language other than English or from promoting any culture other than that of the United 
States,” seemed to be its most prohibitive aspect. However, the vague terminology 
actually gave the Dade County Attorney’s Office the precedent to interpret what counted 
as “promotion” of foreign culture over “United States culture.”  
What exactly was United States culture? In the County attorney’s interpretation, 
the many cultural activities that the county supported, ranging from Israeli Jubilee, 
Hispanic Heritage Week, Bahamian Goombay Festival, were representative of American 
culture, because they celebrated the experiences of Americans of foreign descent living in 
Miami. Citizens of Dade United did not offer a monolithic definition of the boundaries of 
“U.S. culture” in their writing of the ordinance, and in doing so left it open to a wide 
range of interpretation of what exactly, “culture” meant. Greenberg and Ginsburg 
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interpreted culture to be the “composite of the historical experiences and ways of living 
of the people of the United States…not unitary in concept, but multifaceted.”196  
As discussed previously, by 1980 there was already a perceptible shift happening 
within the Cuban community in regards to cultural identification. The end of the Freedom 
Flights in 1973 forced many Cubans to accept the permanence of their settlement in the 
United States. Between 1971 and 1980, Cubans in Miami sought naturalization and 
registered to vote in record numbers. Cubans began to accept and celebrate a new 
bicultural identity that paired American citizenship with the preservation of Spanish and 
Cuban cultural practices. However, it was this biculturalism, rather than complete 
assimilation, that Shafer and CDU found unacceptable.
 197
  
Unruffled by the outrage surrounding the ordinance, Emmy Shafer continued her 
crusade against bilingualism and immigration, first in another appearance before the 
Dade County Commission and then in public speaking appearances and interviews with 
the national press. Basking in the success of the English Only Ordinance, Shafer 
appeared before the Board of County Commissioner in January 1981 to request the repeal 
of the 1973 Bilingual and Bicultural Resolution, and the dissolution of the Office of Latin 
Affairs. Neither was explicitly abolished in her writing of the 1980 ordinance, although 
many of the OLA’s activities were severely curtailed by the new limitations on county 
funding for Latino serving programs. Only two commissioners, Harvey Ruvin and 
Beverly Phillips, remained on the commission from the 1973 board, and Shafer was 
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hopeful that the momentum from November would move Ruvin and Phillips to repeal. 
However, Shafer seemed unaware how unpopular her referendum had been with the 
commissioners and county employees. Ruvin was dismissive of Shafer’s demands, “I 
wonder if she understands that really the resolution has been eliminated.” Stierheim 
likewise was taciturn on the matter, only commenting that he would refuse to close the 
Office of Latin Affairs short of an explicit vote from the board to do so.
198
 
In the press, Shafer fashioned herself as a vigilant protector American culture and 
the sanctity of the English language. In a 1981 interview with the Chicago Tribune, she 
described her daily life under the protection of a police unit, two personal bodyguards, 
and the .38 caliber revolver she kept on her nightstand. Shafer claimed she needed the 
protection from the Miami Latinos who sent her death threats and hate mail daily. 
Undeterred by alleged harassment, or by her failure to abolish the Office of Latin Affairs, 
Shafer worked tirelessly on two new petition drives: to deport all Cubans with criminal 
records to Cuba, and to ban the display of Cuban flags on American soil. Shafer was 
hopeful that the conservative insurgency that swept the Republican Party back into office 
in 1980 would prove beneficial to her cause: “Maybe now with Reagan as President we 
can go back to being America again.”199  
Shafer and Marion Bonsignore, CDU’s new vice-president, were less enthusiastic 
about the county government’s halfhearted support of the ordinance, and took it upon 
themselves to personally oversee its enforcement. In a constant stream of correspondence 
to County Manager Stierheim and the County Commission, Shafer and Bonsignore 
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reported any violations they personally witnessed or violations CDU members reported to 
their headquarters.  
The English Only Ordinance could do little to hinder the soft cultural activities of 
the county, but it had serious repercussions for the logistical improvements county 
agencies enacted over the seven years since the 1973 resolution. New bilingual signage, 
publications, and translation services for meetings and hearings took the hardest hit in 
funding. Ginsburg and Greenberg found that the ordinance prohibition on “hearings, 
meetings, and publications in a language other than English” could only be circumvented 
in cases where state or federal law required translation, such as elections. However, if 
translation services were funded and provided by state or federal agencies, though not 
necessarily required by law, than those services would be permissible under the 
ordinance.
 200
   
Ultimately, county administrators were expected to use the report as a framework 
within to exercise their best judgment. Often, there were still questions of interpretation 
that found their way back to the county attorney’s office. In July 1981, Stierheim 
requested Ginsburg’s aid in resolving whether the Dade County Fire Department could 
print bilingual fire prevention and safety guides, and distribute bilingual materials already 
in its possession from federal safety agencies. Stierheim also asked for guidance as to 
whether a new rapid transit system, in planning stages by the Dade County Transit 
Authority, would be allowed to have bilingual directional signage. Ginsburg advised the 
county manager that the use of county funds would be prohibited for both programs 
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under the ordinance, unless they could be justified under the ordinance’s provision for 
emergency services.
201
 
Image 12. DCPS Bilingual School Walking Route Map. 
202
 
 
The public was interested in the county attorney’s findings, as well. After the 
report’s release in December, Greenberg emphasized the limitations of the ordinance in 
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the press, stressing that emergency services and ballots, areas regulated by federal law, 
would remain unchanged by the ordinance. Existing bilingual signage would remain in 
place. Public schools, administered by a budgeting authority independent of Metro Dade, 
would be free to continue offering bilingual educational programs and instruction to their 
students. Latino leaders remained unsatisfied by the county attorney office’s loose 
interpretation of the ordinance. SALAD persisted with its motion in federal court to have 
the ordinance thrown out. City of Miami Mayor Maurice Ferré described race relations as 
“the worst I’ve seen.” Former City Commissioner and Vice Mayor of Miami Manolo 
Reboso shared the sentiments of many in the Cuban business community that 
bilingualism was an “asset to the community, especially in international trade,” and that 
Anglos were the ones who needed to adapt to a new globally oriented economy, not 
Cubans.
203
  
The ordinance wrought unintended consequences for the agenda of the Office of 
Latin Affairs (OLA), which until that point considered organizing Hispanic Heritage 
Week and translating county documents its primary duties. The ordinance strictly 
curtailed county expenditures on programs that engaged in “foreign culture promotion” 
or translation. Instead, in January 1981 the OLA refocused its efforts on providing 
citizenship education and voter registration workshops for Cubans and other Latinos. The 
ordinance did not prohibit funding to education programs. Ironically, the number of voter 
registration programs and civic education classes offered by the county and local 
organizations increased as a direct result of the ordinance, as administrators were forced 
to reroute funds to different types of programming. The weekly hour-long courses were 
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held in two different community centers near Cuban neighborhoods, and lasted three 
months in order to comprehensively prepare permanent residences for the citizenship test. 
The courses covered the U.S. Constitution, the American governmental system, and the 
fundamentals of the citizenship application process.
204
  
By May 1981, the OLA was facing a series of lay-offs and resignations as a result 
of funding cuts under the anti-bilingual ordinance. Director Aida Levitan, disheartened 
by the collapse in funding for the OLA, resigned to head the public relations and trade 
development office for the City of Miami. Interim Director Carmen Rosada, brought in as 
Levitan’s replacement, also subsequently resigned to pursue her spiritual calling at a 
Little Havana church. Fifty employees staffing the Comprehensive Employment Training 
Act outreach offices were laid off because of budget cuts. Decimated but still standing, 
the five remaining OLA administrators expanded the U.S. citizenship education program 
to four additional community centers, and set up a simultaneous broadcast of the courses 
on Spanish-language Channel 23, and continued to devote their limited resources to voter 
education and registration drives.
205
   
As 1981 drew to a close, Dade County Mayor Steve Clark convened a committee 
of local civic leaders to reflect on the ordinance’s first year and determine if the 
ordinance required further amendment in a series of public hearings. Lester Freeman, 
Vice President of Southeast First National Bank, oversaw a small group of local business 
leaders, commissioners, school board members, and other prominent community 
members as chair of the Bilingual Ordinance Review Committee. Commissioner Jorge 
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(George) Valdes was instrumental in initiating an ordinance amendment. Valdes was a 
Cuban public relations executive who began a career in local politics first as a city 
councilman of Sweetwater, a municipality of Dade County. In 1978 he was elected 
mayor of Sweetwater, becoming the first Cuban-born mayor of an American city. In 
1981, Valdes became the first Latino to serve on the Metro-Dade Commission when he 
was appointed by Mayor Clark to fill a vacancy.
206
  
Upon entering office, Valdes drafted a number of amendments to the Anti-
Bilingual Ordinance. The amendments would allow the county to provide emergency 
service information (such as hurricane evacuation guides), and medical translation 
services in Spanish and Creole for elderly Latino and Haitian residents who could not be 
expected to learn English.
207
   
The Dade County Commission assembled the Bilingual Task Force in part to 
address Valdes’s suggestions for amending the ordinance, and to discuss whether it 
should be considered for another vote. Mayor Clark appointed a diverse, albeit politically 
unremarkable, group that included Carlos Arboleya, a prominent Cuban banker and Boy 
Scout troop leader, Athalie Range, the African-American former county commissioner 
and state secretary of community affairs, and Patricia Keller, a CDU representative and 
anti-bilingual activist. Mayor Clark also solicited input from Dr. José Aybar de Soto, 
director of the Florida State Commission on Hispanic Affairs, whom he invited to make a 
statement at the Committee’s town hall meeting. In his statement on behalf of the State 
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Commission, Dr. Aybar de Soto came down harshly on the ordinance: he stated 
unequivocally that the ordinance had only worsened ethnic relations in Miami, and 
contributed to growing racial polarization in Southern Florida.
 208
   
The Bilingual Task Force determined that the ordinance denied basic services to a 
large portion of the county’s most needy residents, especially the elderly, who struggled 
the most with the language barrier. Administrators at Jackson Memorial Hospital, the 
county’s only public medical facility, experienced tremendous difficulty in adhering to 
the ordinance’s strict wording on providing bilingual documentation and medical advice 
to Spanish speaking patients. In terms of the local economy, the ordinance created 
barriers to effective operation of the tourist industry, primarily by limiting Metro’s ability 
to spend county money on foreign language advertisements and promotions in Europe or 
Latin America. Finally, the Commission called for a full repeal of the ordinance, deeming 
it as only creating an exacerbation of “ill will” and a “decrease in [tourist] revenue to 
Metro.” 209 
The Ordinance Review Committee / Bilingual Task Force drew considerable 
interest from county constituents, who called and wrote in to the Mayor’s Office to offer 
their support or criticism. John T. Cox, a “non-Latin white” residing in North Miami, 
wrote a lengthy letter to Mayor Clark offering his perspective on the damage the 
ordinance had done to Miami’s place as a center for Latin American business. Cox 
dismissed Citizens of Dade United as a splinter group “provincial in their outlook” who 
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stood in the way of Miami’s development as an international center for trade and tourism. 
Letters from constituents who supported the English Only ordinance and Shafer’s own 
correspondence with county officials reveals a grassroots movement that relied heavily 
on the discourse of the “culture wars” to rally support. Harvey Abramson, a local trial 
lawyer, wrote to the commission in support of the ordinance and CDU’s efforts to 
preserve English. Abramson compared Dade County to Quebec, the Canadian province 
perpetually on the verge of splitting from the mother country over language, religion, and 
culture, and sarcastically asked Mayor Clark: “Certainly no member of the county 
commission would like to have Dade County move for separation from the rest of the 
country…?”210  
Shafer was outraged by the county’s presumption to appoint a Bilingual Task 
Force/Ordinance Review Committee without her explicit approval of each committee 
member and at the county’s inclusion of five Latinos on the committee of twelve, who 
formed a minority. The ordinance review was just the start of a multi-year battle between 
Shafer and the Metro-Dade Commission. Between 1981 and 1985, Shafer repeatedly 
petitioned the Metro-Dade Commission on behalf of her own ordinance. She investigated 
language violations and “illegalities,” and locked horns with the commissioners and 
county manager on the correct interpretation of the ordinance’s opaque wording. Indeed, 
Shafer became a one-woman enforcer of cultural assimilation, making sure that Latin 
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immigrants became “AMERICANIZED, by LEARNING & SPEAKING the ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE & AMERICAN CULTURE.”211  
On October 1, 1981, Shafer met with Greenberg and Commissioner Valdes to 
discuss the amendment of the ordinance. Along with several unnamed CDU members, 
Shafer listened to Valdes’s plan to amend the ordinance to allow for medical translation 
services at Jackson Memorial Hospital’s four county medical facilities. Shafer had long 
been critical of the county’s implementation of translators for patients at the over-
burdened public hospital, a centerpiece of the original 1973 Bilingual Bicultural 
Resolution and work of the Office of Latin Affairs. Shafer described Jackson Memorial 
as the institutional embodiment of the “over-Latinazation of the once-Americanized Dade 
County.” Shafer accused Stierheim and the Public Health Trust of directly violating the 
1980 ordinance by knowingly “permitting the practice of VOODOO on Haitians & 
SANTERIA on Cubans as patients” at the hospital. Shafer also demanded the closure of 
Jackson Memorial’s Hispanic International Relations Office. The office existed not to 
service local Hispanics but to accommodate the hospital’s growing medical tourism 
business, which drew well-to-do patients from Latin America and the Caribbean seeking 
treatment in the United States.
212
  
Shafer and CDU undertook their own investigation into translation services being 
offered at Jackson, and through a Florida Public Records Act request they discovered that 
the hospital had spent $318,157.44 in local funds on translation services in 1981. The 
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figure accounted for the yearly cost of “20 interpreters, plus uniforms and supplies, 
operating 3 shifts, 24 hours a day.” Enraged, Shafer argued not only was this service a 
violation of the 1980 ordinance because it drew upon county funds to employ translators, 
but because Commissioners Clara Oesterle, Beverly Phillips, and Ruth Shack were ex-
officio board members of the Public Health Trust, which ran Jackson Memorial, there 
was a “legal conflict of interest since these same commissioners vote on these 
matters.”213   
Beyond her accusations of corruption and conflicts of interest, Shafer constructed 
her argument in terms of “reverse discrimination”--if the hospitals in Miami Beach did 
not offer Yiddish translators to their Jewish American patients, why should the county 
hospital be offering that service to Cuban and Haitian patients? What Shafer and her 
supporters refused to acknowledge was that there were many thousands more Cuban and 
Haitian patients than Jewish American patients. What need did the hospital have for 
translators if any hospital employee could call 911 in an emergency situation and reach a 
bilingual operator? Especially, if 911 was the only county funded translation service that 
the 1980 ordinance had permitted.
214
  
The hysteria that made CDU and Emmy Shafer politically relevant ebbed in 1982. 
It soon became apparent to Metro-Dade that despite their efforts at appeasement, Shafer’s 
entire political mission rested on wishing away the demographic and political changes 
that had already occurred and, hoping that Cubans could be induced to assimilate quickly 
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and completely, just as she claimed “all other immigrants had done.” At the conclusion of 
a lengthy memorandum to County Manager Stierheim, she summed up the consequences 
for the “longtime Dade County residents” CDU ostensibly represented being “inundated 
with SPANISH language & CUBAN CULTURE.” White Miamians needed to be 
protected from “gross REVERSE DISCRIMINATION…by rejecting Americans for jobs 
by the thousands just because they do not speak SPANISH…plus being made to feel like 
a foreigner in your own country!” Cubans needed to be made into “true Americans” by 
being forced to speak English, and “falling into the AMERICAN MAINSTREAM.” In 
February 1982, Metro-Dade tried to appease CDU by encouraging Commissioner 
Valdes’s to withdraw his call for amendment referendum to the ordinance. Valdes 
acquiesced, explaining that after meeting with CDU and careful consideration he felt that 
to revive the referendum at the polls “would only polarize this community even more.”215  
Stierheim too began to disengage from Shafer’s non-stop correspondence and 
badgering. He responded to Shafer’s claims about corruption and voodoo at Jackson 
Memorial Hospital, and misuse of county funds to perpetuate “gross reverse 
discrimination,” in a series of tersely worded and numbered memos. Explaining carefully 
how county funds were used properly in each of the instances she claimed malfeasance 
by the Commission and negligence of the Anti-Bilingual Ordinance’s implementation, 
Stierheim informed Shafer that Jackson Memorial did in fact serve patients with 
“differing religious beliefs” as law required them to, although he had no evidence to 
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substantiate her claims that voodoo and Santeria rituals were being practiced openly on 
the wards. Likewise, the hospital did use some taxpayer funds to provide translators, but 
because the Florida State medical licensure board and the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals standards--state and national agencies respectively--required 
“that patients understand procedures undertaken on their behalf” the hospital had to 
provide translation services to maintain their accreditation. Just as the county elections 
board had to provide ballots in Spanish or Creole to meet federal standards; the hospital 
was governed by federal and state regulations, an exception that superseded the local 
ordinance.
216
   
Cubans and other Latinos may have felt that their world was bicultural, and that 
the racial tensions of 1980 were far behind them, but the reactionary activists who 
organized politically around these issues felt otherwise. Even as the English Only 
movement lost steam in Dade County some local activists attempted to generate national 
interest in English Only. Patricia Keller, CDU vice president and president of the 
Allapattah Community Association, expressed “the mood of many whites” in a special 
New York Times report on Miami’s racial problems. Keller described a vast political 
conspiracy at work in Miami, in which the federal government and local politicians were 
in cahoots in an effort to “Cubanize, Latinize, the city and get rid of Americans 
here…[They are] hell bent on destroying the city with their tremendous grab to get 
refugees and more government money.” In addition to her interest in language legislation, 
Keller was involved in zoning and community issues effecting inner city residents, 
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making her an unlikely ally to African American community activists. Howard Gary, the 
first black city manager of Miami, echoed Keller’s concerns about where federal funding 
and programming was going: “This community has failed to share its economic well-
being with the Liberty City’s and Overtown’s of Miami.”217   
Image 13. Patricia Keller and Rita Mason Attend Metro-Dade Commission Meeting. 
218
 
 
Despite feeble attempts to ally themselves with African-American community 
organizations, CDU continued to lose political traction within the county, especially as 
Latino political representation increased in the mid-1980s. Shafer found herself at an 
impasse, as the commissioners relied heavily on state and federal laws to protect as many 
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bilingual services as possible. In a bid to re-capture public attention, Shafer set her sights 
lower. She tried to petition the county about the possibility of Spanish signage being 
introduced at the county financed Dade Metro-Zoo. In June 1984, the Miami Herald 
reported that Robyn and Bart Greene and the Little Havana Kiwanis Club had offered the 
Metro-Dade Parks Department $3000 to add bilingual signage to the Metro-Zoo, 
primarily as a tourism incentive. Because the project would be funded with private 
monies, Asst. County Attorney Greenberg suggested to the Herald that legally the county 
could implement the signage. Shafer, neither a lawyer nor a commissioner, immediately 
took the offense: “I am advising you Mr. Murray Greenberg that you have made an 
incorrect legal interpretation of the ordinance…I am advising you not to put up any signs 
in Spanish.” Shafer’s demands went unanswered.219 
In September, Commissioner Valdes renewed his proposal to amend the English 
Only Ordinance, but this time with the support of the Board of Commissioners and the 
County Attorney’s office. The new amendments were put to the board for a vote in a 
public hearing on October 16. The amended ordinance would allow the county to provide 
healthcare information in different languages, produce promotional tourist materials in 
Spanish, and provide non-emergency literature on hurricane preparedness and medical 
services in Spanish and Creole. The amendments would also allow the Metrorail and 
Metro-Dade Transportation Authority more leeway in posting informational signage.  
The amended ordinance passed on October 16, but not without resistance from 
both Cuban groups and CDU. After the public hearing adjourned on October 16, SALAD 
chairman Manny Diaz promised Cubans “we will not stop until the law is repealed and 
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taken off the books.” The amended ordinance was still seen by Latinos as “an insult and 
offensive.” Also present at the public hearing, Mark Benson, CDU’s new vice-president, 
demanded an Ethnic Relations Board to mediate racially charged community 
problems.
220
   
After being excluded from the selection process for the Bilingual Task Force in 
1981, CDU only agreed to cooperate with the amendment under the condition that the 
Board of Commissioners would follow a strict set of guidelines on the selection of the 
new Ethnic Relations Board. New members could not be “county employees, politicians, 
or political office holders, Chamber of Commerce persons, news media or religious 
officials.” Wilma Cook, an unaffiliated supporter of the ordinance present at the hearing 
described the revisions and CDU’s cooperation with the amendment process as an “insult 
to U.S. taxpayers...it appears that Castro and Duvalier have taken Dade County without a 
shot!” 221  
After three months of silence from county officials, Shafer may have begun to 
believe that Duvalier and Castro had indeed taken the Metro-Dade Government. 
Undeterred, she continued petitioning Stierheim about the assemblage of the Ethnic 
Relations Board and the finer points of the amendment.
 
By late January, the group had 
yet to meet or go through a member selection process.
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After five unanswered letters, Shafer resorted to threatening Stierheim to rescind 
CDU’s cooperation with the amendments. “All we received were many cancelled 
appointments, stalling tactics and broken promises…hereby were are advising you that all 
Oct. 16, 1984 Amendment Agreements are VOID and CANCELLED.” Shafer was under 
the impression that the Board of Commissioners needed CDU’s approval to pass the 
amendment, when in fact the group was included in the public hearing merely as a 
courtesy to the originators of the first referendum and to avoid stirring up negative 
publicity.
223
   
All the evidence suggests that Commissioner Valdes’s amendment would have 
passed with or without CDU’s cooperation or support. Shafer’s letter held no force of 
law, only the commission’s unanimous vote did.  Shafer’s hysterical tone finally caught 
Stierheim’s attention and he responded informing her that her recently ousted vice-
president Mark Benson had cancelled two meetings with county officials. Clearly, Shafer 
was not only losing political relevance, but also control of her own organization. 
Exasperated, Stierheim reminded her “these amendments cannot be voided or cancelled 
by unilateral action of your organization.” Ignoring Stierheim’s response, Shafer 
disseminated a press release in another attempt to raise interest in the county’s non-
compliance with CDU’s demands, reminding Miamians that “legal promises should have 
been kept!” The press release received no coverage from the local press and no 
acknowledgment from the Metro-Dade Commission or Stierheim.
224
  
                                                 
223
 Emmy Shafer to County Manager Merrett Stierheim, CODU Memo #3-85, Coral Gables Fl., 21 January 
1985, Office of Latin Affairs, Box 05-335, Dade County Clerk of Courts. 
 
224
 County Manager M.R. Stierheim to Emmy Shafer, Miami Fl., 24 January 1985, Office of Latin Affairs, 
Box 05-335, Dade County Clerk of Courts; Emmy Shafer, Citizens of Dade United, Press Release Re: 
Citizens of Dade United Voids Unfulfilled Anti-Bilingual Agreement with Dade County, Coral Gables, Fl., 
30 January 1985. Emmy Shafer to County Manager Merrett Stierheim, CODU Memo #4-85, Coral Gables 
151 
Conclusion 
The Anti-Bilingual Ordinance was no match for social and demographic changes 
wrought by Mariel. Between 1983 and 1985, the U.S. English movement spread 
nationally but lost considerable traction in Miami. English Only activists hoped that 
legislating language would force Cubans to Americanize and dissuade other Latinos from 
immigrating to South Florida. By 1983, more Cubans and Latinos were living in Miami 
and speaking Spanish in the home and the workplace than ever before.  
In a major marketing research study conducted by Strategy Research Corporation 
in 1982 and 1983, pollsters found that Mariel made “Latins more Latin.” The survey 
found a number of significant demographic and socioeconomic shifts occurring with the 
Latino community just in the three years between the release of the study and the 
preliminary 1980 U.S. Census. In terms of language, between 1980 and 1983 the number 
of Latinos who stated they only spoke Spanish at home increased from 75.6 percent to 
89.2 percent. In the same three-year period the number of Latinos in Dade, Broward (Ft. 
Lauderdale), and Monroe (the Florida Keys) counties increased by nearly 200,000, 
compared to the number registered in the 1980 Census. Undermining the fear of many 
Anglos in the area that Mariel refugees would become a permanently jobless underclass, 
the survey found that the unemployment rate among South Florida Latinos was 8.3 
percent, lower than the national average. Likewise, the average number of people per 
Latino household also decreased between 1980 and 1983, as Mariel refugees became 
economically independent and established their own households. Far from becoming 
assimilated in the typical notion of the word but still integrating into mainstream life, 
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Cubans and Latinos in Miami were living in a “bicultural but by no means polarized 
community.”225 
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CHAPTER IV: EPILOGUE 
On September 16, 1984 Americans tuned into a brand new police series 
premiering on NBC at 10 PM. Set to a barrage of New Wave electronica, Miami Vice was 
beamed into millions of living rooms. Speed boats, flamingos, Jai Alai (a Basque sport 
transplanted from Cuba), the Atlantis Condominium (designed by the Latino owned 
architecture firm Arquitectonica), and the sparkling white façade of El Banco Industrial 
de Venezuela raced across the screen like a newsreel travelogue on amphetamines. On a 
street corner in South Beach, Detective Sonny Crocket watched a group of black and 
Latino teenagers breakdance. Miami was the modern day American Casablanca, a 
multicultural “Barbary Coast” for the Reagan years. Like so many Miamians, the main 
characters were transplants, two sharply dressed detectives: a New York Afro-Puerto 
Rican and a blonde former football hero from northern Florida. The police chief? A grim-
faced Cuban, of course. In Miami Vice, the hierarchy of the Miami Police Department 
functioned as a reflection of local power structure writ large. But as has become clear in 
Miami’s history, the glossy image that the city sells often masks an altogether different 
reality.  
By the time Miami Vice became NBC’s breakout hit of 1984, it seemed that 
Cubans had finally gained a foothold in the adopted homeland, and more importantly in 
local politics. Miami was weathering the Reagan Recession remarkably well as the center 
of trade and banking for Latin America. In the Metro-Dade Commission, Commissioner 
Valdes’s amendment to the English Only ordinance had quashed much of the English 
154 
Only movement’s momentum. Mayor Maurice Ferré held onto office for another year 
after two hard fought campaigns in 1981 and 1983, and was joined by Cubans Armando 
Lacasa and Demetrio Perez, Jr. on the City of Miami commission.  
Cubans, and to a lesser extent African-Americans and Haitians, were registering 
to vote and running for political office in greater numbers than ever before, but their 
political power remained diluted at the county level. The structure of Metro government 
no longer seemed to serve and represent the expanding minority population. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Metro-Dade system of appointments and municipal autonomy enabled the 
rise of Miami’s first Latino and black politicians, but the continued existence of the at 
large election system meant that the ethnic and racial makeup of  the Metro Commission 
had ceased to accurately represent the diversity of the county. Latinos and African-
Americans were dissatisfied by the tokenism of one or two minority commissioners, and 
called unsuccessfully for a referendum to revise the Metro-Dade Charter in 1982 and 
1984.
226
  
Miami in the mid-1980s not only grew in terms of population; real estate 
development, fueled by foreign investment, radically altered the geography of the city. 
New suburbs such as Kendall, Miami Lakes, and Cutler Ridge, sprang up in 
unincorporated areas that had once been agricultural fields or swamp land to the far west 
of the downtown city center and Miami Beach. Lured by the promise of newly 
constructed housing and schools, upwardly mobile Cubans (and affluent Nicaraguans, 
Haitians, and Colombians fleeing political instability) and white Miamians abandoned 
Little Havana and West Miami for the promise of suburban life at the edge of the 
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Everglades. In these unincorporated areas of the county, municipal politics held little 
meaning. Latino suburbanites looked to the Metro Commission to provide the 
representation they had experienced in the incorporated municipalities, and found they 
were being offered little.  
For Maurice Ferré, the rapidly changing political landscape would have disastrous 
consequences. The City of Miami grew more Cuban with every passing day. Ferré’s hold 
on the office rested on a delicate balance between the African American residents of 
Overtown, the affluent Anglos of Brickell, working class Cubans and Puerto Ricans in 
Little Havana and Wynwood. But by 1984, three of the five city commissioners were 
Cuban, and the population was almost 60 percent Cuban. After barely scraping past 
Cuban candidates Manolo Reboso and Xavier Suárez in 1981 and 1983, Ferré called for a 
racially and ethnically “balanced city commission” in 1984 and attempted to build 
interest in a municipal charter revision that would transition to a strong mayor style of 
governance. Ferré’s pleas fell flat and came across as political self-preservation rather 
than a call for true racial harmony.
 227
   
The 1985 City of Miami mayoral race exposed the fragility of the Latino political 
coalition that Ferré constructed in the 1970s. Ferré lost considerable black political 
support in 1984 when he fired the city’s first black City Manager, Howard Gary, over 
allegations that Gary was involved in business dealings with a local bank suspected of 
money laundering. To make matters worse, the election had the most diverse field of 
mayoral candidates to date: Dr. Marvin Dunn, a black community activist and tenured 
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professor at Florida International University, Raul Masvidal, a Cuban banker and Bay of 
Pigs veteran, and Xavier Suárez, a young Cuban lawyer.  
Suárez, the dark horse second place contender in the 1983 race, posed the greatest 
threat to Ferré’s candidacy. The son of engineers, Suárez fled Cuba with his family as a 
child and grew up in Washington, D.C. An exceptional student, Suárez attended 
Villanova and Harvard Law School, and moved to Miami to practice law.  Suárez spoke 
perfect unaccented English and his sober, even dour, demeanor offered a counterpoint to 
Ferré’s image as “Miami’s millionaire mayor.” But in almost every other respect, 
Suárez’s candidacy operated on a template created by Ferré during his 1970 and 1973 
campaigns. Moving fluidly between black prayer breakfasts in Overtown, luncheons at 
the Cuban municipios, and cocktails at the Tiger Bay Club in the affluent Bay Heights 
neighborhood, Suárez used the same ethnic bloc campaigning strategies that had kept 
Ferré in office for 12 years. Suárez also ran in the same Florida Democratic Party circles 
as Ferré, while maintaining a public commitment to President Reagan’s anti-communist 
foreign policy platform.
228
  
However, Suárez had a powerful Cuban exile story that Ferré could only gesture 
to when recounting his grandfather’s experience in the Cuban War of Independence. For 
Cubans in the City of Miami, Suárez was the candidate that they had been waiting for, the 
ideal bilingual and bicultural Cuban exile, with an elite American education to boot. 
Suárez lacked Ferré’s extensive network of contacts in the local real estate and 
construction industries, and failed to secure an endorsement from the Latin Builders 
Association, who continued to support Ferré. Suárez secured significant campaign 
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contributions, including the financial support of Norman Braman, the Florida billionaire 
who thirty years later helped Marco Rubio ascend to the U.S. Senate. All over Little 
Havana, banners and lawn signs appeared bearing the slogan: “CUBANO VOTA 
CUBANO.” Cubans vote Cuban.  In response, Ferré warned of a “Cuban takeover;” a 
city commission dominated by Cubans uninterested in serving the black or white 
communities. Lacking black or Cuban support, his campaign message came across as 
racially divisive and desperate. For the first time in 12 years, Ferré failed to make the run-
off and Xavier Suárez became the City of Miami’s first Cuban-born Mayor.229 
“Cuban takeover” proved to be an empty threat, and Suárez accommodated both 
the black community and the dwindling white establishment. Cuban voters, on the other 
hand, were frustrated by the lack of services the City of Miami could offer them. As one 
veteran lobbyist observed in 1987, “The ones who wanted a Cuban mayor have gotten 
one and they see that it doesn’t do them much good. The game is now at the county 
level.” As the municipalities became controlled by single ethnic group blocs, Latino 
politicians and civic activists trained their sights on reforming the county election 
structure in order to build minority political representation at every level of local 
government.  
On August 26, 1986, Maurice Ferré and Xavier Suárez joined ten other bipartisan 
plaintiffs led by State Senator Carrie Meek in a class action lawsuit filed against 
Metropolitan Dade County in the United States District Court (Southern District of 
Florida) alleging that the at-large electoral structure for County Commissioners violated 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by diluting black and Latino voting power. U.S. District 
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Judge Kenneth Rystamp threw out the suit in 1988. In 1990, the 11
th
 U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals reinstated the suit, and Dade County requested a Supreme Court review of the 
appellate decision.
230
  
The appeals court found that Ryskamp had erroneously applied the 1986 
Thornburg v. Gingles decision by ruling that the Latino and black defendants failed to 
satisfied the third prong of the Gingles test for a voting dilution claim, by failing to 
“show the existence of a Non-Hispanic white majority that usually defeated the election 
of the minority’s preferred candidate.” Ryskamp ruled that Hispanic and black candidates 
failed to be elected because their constituents failed to successfully register to vote. The 
appeals court found that although Non-Latino whites did not constitute a majority, when 
paired with the politically cohesive black community the two groups formed a majority 
which usually denied Latinos the opportunity to elect their candidate.
231
  
In August 1992, U.S. District Judge Donald Graham ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs and ordered that the county replace the at large system with 13 new districts, in 
which residents cast ballots only for the commissioners in their districts. In his ruling, 
Judge Graham pointed out that since 1964 not a single black candidate for County 
Commissioner had won without first being appointed. Likewise, only two Latinos had 
served on the Metro Commission: the first, Jorge Valdes by appointment and the second, 
Alex Penelas, by at-large election.  Each new district was comprised of about 150,000 
residents. The first election in the new district system yielded a record 90 candidates on 
the ballot for the various districts. The new crop of candidates ranged from political 
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stalwarts like Maurice Ferré, to George Milhet, a Cuban real estate broker making his 
second bid for a commission seat. He first ran thirty years prior in 1964, shortly after 
attaining his American citizenship.
232
   
On April 20, 1993 the new Metro Commission was elected. The board finally 
represented Miami’s diverse population and was comprised of six Latinos, four African 
Americans, and three Anglos. One month later, they gathered to consider the fate of the 
English Only Ordinance.  Citizens of Dade United, an anemic version of the earlier 
organization, and U.S. English lobbied the commission to uphold the ordinance. U.S. 
English field director Christopher Doss warned that repealing English Only would turn 
Miami into an “apartheid enclave for Cubano culture and language.” Maurice Ferré, the 
newly elected Commissioner of District 7, received hundreds of phone calls and letters 
from constituents, labor leaders, business owners and local journalists about the 
ordinance. The Miami Herald, led by columnist Carl Hiaasen, and the Miami News called 
for the ordinance’s repeal.233  
On May 17, 1993 the freshly elected Board of County Commissioners voted 
unanimously to repeal the English Only Ordinance. A new generation of Latino 
commissioners, led by Miguel Diaz de la Portilla and Alex Penelas, denounced the 
ordinance. “It is a hate ordinance that serves absolutely no purpose,” Diaz de la Portilla 
told reporters. Metro-Dade Chairman of the Board of Commissioners Arthur Teele Jr., 
hailed the repeal as new day for race relations in Miami, “Dade County has entered an era 
of racial understanding and tolerance.” Citizens of Dade United and U.S. English refused 
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to accept the repeal quietly. Patricia Keller, formerly of CDU, described the repeal as 
“obscene.” CDU Vice President, Enos Schera threatened to use the repeal as the basis for 
a federal lawsuit, “It is very, very, unequal to use county money and re-disburse that to 
Spanish people.” Immediately after the repeal, Citizens of Dade United filed a lawsuit 
against the Metro Board of Commissioners alleging that the commission had no authority 
to repeal the ordinance. In August 1993, Circuit Judge Peter Capua ruled that the 
commissioners had acted properly and within their rights to repeal the ordinance. Citizens 
of Dade United did not offer a public response.
234
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AFTERWORD 
The strides that Latinos in Miami have made in creating a local government that 
serves the needs of immigrants and minorities are often obscured by Miami’s continued 
prominence as a tourist mecca. Recently, the New York Times ran a feature on the city in 
its travel section. The title exclaimed: “In Miami, Cuban Culture, No Passport Required.” 
Writer Colleen Creamer revisited her American hometown, in search of the Havana her 
father had visited as young naval officer in the 1940s and 1950s. What she claimed to 
find was a satisfying facsimile of Cuban culture, a memory of “Old Havana” 
conveniently located on a single commercial strip in Miami. Blissfully ignorant of the 
rest of the city, Creamer fixates on her “authentic musical experience” at the Hoy Como 
Ayer lounge, and her perfect Cuban medianoche sandwich. The piece reflects a strange 
historical amnesia about Miami’s long relationship with Cuba and the Caribbean that 
began before 1959, and a blissful ignorance of the role that Cubans themselves and the 
local government have in fostering exactly the sort of “no passport required” travel 
experience she praises.  
But as this project has shown, the city is far more than a resort town and has 
grown into not only the most economically and politically powerful city in Florida, but 
arguably the political and economic capital of the Caribbean and Latin America. Miami 
has much more to offer historians and political observers who are interested in what a 
Latino-majority American population might be. Perhaps it is comforting for travel writers 
to think Miami exists only for freshly rolled cigars and fried plantains, but what makes 
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Miami compelling is not that it is a poor man’s Havana, but that it is something entirely 
different. It is a truly minority dominated American city, where through years of activism 
and policymaking, Latinos created a globalized immigrant city that catered not only to 
tourists, but to immigrants, foreign investors, and multinational corporations. For better 
or worse, Miami was one of the first major American cities to bind its fate completely to 
the new global economy.  
As the voting public and political future in the United States becomes increasingly 
Latino, the experiences of Cubans in Miami can offer valuable lessons on the role federal 
and municipal governments and agencies can have in empowering their minority 
constituents. During the mid 1960s, Cubans in Miami rejected traditional notions of 
assimilation in favor of a version of American citizenship that allowed them to embrace 
both their Cuban heritage and American civic life. They were enabled by the Cuban 
Adjustment Act and in Miami, by a local government that saw a bilingual and bicultural 
population as an asset to the tourist trade and to foreign investment in the local economy. 
Cubans are labeled a “model minority” for their unusually high socioeconomic status and 
education levels compared to other Latinos and to African Americans, but the model 
minority tag obscures the extent to which government aid and progressive municipal 
employment and education programs enabled Cubans in Miami to become “taxpayers 
and homeowners” and to participate in a local economy that ultimately viewed them as 
valuable workers, rather than undesirable migrants.    
Partisan politics in Miami also reveal a great deal about what a Latino majority 
electorate could look like in the next fifty years. For a brief moment in 2015, it seemed as 
if a son of Miami would inherit the Earth, or perhaps just the Republican presidential 
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nomination. U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, former West Miami City Commissioner and 
protégé of Governor Jeb Bush, established his campaign headquarters on Capitol Hill and 
hit the campaign trail. Rubio, although the product of many of the traditional Latino 
political networks in Miami, surged into office on the wave of the Tea Party, and perhaps 
hoped to recapture that energy with a presidential run after only one term in the Senate. 
However, as his presidential campaign imploded in the face of Donald Trump’s 
unexpected popularity and nativist political platform, Florida lobbyists and fundraisers 
have been left to wonder what will become of their party in the state. Rubio, whose 
presidential platform originally emphasized his immigrant story and conservative values, 
has doubled down on the xenophobia en vogue in the Republican Party and is using his 
lame duck term to pass a bill  dismantling the CAA and ending refugee benefits for 
Cuban immigrants, whom he claims “steal $700 million a year from taxpayers.”  
In light of normalized diplomatic relations and possible regime change in Cuba, 
reconsideration of the Cuban Adjustment Act and refugee status for Cubans will likely 
happen in the very near future. What is certain is that employing the nativist rhetoric that 
once drove Cubans to register to vote and demand the right to be heard from their 
legislators, will do little to endear Rubio and other Republican candidates to the growing 
number of Latino voters in Florida and elsewhere. If anything, Democrats and 
Republicans alike in search of a solution to comprehensive immigration reform should 
look to the CAA and local immigration services programs in Miami as a model for 
fostering economic independence, political participation, and civic engagement in 
immigrant communities. 
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In his historic speech to the Cuban people given at the Gran Teatro de la Habana 
in April, U.S. President Barack Obama remarked, “In the United States we have a clear 
monument to what the Cuban people can build: its called Miami.” But as often is the 
case, truth is stranger than political pandering. In many respects, contemporary Miami is 
the multicultural and multilingual urban center that Cuban and other Latino politicians 
envisioned, but it is also a testament to the power of interethnic political alliance building 
and to the longevity of Miami’s “Pan-American” appeal to tourists and immigrants.  
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